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During April-May 2010, the eruption of Eyjafjallajo¨kull volcano in Iceland caused the
largest breakdown of civil aviation after World War II. Although the eruption was weak
in intensity, the dispersal of volcanic ash clouds over northern and central Europe re-
sulted in more than 100.000 flights canceled and caused over USD 1.7 billion economical
losses. This event and its unexpected effects raised many questions amongst the affected
communities and stakeholders. But were these impacts totally unexpected? What could
have been done to improve preparedness of aviation sector? The harmful effects of vol-
canic ash on aircraft’s components have long been recognized, and ash dispersal patterns
in the atmosphere can be forecasted thanks to sophisticated numerical models. However,
the Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption revealed a low preparedness of society to direct and indirect
impacts of volcanic eruptions and pointed out some flaws that must be improved for a
better air traffic management. The issues pointed out by the 2010 crisis are the starting
point of this PhD research, which aims at improving aviation management in case of
volcanic eruptions. This manuscript describes the novel contributions developed during
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proach to assess vulnerability of the air traffic network and its element. Contributions of
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
During April-May 2010 the eruption of Eyjafjallajo¨kull volcano in Iceland caused the
largest breakdown of civil aviation after World War II (Oxford Economics, 2010). Al-
though the eruption was weak in intensity, the dispersal of volcanic ash clouds over
northern and central Europe resulted in more than 100.000 flights canceled and caused
over USD 1.7 billion economical losses (IATA Economics, 2010). One year later, the
eruption of Cordo´n Caulle volcano in Chile caused large-scale disruption of air traffic
operations across the southern hemisphere, with hundreds of flight cancellations in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. But how can volcanic eruptions cause severe disruptions at
continental scales? Were these impacts totally unexpected? What could be done to
improve preparedness of aviation sector and reduce societal impacts of air traffic disrup-
tions?
The harmful effects of volcanic ash on aircraft’s fuselage, turbines and navigation in-
struments have long been recognized, especially after the famous British Airways Flight
9, impacted by Mt. Galunggung’s volcanic ash in 1982 (the “Djakarta incident”). Since
then, more than 100 aircraft encounters with ash clouds have been officially documented
(Guffanti et al., 2008). Given the threat posed by volcanic ash clouds on flight safety, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) established in 1994 the International
Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) program to provide international arrangements for the
monitoring of volcanic ash in the atmosphere and warnings to the aviation community.
Moreover, Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers (VAACs) were constituted in 1997 and are
1
Chapter 1. Introduction 2
Figure 1.1: Disaster management cycle constituted by 4 phases: response, recovery,
mitigation and preparedness.
officially designed by the IAVW for issuing volcanic ash warnings and forecasts. But the
procedures to be implemented in case of ash-contaminated airspace where never applied
before in dense air traffic network such as the European, and perception of volcanic risk
amongst many involved stakeholders remained low until the 2010 event. At the same
time, the continuous increasing demand of passenger’s air transportation makes air traf-
fic network management more challenging. All these factors contributed in increasing
the vulnerability of stakeholders involved in aviation management during volcanic erup-
tions, in particular in Europe. Thus, after the 2010 events, the attention of aviation
sector on risk management procedures in case of explosive volcanic eruptions increased
dramatically.
In general, risk analyses distinguish between two timescales: short-term emergency man-
agement and long-term planning, following a general scheme called “disaster manage-
ment cycle” (Vasilescu et al., 2008; Khan, 2008; Joyce et al., 2009). The fist phase of the
cycle is constituted by the immediate response, the implementation of emergency plans
and the societal recovery. The second part of the cycle consists in the definition of miti-
gation measures and the preparedness phase. The ultimate goal is to increase resilience
and reduce future impacts. Short-term timescale corresponds to the emergency phase,
when response strategies are implemented, while long-term refers to territorial planning
and other activities aimed at increasing preparedness. The general scheme (Fig. 1.1) is
maintained, with some modifications, in all branches of risk management, and amongst
them in volcanic risk management (De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling, 2008).
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In particular, volcanic risk management has been traditionally focused on the mitigation
and reduction of direct impacts on population (e.g. pyroclastic density currents, Zuccaro
et al., 2008), which are given a higher priority by governments and public stakeholders,
due to their strong social impact. However, indirect impacts of explosive eruptions,
for example due to the disruption of infrastructures (e.g. roads, communications) con-
tribute to a substantial portion of socio-economic impacts of volcanic events (Spence
et al., 2006). In the specific case of volcanic ash dispersal, the disruption of air traffic
is relevant from both points of view: the direct damage of aircraft’s components can
cause casualties to crew and passengers, and the disruption of air traffic operations can
impact a much wider area than the one directly affected by ash dispersal. Finally, the
indirect impacts can potentially affect the socio-economic system at global scale, due to
the strong interdependencies between air traffic services and commercial activities (e.g.
import/export).
At both short and long-term, Tephra 1 Transport and Dispersal Models (TTDMs; Folch,
2012), a type of atmospheric dispersion models, are the main instrument used to sup-
port decision-makers and provide relevant information on ash dispersal patterns in at-
mosphere. Their usage is often associated to meteorological models and to a network
of monitoring and alert sytems. On one hand, short-term (hours to days) emergency
management of volcanic crises are based on forecast maps. Before 2010, the delivered
forecast product was of qualitative nature and the criterion for airspace closure was based
on a “zero ash tolerance”, applied during the first days of the Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption.
Quantitative concentration thresholds where then adopted in Europe, being at present
(December 2014) still under discussion within the wide range of involved stakeholders.
Fig. 1.2 shows an example of volcanic ash dispersal forecasts issued by London VAAC
during the Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption (left) and quantitative ash concentration charts is-
sued by U.K. meteorological office during the 2011 Gr´ımsvo¨tn eruption. Before 2010,
operational TTDMs were used mainly on a qualitative basis, the adoption of quantitative
criteria found the institutions in charge of ash forecast unprepared, and the operational
set up of models had to be adapted on-the-fly. At present, although VAACs are not
1Tephra is the general term for the fragmented material ejected during an explosive volcanic eruption,
regardless of its size and composition. The term ash refers only the finest fraction of tephra, i.e. particles
smaller than 2 mm in diameter. In principle, TTDMs can be used to model the atmospheric transport
of ejected material from few cm to few µm in diameter. Models that focus only on the fine fraction (i.e.
ash and fine ash) are also known as Volcanic Ash Transport and Dispersal Models (VATDMs), but this
distinction is not relevant here.
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of volcanic ash charts during the 2010 crisis. The first ash fore-
casts were qualitative (left), with maps showing the contours delimiting the volcanic
ash cloud at three different flight levels. After the introduction of quantitative thresh-
olds (right) ash charts were issued separately for each flight level showing concentration
contours for three thresholds of 0.2 2 and 4 mg/m3.
officially required by ICAO to produce short-term quantitative maps of ash concentra-
tion, some of them (e.g. London and Tolouse VAACs) issue complementary quantitative
products. In addition, other institutions (e.g. research centers or volcano observatories)
run operational forecasts and issue both official and unofficial products, often used by
aviation stakeholders (VAST2012). On the other hand, the interest in long-term impacts
on civil aviation is increasing, as volcanic ash contamination is being included in Safety
Risk Assessment (SRA) procedures that allow operations in ash-contaminated airspace.
TTDMs can support these analysis by producing long-term probabilistic hazard maps
that give the probability for a critical ash concentration value to be exceeded at each
point of the computational domain. Until 2010, hazard maps existed only for tephra
fallout and not for airborne concentration, partly because the generation of quantita-
tive ash concentration maps requires numerical models with higher computational cost.
The 2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull crisis triggered a deep change in aviation procedures in case
of ash-contaminated airspace, in particular in Europe. This event revealed some flaws
that must be improved for a better crisis management, from both the point of view of
the scientific community (volcanologists, atmospheric modelers) and the aviation stake-
holders (aviation managers and operators). Since 2010, the scientific community has
been constantly improving TTDMs (Folch, 2012; Bonadonna et al., 2011a; Bonadonna
et al., 2013). The first IUGG-WMO (International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics
- World meteorological Organization) Ash Dispersal Forecast and Civil Aviation Work-
shop (Bonadonna et al., 2011b) gathered more than 50 scientists from 12 countries to
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compare different TTDMs and discuss the short-term scientific road-map. Since 2010,
aviation stakeholders have been applying new procedures in case of ash-contaminated
airspace such as SRA (ICAO, 2012a) and exercises for improving emergency manage-
ment (Bolic´ and Sivcˇev, 2012). All these meetings and activities pointed out the key
aspects to be developed from both scientific and aviation point of view. In addition,
and from both sides, the 2010 crisis pointed out the low efficiency of information flow:
scientists and aviation stakeholders had to deal with an information overload that in-
creased the reaction times, and some of the volcanic ash alert procedures were found
to be redundant. Collaboration between aviation stakeholders and scientists has been
strongly enhanced in last years and led to an overall improvement of the coping capacity
during volcanic eruptions, but there is still a need for improving multidisciplinary col-
laborations and projects between scientific and aviation communities (Bonadonna et al.,
2013). Needs expressed by each stakeholder can be synthesized as follows:
For the scientific community (atmospheric transport modelers, volcanologists):
• Improve some aspects of TTDMs physics
• Improve of TTDM modeling strategies
• Improve the definition of the Eruption Source Parameters (ESPs) for TTDMs
• Enhancement of monitoring techniques at both short and long-term
• Quantify uncertainties associated with the forecasting process
• Produce forecasts and hazard maps focused on civil aviation needs
For aviation stakeholders (VAACs, airport authorities, airlines), risk managers, decision
makers and territorial planners:
• Speed up procedures
• Avoid information overload
• Improve information exchange
• Quantification of the vulnerability of the air traffic system to volcanic eruptions
• Estimate expected impacts on air traffic system
• Improve emergency management and define mitigation strategies
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• Produce and apply SRAs in case of ash-contaminated airspace
• Produce long-term risk management plans for volcanic risk to aviation
• Reduce socio-economic impacts at both short and long-term
This research aims at addressing part of these needs, in particular those related to the
creation of an integrated risk management strategy between the stakeholders.
1.2 Objectives of the Thesis
The research activity is supported by the Spanish national research project ATMOST
(Atmospheric Transport Models and Massive Parallelism, CGL2009-10244). The project
is focused on modeling dispersal of volcanic ash at regional scale and pollutants at an
urban microscale. This thesis develops one of the topics of the project (i.e. ash dispersal
modeling in atmosphere), focusing on civil aviation needs. The main objective is to
support air traffic management during explosive volcanic eruptions.
Impacts of volcanic ash dispersal on aviation do not only depend on expected hazardous
conditions (i.e. presence and concentration of volcanic ash), but rely also on the vul-
nerability of the exposed targets (i.e., the air traffic network and its elements). Thus,
given that risk management builds on hazard, vulnerability and impact assessment, the
research field was enlarged in order to include these three main concepts.
Although the strong multidisciplinary character of this topic, analyses are usually per-
formed separately by different groups of stakeholders (i.e., volcanological community and
aviation managers, respectively). In addition, different stakeholders make use of very
different tools, often adapted from a much more general purpose, and very few tools
developed for air traffic management in cases of ash-contaminated airspace are currently
available. Finally, this work follows the timescale distinction traditionally applied in risk
Table 1.1: Main objectives of the PhD thesis
SHORT-TERM LONG-TERM
Hazard Ash dispersal forecast Hazard assessment
Vulnerability/Impact Response/mitigation planning/preparedness
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management, and analyses two timescales: long-term, intended as the scale at which ter-
ritorial planning is implemented and focused on preparedness, and short-term, mainly
focused on emergency and response (Fig. 1.1). The research presented here follows this
distinction and contributes to existing strategies for TTDM and vulnerability/impact
assessment at long and short-term timescales (Table 1.1).
The aims of the research are:
• Improve some aspects of short and long-term volcanic ash dispersal modeling
strategies (aimed at producing, respectively, forecasts and hazard maps)
• Propose a novel approach to assess vulnerability and impacts on air traffic
network its elements
• Develop a map-based tool to estimate impacts of volcanic ash dispersal on air
traffic system and support air traffic management during volcanic crises. In par-
ticular, the intention is to use Geographical Information Systems (GIS) at its full
potential, to enhance the current vulnerability impact assessment methodologies
A seconday objective is to contribute to the improvement of communication between
stakeholders, a critical issue underlined during and after the 2010 aviation crisis (Bonadonna
et al., 2011a; Bolic´ and Sivcˇev, 2012; Bonadonna et al., 2013).
1.3 Structure of this document
This document resumes the work done during the 4-years research activity. It is con-
stituted by a compendium of publications (Appendix A). The text covers the relevant
topics of the research and complements the information providing a general background,
that allows appreciating the research work as a whole. Also, specific information on the
methodology and results of complementary analyses are added when not fully described
in the papers. The document is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents the state-of-the-art for each main topic considered during the
PhD study. The review poses the basis for the definition of specific objectives,
focused at filling current gaps in knowledge and methodologies.
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• Chapter 3 describes novel contributions and the methodologies proposed, that
have been applied to case-studies (Concepcio´n volcano, Nicaragua; Popocate´petl
volcano, Mexico; Vesuvius volcano, Italy; 4 Icelandic volcanoes, Iceland)).
• Chapter 4 presents the main findings of this research and discusses results
• Chapter 5 discusses implications from a wider point of view, identifying opportu-
nities for future work.
The methodologies introduced in this research and the results of their application have
been published in a collection of journal papers (attached to this document), some of
them included in the compendium of publications.
1.4 List of publications for the compendium
• Paper I: Scaini, C., Folch, A., Navarro, M.. “Tephra hazard assessment at
Concepcio´n volcano, Nicaragua”, Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research
(IF 2.515, 5-years IF 2.664), vol. 219-220, pp. 41-51, 2012.
• Paper II: Bonasia, R., Scaini, C., Capra, L., Nathenson, M., Aran˜a Salinas, L.,
Siebe, C., Folch, A.. “Long-range hazard assessment of volcanic ash dispersal for a
Plinian eruptive scenario at Popocate´petl volcano (Mexico): implications for civil
aviation safety”, Bulletin of Volcanology (IF 2.667), 76, 789, 2013.
• Paper III: Scaini, C., Biass, S., Galderisi, A., Bonadonna, C., Folch, A., Smith,
K. and Ho¨skuldsson, A.. “A multi-scale risk assessment for tephra fallout and
airborne concentration from multiple Icelandic volcanoes - Part II: vulnerability
and impact”, Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. (IF 1.826, 5-years IF 2.075), 14,
2289–2312, 2014, www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/14/2289/2014/doi:10.5194/nhess-
14-2289-2014
• Paper IV: Scaini, C., Folch, A., Bolic´, T., Castelli, L.. “A GIS-based tool to
support air traffic management during explosive volcanic eruptions”, Transporta-
tion Research Part C: Emerging Technologies (IF 2.820, 5-years IF 3.118), pp.
19-31, 10.1016/j.trc.2014.09.020.
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Other publications have been produced during the PhD and are not included in the
compendium. These works are referenced in the text and the accepted publications are
included in Appendix B. In particular, the work presented in Paper III is based on a
companion paper that contains relevant information for the understanding of the second
part. Given the relevant contribution given to this work, and that the paper is published
with open access, the full text is attached in Appendix B.
• Sulpizio et al,. 2012: Sulpizio, R., Folch, A., Costa, A., Scaini, C., Dellino,
P. “Hazard assessment of far-range volcanic ash dispersal from a violent Strom-
bolian eruption at Somma-Vesuvius volcano, Naples, Italy: implications on civil
aviation.” Bulletin of Volcanology (IF 2.667), DOI 10.1007/s00445-012-0656-3,
2012.
• Scaini et al., 2012: Scaini, C., A. Folch, “The role of GIS in multi-scale im-
pact assessment of explosive volcanic eruptions: case-study of Concepcio´n volcano,
Nicaragua.”, proceedings of the 21st GIS Research UK (GISRUK) conference,
School of Environmental Sciences, University of Liverpool, 3-5 April 2012. Paper
awarded with the “best Early Career Research” Award.
• Scaini et al., 2013: Scaini, C., T. Bolic´, L. Castelli, A. Folch. “GIS-based tool
for the estimation of impacts of volcanic ash dispersal on European air traffic”,
Schaefer, Dirk (Editor), Proceedings of the 3rd SESAR Innovation Days (2013)
EUROCONTROL. ISBN ISBN 978-2-87497-074-0.
• Biass et al., 2014: Biass, S., Scaini, C., Bonadonna, C., Folch, A., Smith, K.,
Ho¨skuldsson, A.. “A multi-scale risk assessment for tephra fallout and airborne
concentration from multiple Icelandic volcanoes - Part I: Hazard assessment”,
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. (IF 1.826, 5-years IF 2.075), 14, 2265–2287,
2014. www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/14/2265/2014/ doi:10.5194/nhess-14-
2265-2014.
• Scaini et al., submitted: Scaini, C., T. Bolic´, A. Folch, L. Castelli, “Civil
aviation management during explosive volcanic eruptions: a survey on the stake-
holders’ perspective”, Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research (IF 2.515,
5-years IF 2.664), submitted.

Chapter 2
State-of-the-art and specific
objectives
2.1 Tephra hazard modeling strategies
This section overviews the state-of-the art of existing tephra hazard modeling strategies
at both short and long-term, and identifies cutting-edge developments and open issues.
Specific objectives of this research are defined based on this overview, and address some
aspects to be improved in current tephra hazard modeling.
2.1.1 State-of-the-art of tephra hazard modeling strategies
2.1.1.1 Tephra Transport and Dispersal Models
Tephra Transport and Dispersal Models (TTDMs) are Atmospheric Transport Models
(ATMs) used to simulate tephra dispersal in atmosphere. TTDMs are often referred
as Volcanic Ash Transport and Dispersal Models (VATDMs), which are actually a sub-
group of TTDMs especially adapted to model volcanic ash.
TTDMs can be classified as Eulerian or Lagrangian models. The main difference is
that Eulerian models use a fixed three-dimensional grid (typically Cartesian), whereas
Lagrangian models calculate the trajectories of “particles” within the computational do-
main. Hybrid Eulerian-Lagrangian approaches are also possible. Eulerian models can be
classified depending on how the mass transport or Advection-Diffusion-Sedimentation
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(ADS) equation is solved. Gaussian models (also called “Semi-analytical”) consider
a simplified ADS equation (Costa et al., 2006) and obtain an analytical solution un-
der strong assumptions (homogeneous and steady wind field, Macedonio et al., 2005).
Examples of such models are TEPHRA2 (Bonadonna et al., 2005) and HAZMAP (Mace-
donio et al., 2005). Gaussian models calculate the total mass deposited at ground and,
because admit analytical solutions, require lower computational resources (Folch and
Sulpizio, 2010). However, the calculation of ash concentration (Folch, 2012) requires a
fully numerical approach in order to solve the complete ADS equation. An example of
fully numerical model is FALL3D (Costa et al., 2006; Folch et al., 2009), an Eulerian
TTDM developed at the Italian Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (INGV)
and the Barcelona Supercomputing Center (BSC). A detailed review of TTDM models
has been performed by Folch (2012), and its main characteristics are summarized in the
Consensual document from the 1st Ash Dispersal Forecast and Civil Aviation Work-
shop (Bonadonna et al., 2011a). Folch (2012) underlines the range of application and
the characteristics of existing models presenting a comparative table (Table 2.1).
TTDMs differ in many aspects, and in particular in the definition and/or modeling of the
source term, that is, the eruptive column and its characteristics (“source term”, bottom
line of Table 2.1). The vertical distribution of mass along the eruptive column can be
modeled as uniform, linear or parametric (Suzuki, 1983), or applying 1D Buoyant Plume
Theory models (BPT, Bursik, 2001) that account for column-wind interaction. There
are also more complex source models, which take into account wind interaction and the
3D structure of the plume (Neri et al., 2007; Suzuki and Koyaguchi, 2013) but have a
higher computational cost. The modeling of weak plumes and wind-plume interaction is
still an open issue (Folch, 2012) and the interaction of wind with eruptive column is an
important factor in assessing potential impact of a given scenario on air traffic (Bursik
et al., 2009). Inputs of TTDM are commonly divided in two groups: meteorological and
volcanological inputs.
• Meteorological inputs. Meteorological data are the driver for running the TTDM.
They can be stored in many different formats and contain simple vertical wind
profiles (for Gaussian TTDMs) or 4D gridded variables (for numeric TTDMs).
• Volcanological inputs of a TTDM are the Eruption Source Parameters (ESP) that
include column height, eruption duration, erupted mass and characteristics of the
ejected material. An overview of the techniques used for the determination of ESPs
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Table 2.1: Comparison of existing TTDMs (from IUGG-WMO, 2013b. Colored/white
cells indicate that the option is available/not available for the TTDM.
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has been performed by Folch (2012). The Data Acquisition Document produced
during the 2nd IUGG-WMO Ash Dispersal Forecast and Civil Aviation Work-
shop (IUGG-WMO, 2013a) synthesizes the main detection and retrieval techniques
adopted for the characterization of ESPs.
Some parameters such as column height and exit velocity can be inferred by radar
measurements (Gouhier and Donnadieu, 2008), infrasounds and thermal imagery
(Ripepe et al., 2013). For past events, most eruptive parameters including Mass
Eruption Rate (MER) are estimated a posteriori from the analysis of deposits
(Carey and Sparks, 1986; Bonadonna et al., 2005) and using empirical and semi-
empirical relationships (Sparks et al., 1997; Mastin et al., 2009; Woodhouse et al.,
2013) or analytical expressions (Degruyter and Bonadonna, 2012).
Total Grain Size Distribution (TGSD) of ejected ash strongly influences the mod-
eling results (Bonadonna et al., 2011c). Field studies allow reconstructing the
TGSD from the analysis of deposits (e.g. Bonadonna and Houghton, 2005). How-
ever, these methods rely on the availability of complete geological records and may
lead to underestimation of fine ash fraction. Recent developments are focused on
quasi-real-time characterization of tephra grain size and characteristics during a
volcanic event using satellite (Dean et al., 2002; Gangale et al., 2010; Kerminen
et al., 2011) and ground-based measurements (Andronico et al., 2009; Marzano,
2011; Marzano et al., 2011). Finally, a critical point for the definition of the
TGSD is the estimation of the percentage of aggregating particles (Costa et al.,
2010), sometimes observable in the field (Bonadonna et al., 2002; Bonadonna et al.,
2011a).
2.1.1.2 Tephra hazard modeling strategies
TTDMs are nowadays used by a wide range of institutions at National and International
level, including research centers and private parties. These institutions run TTDMs
under different configurations and employ a wide range of modeling strategies and op-
erational configurations, depending on the requirements that are expected to fulfill.
Numerical TTDMs calculate ash concentration and can simulate far-range ash dispersal
but require higher computational resources (Folch and Sulpizio, 2010). The choice of the
modeling strategy is not straightforward and strongly conditions the modeling results.
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The main factors that contribute to the definition of modeling strategies are:
• definition of TTDM inputs
• TTDM timescale
Definition of TTDM inputs. The famous sentence “garbage in, garbage out”,
emphasizes the importance of a correct definition of modeling inputs. The choice of input
parameters is in fact extremely relevant for the reliability of modeling results. Tephra
hazard modeling strategies rely on the definition of an eruptive scenario, constituted by
a set of meteorological and volcanological input parameters.
• Meteorological inputs. The type of meteorological data depends on the spatial
resolution at which tephra dispersal is simulated, which in its turn depends on the
specific purposes of the modeling. In fact, it is desirable that the meteorological
data and the TTDM have a similar spatial resolution (Folch, 2012). If the aim
is to model ash dispersal at a global scale, it is necessary to use a global Numer-
ical Weather Prediction Model (NWPM), with resolutions ranging from 0.5◦ to
2.5◦. For the long-term hazard assessment, is quite common to use global Reanal-
ysis datasets such as the NCEP-NCAR Global Reanalysis dataset (Kalnay et al.,
1996) or the European Center for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF)
Era-Interim dataset. However, if the simulation is performed at local scale, it is
necessary to run a mesoscale NWPM reaching higher resolutions (up to few km).
The ideal strategy for interfacing meteorological and TTDM models is an on-line
coupling, which allows running both contemporaneously. However, for different
reasons, most TTDM use an off-line approach, in which the output of the me-
teorological model is used as an input for the TTDM (Folch, 2012). One of the
most widely used mesoscale model is the Weather Research and Forecasting model
(WRF), available in two different versions: WRF-NMM (Janjic et al., 2001) and
WRF-ARW (Michalakes et al., 2001). Examples of coupling between the WRF
meteorological model and the FALL3D model can be found in Folch et al. (2008)
and Parra and Folch (2012).
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• Volcanological inputs. The characterization of Eruption Source Parameters (ESPs)
is a complex multi-disciplinary process based on geological studies, physical vol-
canology, and observations (Mastin et al., 2009). Column height, MER and erup-
tion duration can be introduced as a constant value into the models, or vary
according to the different measurements available. If there is no information avail-
able on the TGSD, a common method is to assume a Lognormal or bi-Lognormal
distribution of the particle size (Bonadonna et al., 2005). In addition, the fraction
of fine ash can be accounted in percentage. Finally, all TTDMs simplify the aggre-
gation phenomena by changing in the initial TGSD assuming a certain aggregation
percentage a priori. However, all these choices increase the uncertainty associated
with modeling results, which may be partially accounted by using statistical dis-
tribution of eruptive parameters (Bonadonna et al., 2005).
TTDM timescale. Following a general distinction presented in Chapter 1, Tephra
hazard modeling strategies can be classified in two different timescales (i.e. short and
long-term), which correspond to two phases of risk management: response/mitigation
and planning/preparedness. This distinction has been defined during the years by the
modeling community (atmospheric scientists and physical volcanologists), but other
communities involved in aviation management may associate timescales with different
temporal ranges. Tephra hazard modeling strategies are conditioned by the tempo-
ral requirements of end-users, which may want to use modeling outcomes at different
timescales (from few hours to many decades) depending on the purpose of the analysis.
• Short-term. Short-term modeling aims at forecasting the dispersal of tephra dur-
ing the next few days. This is typically done by Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers,
which run different TTDMs in operational mode during volcanic crises. Usually,
eruptive scenarios are defined prior to the eruption in order to initialize the TTDM,
and then modified when new data are available (i.e. data assimilation). In case
of eruption, VAACs issue official ash dispersal forecasts every 6 hours, containing
information for the following 18-24 hours, although the tendency is to increase
forecast frequency (IVATF, 2011). For example, the Anchorage VAAC (Alaska)
has implemented an operational forecast based on the PUFF model (Searcy et al.,
1998) and monitoring (i.e. satellite remote sensing), that allows automated pro-
duction of ash dispersal forecasts (Webley and Mastin, 2009). Other institutions,
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e.g. Volcano Observatories or National Research Centers, may also run their own
operational forecast. This is the case of the Volcanological Observatory of Catania
of the Italian Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (INGV), which pro-
vides an ensemble forecast (i.e. merging results of different TTDM outputs) on
a 3-hour basis (Scollo et al., 2009). But operational strategies such as the ones
mentioned here have still a very low diffusion, partially due to the need for a wide
range of volcanological data at quasi-real-time (often provided by monitoring net-
works). In addition, the demand for timely forecasts substantially increases the
computational requirements. Finally, there is strong criticism on the short-term
reliability of modeling outputs, that may be enhanced by the systematic adop-
tion of techniques such as data assimilation and ensemble forecasting (Bonadonna
et al., 2011a; Folch, 2012).
• Long-term. Long-term modeling aims at producing probabilistic hazard maps by
merging hundreds/thousands of runs under different volcanological and meteoro-
logical conditions. Until recently, hazard maps were produced only for tephra ac-
cumulation at ground using simplified semi-analytical TTDMs (Bonadonna et al.,
2005; Macedonio et al., 2008; Costa et al., 2009). The first probabilistic tephra
dispersal hazard assessment computed with fully numerical models was developed
by Papp et al. (Papp et al., 2005) for more than 20 active volcanoes in the North-
ern Pacific region, and results were merged according to the relative probability
of occurrence of the considered events. First maps for airborne concentration for
specific volcanoes have been produced by Folch and Sulpizio (2010) and Leadbet-
ter and Hort (2011). However, probabilistic tephra dispersal hazard maps based
on numerical simulations are still poorly diffused due to their high computational
cost (Folch and Sulpizio, 2010).
The choice of input parameters to be used for initializing TTDM for hazard assess-
ment purposes presents specific issues. Probabilistic hazard assessment is in fact
based on the choice of representative meteorological conditions for the study area.
The long-term wind field characterization is extremely important for the long-term
hazard assessment, as underlined in Davies et al. (2010). While semi-analytical
models use vertical profiles at given points, numerical TTDM use meteorological
datasets produced by meteorological models, increasing both need for storage disk
space and computational cost, especially for local scale analyses when meso-scalar
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models are required to be run. Given that TTDMs rely on meteorological datasets
and are often run at regional/global scales, the definition of such conditions based
on vertical profiles, proposed by Macedonio et al. (2008) and Costa et al. (2009)
for tephra fallout hazard assessment, could not guarantee the representativity at
the scale of the simulation. Moreover, given that probabilistic hazard assessment
require running thousands of simulations based on a set of input conditions, it is
necessary to constrain the meteorological dataset, in order to reduce the number
of simulations but ensure the representativity of the input conditions used.
The first example of hazard assessment for airborne ash concentration is presented
by Papp et al. (Papp et al., 2005) who used a 7-years database of gridded mete-
orological data for initializing the TTDM. Folch and Sulpizio (2010) selected on
a representative year, for which the meso-scalar model WRF (Michalakes et al.,
2001) was run and coupled off-line with the FALL3D TTDM (Costa et al., 2006;
Folch et al., 2009). The adoption of the representative year allowed a reduction of
the time period for the meteorological simulations, and the representativity of the
selected year was checked a posteriori against long-term daily means. Finally, the
other example of tephra dispersal hazard assessment was published by Leadbetter
and Hort (2011), based on U.K. MET Office meteorological data. The authors
modeled a eruption every 3 hours for a 5-years period, running more than 17.000
numerical simulations. Nowadays there is still no common methodology for defin-
ing representative meteorological conditions on which to build probabilistic tephra
dispersal hazard maps.
This overview points out that tephra hazard modeling strategies depend on many factors,
and in particular on the availability of input data from field and observations. The
timescale at which the outcomes will be used is also an important factor, and depends
on the specific end-user requirements (in this case, aviation purposes). Finally, it is worth
noticing that modeling strategies are also subjected to changes due to new regulations
and new scientific and technological findings.
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2.1.2 Open issues and specific objectives
The volcanic eruptions of Eyjafjallajo¨kull (Iceland, 2010) and Cordo´n-Caulle (Chile,
2011) underlined the need to improve tephra dispersal modeling strategies used to fore-
cast volcanic ash concentration at short term, in order to increase response capabilities
and improve emergency management. In addition, and due to the increased risk per-
ception towards such events, a higher attention has been posed on long-term hazard
assessment, that allow increasing preparedness and reduce expected losses. After 2010,
the scientific community together with involved stakeholders identified key issues to
be addressed and solved in the near future. An overview of key issues and cutting-
edge methodologies can be found in the conclusions of the Consensual Document from
the 1st Ash Dispersal Forecast and Civil Aviation Workshop, held in Geneva in 2010
(Bonadonna et al., 2011a). The main critical aspects for the development of TTDMs
and related tephra hazard modeling strategies are:
• Definition of representative meteorological conditions. Long-term hazard assess-
ment builds on merging many simulations under different meteorological condi-
tions statistically representative of the long-term conditions. Typically, hundreds
to thousands of simulations must be considered with wind conditions sampled
from a meteorological dataset (Bonadonna, 2006). This strategy, feasible for semi-
analytical models, increases the computational cost of producing tephra dispersal
hazard assessment. In particular, in case of local-scale simulations, due to the
high computational cost of running NWPM and TTDM models, it is crucial to
limit the number of simulations circumventing their computational cost. When
this research activity started, there was not a common strategy for the production
of probabilistic 3D tephra dispersal hazard maps at local scale, and only few ex-
amples of at regional scale (Papp et al., 2005; Folch and Sulpizio, 2010; Leadbetter
and Hort, 2011).
• Definition of eruptive scenario. Definition of the eruptive scenario must be im-
proved. In particular, the scenario should take into account the uncertainties
associated to ESPs. Costa et al. (2013) proposed the use of Probability Density
Functions (PDF) for the definition of ESPs. There are several example of applica-
tion of PDF to produce a probabilistic hazard assessment of tephra accumulation
at ground (Connor et al., 2001; Bonadonna et al., 2005). However, at the beginning
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of this research, there were no examples of probabilistic tephra dispersal hazard
assessment based on fully-numerical modelling that used PDF for the definition of
ESPs.
• Focus on aviation needs. Recent developments show that there is a growing atten-
tion on TTDMs strategies and a general need for adapting these strategies to the
specific aims of aviation stakeholders. In particular, aviation stakeholders require
to decrease the time interval at which the ash dispersal forecast is issued, and at the
same time there is a strong criticism on uncertainties related to TTDM outputs.
An increasing number of institutions and scientific groups are making a strong ef-
fort towards the improvement of the existing modeling strategies. However, this is
still an ongoing process due to the recent changes in regulation and the differences
in response strategies and procedures, defined by each specific stakeholder.
• Implementation of cutting-edge modeling techniques at operational level (in partic-
ular, data assimilation and ensemble forecasting). Data assimilation is the process
of updating model input parameters with data coming from real or near real-time
observations. Ensemble forecasting is the process of combining different modeling
results, and can be performed combining several forecasts initialized with differ-
ent ESPs, or combining results from independent simulations, obtained running
different models (with the same ESPs). Galmarini et al. (2004) showed that en-
semble techniques correctly performed can introduce a substantial improvement of
modeling results.
• Communication. Outcomes of the 1st Ash Dispersal Forecast and Civil Aviation
Workshop (Bonadonna et al., 2011a) underlined the need for improving communi-
cation between different actors involved in aviation management during explosive
volcanic eruptions. In particular, communication of uncertainties was recognized
to be a critical issue. The adoption of a probabilistic framework was suggested
in order to account for the uncertainty associated to the TTDM outputs. An-
other critical aspect is the graphical output of the official VAACs forecasts, ques-
tioned during the 2012 IVATF meeting (IVATF, 2012). Recently, VAACs started
to produce new types of volcanic ash forecasts to accomplish these community
requirements (ICAO, 2012b; IAVWOPSG, 2014). Other institutions, like EURO-
CONTROL, are developing new tools to visualize ash dispersal forecasts in case
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of volcanic ash contaminated airspace (Bolic´ and Sivcˇev, 2012). TTDM graphical
output is likely to be improved in the future.
The open issues identified by the community put the basis for the definition of specific
objectives of this research, presented in Table 2.2. The aim of this research is to improve
modeling strategies with the specific aim of supporting civil aviation management at for
both long (hazard and vulnerability assessment) and short (aviation crises during an
eruption) term.
Regarding long-term, two major issues during the computation of probabilistic hazard
maps are the choice of the meteorological dataset and the definition of the ESPs. One
objective of this research is to contribute to tephra hazard modeling strategies by defin-
ing representative meteorological dataset and producing probabilistic tephra dispersal
hazard maps. In addition, this research intends to establish a methodology to perform
probabilistic tephra dispersal hazard assessment accounting for the variability of ESPs.
Current short-term TTDM strategies do not automatically provide civil aviation au-
thorities with a volcanic ash forecast in a easy-to-use format (IVATF, 2012). A better
post-processing and visualization of data, focused on aviation needs, would improve the
information flow between scientific community and decision makers (Fox and Hendler,
2011). This research aims at enhancing the post-processing of TTDM outputs in or-
der to be visualized by involved stakeholders. This would also support the subsequent
impact assessment tool in a timely manner.
Table 2.2: Specific objectives regarding ash dispersal modeling strategies analysis
TIMESCALE OPEN ISSUES SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
Representative meteorological con-
ditions
Methodology for identifying repre-
sentative meteorological conditions
Long-term Definition of expected scenarios and
ESPs
Methodology for defining eruptive
scenarios and ESPs
No modeling strategies for aviation
needs at reasonable computational
cost
Methodology for producing hazard
assessment for aviation
Short-term Few specific forecast products for
aviation stakeholders
Effective post-processing of mod-
eling results, focused on aviation
needs
Cutting-edge modeling techniques Account for recent development for
aviation purposes
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2.2 Vulnerability and impact assessment
This section reviews the state-of-the-art of vulnerability and impact assessment. Having
defined the concept of vulnerability and other concepts related to it (resilience, impact),
examples of vulnerability and impact assessment of volcanic ash dispersal on aviation
are reviewed. This section also describes existing impact assessment tools for air traffic
management during explosive eruptions. Given the novel character of this research, few
works exist on this issue. Thus, the revision of the state-of-the-art includes studies on
related topics, that provide useful insights and support this research. In addition, this
section describes cutting-edge techniques currently being introduced and adopted by
stakeholders involved in this field, pointing out the main open issues. Finally, based on
this review, specific objectives are defined in order to improve current vulnerability and
impact assessment methodologies and define new tools for managing air traffic during
explosive volcanic eruptions.
2.2.1 State-of-the-art of vulnerability and impact assessment
Generally speaking and within the frame of natural hazards, vulnerability is the predis-
position of the exposed elements to be affected, damaged or destroyed by a hazardous
event. A theoretical overview and a collection of vulnerability definitions can be found
in Cutter (1996), while an overview of assessments performed in different contexts can
be found in the book of Menoni and Margottini (2011). The vulnerability of an element
is defined in relation to a certain external solicitation, so that an element is vulnerable in
different ways to different hazardous phenomena (Minciardi et al., 2006). Vulnerability
should be therefore evaluated separately for each hazard (multi-hazard approach) and
results synthesized in a global vulnerability assessment.
Although vulnerability is an intrinsic property of the exposed element, it is difficult to
consider vulnerability without mentioning the impacts. In fact, empirical data collected
in active volcanic areas are useful to characterize the vulnerability of the exposed assets.
Moreover, localized damages can trigger cascading effects that influence the vulnerability
at different temporal and spatial scales. Thus, the characterization of impacts on dif-
ferent elements often allows inferring the underlying vulnerability. Finally, vulnerability
is related to the concept of resilience, defined as the capability of a physical element or
an entire society to cope with hazardous phenomena and its consequences (Menoni and
Chapter 2. State-of-the-art and specific objectives 23
Margottini, 2011) and to develop response strategies to reduce impacts.
The concept of vulnerability has two aspects: physical and systemic. Physical vulner-
ability is based on the physical interaction between the hazardous event and the single
element, while systemic vulnerability takes into account the effect of a physical failure
on a complex system and its interactions (Menoni and Margottini, 2011). Both physical
and systemic vulnerability can be reduced by mitigation measures, and assessed using
specific tools.
• Physical vulnerability: The aim of a physical vulnerability assessment is to
define the specific vulnerability of each element of a system, for each hazard un-
der consideration. Vulnerability assessment is usually based on indicators, defined
according to the characteristics of the elements that increase/decrease their vul-
nerability. In some cases, physical vulnerability can be characterized by fragility
functions, which allow quantifying the vulnerability of elements with increasing
hazard levels. But fragility curves are not available for most natural hazards, with
the exception of seismic hazard. A common methodology in absence of fragility
curves is to assume a constant vulnerability value for exposed elements with given
characteristics (Douglas, 2007). Traditionally, vulnerability studies for volcanic
hazards have focused only on the physical dimension of vulnerability. First phys-
ical vulnerability studies were developed for pyroclastic density currents, due to
their high impact on human lives (Spence et al., 2005b; Zuccaro et al., 2008).
Physical vulnerability studies have also been performed for tephra fallout, due to
its wide range of impacts on most human activities and assets, including buildings
(Pomonis et al., 1999; Spence et al., 2005a; Zuccaro et al., 2013), infrastructural
systems and productive activities (Stewart et al., 2006; Stewart et al., 2009; Wil-
son et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2011; Wardman et al., 2012).
The few existing examples of physical vulnerability studies for air traffic network
are focused on two physical elements: airports and aircraft. Airports hundreds of
km away from a volcano can potentially be disrupted by a weak tephra fallout,
as few millimeters of ash deposited at ground impede normal airport operations
(Casadevall, 1993; Guffanti et al., 2008). Cleaning operations are often difficult
and time-consuming, especially under adverse meteorological conditions (Casade-
vall, 1993; ICAO, 2007). Finally, the remobilization of tephra at ground can
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disrupt aviation operations, especially in dry and windy areas such as some re-
gions of Argentina (Casadevall, 1993). However, the most hazardous phenomenon
to civil aviation is tephra dispersal: airborne ash can disrupt flying operations at
regional scale for days to weeks, as occurred during 2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption
in Europe. The main impact for an aircraft flying through high concentrations of
volcanic ash is due to the ash melting in the engines, which can lead to engine
stall (Casadevall, 1994). A description of past encounters and their consequences
on engines can be found in Casadevall (1993) and Casadevall (1994). Bursik et al.
(2009) underline that jet aircraft tend to fly at the jetstream level, increasing the
probability of encountering ash particles due to the prevailing ash dispersal at such
level. In addition, volcanic ash can also cause long-term damages to aircraft. The
abrasive effect of volcanic ash particles can affect the turbine surface and/or cause
significant damage to the exposed surface of the aircraft fuselage. These impacts
do not affect the normal operation, but result in long-term damages, and life cycle
of an affected engine can be considerably reduced. This phenomenon, although
not producing serious consequences for human lives, can cause economical losses
to private companies due to the high cost of maintenance operations.
During the 2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption, a high attention was put on the defini-
tion of physical impacts of ash on aircraft. Until 2010 the air traffic operations were
prohibited in presence of any detected volcanic ash, based on the so-called “zero
tolerance” criterion (ICAO, 2007). However, during the 2010 crisis, the closure
of a substantial part of European airspace caused many objections within airlines
and general public. The European Commission gave the mandate of solving the
crisis to EUROCONTROL, that proposed to allow flight operations in areas con-
taminated by the lower levels of ash concentration (Bolic´ and Sivcˇev (2011)). The
UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) produced the first official quantitative ash
charts, based on the values of 4 and 2 mg/m3 were initially introduced to identify
the areas of high and medium contamination, corresponding to no-fly zones and
restricted fly-zones respectively (Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), 2010; IVATF,
2010a). However, the value of 2 mg/m3 was finally established as quantitative
threshold (IVATF, 2010b; ICAO, 2010) for the European airspace. Avoidance
based on visible/discernible criterion has been proposed, but unfortunately there
is still no agreement on the definition of “visible” and “discernible” ash (IVATF,
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2012; EASA, 2012). Finally, since 2012 EASA adopted the Safety Risk Assess-
ment (SRA) procedure, that allows operations in low-contamination airspace, if
performed in compliance with the safety regulation (EASA, 2012).
The introduction of quantitative thresholds represents an important step forward
in the definition of new strategies for crisis management, but there is still no uni-
versal agreement in their use. The introduction of quantitative thresholds poses
the basis for quantitative impact assessment that allows identifying expected im-
pacts on air traffic network components (airports, aircraft). However, the lack of
well-defined tolerance values for aircraft engines limits the development of strate-
gies to better manage the presence of volcanic ash in the aerial space (Bolic´ and
Sivcˇev, 2011). The evolution of the ash concentration thresholds after 2010 erup-
tion is synthesized in Table 2.3.
First ash concentration hazard maps were based on quantitative thresholds (e.g.
10-100 mg/m3, Folch and Sulpizio, 2010 and 10−14-10−15 mg/m3, Leadbetter and
Hort, 2011). According to Folch and Sulpizio (2010), ash concentration of 0.1
mg/m3 can impact aviation operations. However, the adopted thresholds differ
of many orders of magnitude. The first ash dispersal hazard assessment based on
official quantitative threshold introduced by U.K. CAA was developed within this
PhD (Paper I. Nowadays, experiments performed by manufacturers show that
their engines can operate under ash concentration of 2 mg/m3 (Haselbach, 2010;
Emmott, 2010; Monso, 2010; Clarkson, 2013), but there are only a few scientific
publications about this topic (e.g. Drexler et al., 2011), mainly because the infor-
mation is still confidential and the manufacturers are developing private research.
• Systemic vulnerability. The importance of the systemic aspect of vulnerability
Table 2.3: Evolution of thresholds after 2010 eruption.
YEAR THRESHOLD DOCUMENT
Before April 2010 “Zero tolerance” ICAO (1997)
April-May 2010 0.2 - 2 - 4 mg/m3 CAA (2010), EASA
(2010)
May 2010 0.2 - 2 mg/m3 IVATF-1 -
WP/21(2010)
July 2010 2 mg/m3 IVATF-1 - DP/5 (2010)
June to November 2012 visible/discernible IVATF-4 (2012); EASA
(2012)
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has been underlined in recent times by natural phenomena that, in some cases,
led to catastrophic consequences (e.g. 2011 Japanese tsunami or 2012 Sandy hur-
ricane). After these hazardous events, the attention on the indirect effects caused
by physical damages has increased and today is a key aspect for risk managers and
governments. However, in volcanology, there are only few examples of systemic
vulnerability assessment, and none regarding tephra dispersal impacts.
Some pioneering studies on systemic vulnerability were developed for tephra fall-
out (e.g. Wilson et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2011; Wardman et al., 2012). Wilson
et al. (2011) introduced the concept of vulnerability of an infrastructural system,
posing the basis for the application of the systemic approach in risk management.
Also, the European project ENSURE (Contract 212045) is one of the few exam-
ples of vulnerability assessment from multiple hazard sources (ENSURE project,
2011). Results produced for the case study of Vulcano island (Italy) show how
tephra deposition can affect the whole infrastructural system and produce indirect
impacts on human activities, affecting the whole socio-economic system (Belvaux
et al., 2011; Galderisi et al., 2011). In addition, studies in other branches of natural
hazards (e.g. landslides, seismic hazard) provide relevant insights for this research.
For example, Minciardi et al. (2006) underlined the importance of studying the
road network structure as a starting point for assessing the systemic vulnerability
of a road traffic network to landslides.
Regarding the air traffic operations, the study of the network structure can sup-
port the identification of relationships and hierarchies between the main elements of
the whole system (Bel and Fageda, 2007; Wegner and Marsh, 2007) or specific seg-
ments of the market (commercial, freight, charter, low-cost aviation) (Burghouwt
and Hakfoort, 2001; Francis et al., 2004). Redundancy is also identified as an
indicator of how many alternative solutions are available in case of local failure
(Kro¨ger, 2008; Utne et al., 2011; Kjølle et al., 2012; Menoni et al., 2012). The only
existing study where the vulnerability of the European air traffic network is related
to natural hazards is that of Wilkinson et al. (2011) who discuss some properties of
the air traffic network and describe the vulnerability to spatially-directed attacks.
They demonstrated that the European air traffic system is a scale-free network,
meaning that it has a high resilience to random attacks, but low resilience to driven
attacks to hubs. Thus, understanding the interactions between the elements of the
system is crucial for a long-term management (Hustache et al., 2011).
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Besides the direct impacts of volcanic ash dispersal on air traffic sector, the Ey-
jafjallajo¨kull eruption pointed out the wide dimension of indirect impacts on pro-
ductive activities. Before 2010, there were very few studies on the quantification
of economic impact of volcanic eruptions on the air traffic. The description of the
economic disruptions produced by the eruption of Redoubt volcano was the very
first (Tuck et al., 1992). The 2010 aviation disruption in Europe caused serious
economical consequences, affecting not only the aviation sector (IATA Economics,
2010; IATA Economics, 2012) but also several stakeholders indirectly affected by
its impacts (Sammonds et al., 2010; Jones and Bolivar, 2011). The interest in
economic impacts of aviation crisis increased dramatically, together with the at-
tention to the social dimension of vulnerability. Mazzocchi et al. (2010) proposed
a methodology to account economical losses and the redistribution of benefits due
to the air traffic disruption caused by the 2010 crisis. Socio-economic impacts of
the Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption and the subsequent air traffic disruptions have been
discussed in 2010 by the European Commission and the International Volcanic
Ash Task Force (IVATF, 2010b). Resilience has been also identified as a relevant
aspect to be taken into account (Cutter et al., 2003; Paton et al., 2001). However,
there are no specific studies on the evaluation of social vulnerability and resilience
of communities to the volcanic ash dispersal phenomena, mostly because it is a
secondary hazard compared to other volcanic phenomena.
Both physical and systemic vulnerability may be decreased acting directly on the
main exposed elements (i.e. aircrafts engines). On one hand, aircraft engine tol-
erance may be increased by the use of new materials (Drexler et al., 2011). In
addition, the definition of tolerance for new engines would imply the renovation
of aircraft fleet and the modifications of current standards. Thus, this option is
not feasible at short and medium-term. On the other hand, systemic vulnerability
can be reduced by identifying vulnerabilities of the exposed assets, and increasing
preparedness of the system, focusing on its critical features. These options are
more feasible but nowadays there are no examples of such practices.
• Mitigation measures. Some initiatives have been taken by the aviation stake-
holders in order to improve risk management during eruptions, with the aim of
increasing preparedness and decrease economic losses. Most of these were focused
on European Air Traffic Management (ATM) services in case of eruptions, which
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ensure the required level of aviation operations at the available airspace capacity.
ATM systems facilitate the planning of delays and the re-organization of flights
during emergencies (e.g. strikes, adverse weather conditions) and the management
of FIR (Flight Information Region) capacity and allow reducing the impact of air
traffic disruptions, in order to maximize efficiency (Leal de Matos and Ormerod,
2000). However, before 2010, ATM procedures specifically designed for volcanic
ash contamination were limited to ash avoidance (ICAO, 2007). It is also worth
mentioning some initiatives taken at global level that may promote the integra-
tion of studies on volcanic eruptions and its impacts in a general natural hazard
management framework.
– There is a standardized procedure in case of volcanic eruption. The Vol-
canic Observatories, in charge of the monitoring, notify the eruption onset to
VAACs. VAACs issue the Volcanic Ash Advisory (VAA), while the Meteo-
rological Watch Office (MWO) produce and dispatch the Significant Meteo-
rological Information (SIGMET) and the Notice To Airmen (NOTAM). This
procedure has been maintained after 2010, although having showed several
debilities (Bolic´ and Sivcˇev, 2011).
– After the Eyjafjallajo¨kull crisis, new ICAO “Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan”
was issued for European and North Atlantic (EUR/NAT) regions, introducing
new procedures in case of volcanic activity (ICAO, 2010). ICAO also insti-
tuted the International Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF). IN 2012 the ICAO
task force meetings (IVATF, 2012) stated that the airlines have the possibility
to decide how to act in presence of volcanic ash. This is conditioned to the
approval of a Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) plan, presented by the airlines
to the corresponding national authority. The existing volcanic eruption exer-
cises, called VOLCEX and leaded by EUROCONTROL, were improved and
used for testing new procedures (Sivcˇev, 2011) such as the new contingency
plan (IVATF, 2011) and the possibility for airlines to decide whether to fly
or not in the contaminated area. A description of the exercise can be found
in Bolic´ and Sivcˇev (2012).
– In Europe, decisions are often taken at an international level, and recent
procedures favor the centralization of information to contribute to a better
management of forthcoming aviation impacts due to volcanic eruptions. In
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2004, the Single European Sky (SES) was created to ensure the modernization
of the European Air Traffic Management (ATM) system (SESAR, 2006).
SESAR (Single European Sky Initiative) is the mechanism which coordinates
and concentrates all European research and development activities in ATM.
It aims at facilitating the information flow within the European air traffic
system. In Europe, EUROCONTROL has been designated as the network
manager, whose aim is to coordinate the response to air traffic disruptions
in the SES and centralize flying operations. In case of volcanic eruption,
EUROCONTROL maintains its role as a service provider, but has neither
the task nor the responsibility of judging the airlines choices (Sivcˇev, personal
comm., 2012), especially after the introduction of the SRA.
– The 2010 crisis caused many reactions also at worldwide level. The exist-
ing forecast and monitoring systems (e.g. Webley and Mastin, 2009; Webley
et al., 2009) were enhanced by a standardization of the USGS Volcano Alert
Level System (VALS) (Fearnley, 2011; Fearnley et al., 2012). This standard-
ized alert system, together with the enhancement of monitoring systems at
many Volcano Observatories, put the basis for more effective warning systems
to support aviation operations worldwide (Guffanti and Miller, 2013). Finally,
other international organizations such as IFALPA (International Federation of
Air Line Pilots Association) underline the role of pilots in the decision-making
process (Vujasinovic´, 2012) and suggest the adoption of a “pilot-in-charge”
paradigm. All these regulations and initiatives put the basis for implementing
response and design strategies to deal with ash-contaminated airspace.
The ongoing development of specific regulation and response strategies can
support a faster and more efficient response during eruptions, eventually low-
ering impacts. There are only few documented examples of response actions
performed during volcanic eruptions. Ulfarsson and Unger (2011) describe
the strategy applied by Icelandair during the 2010 crisis. The company per-
formed a rerouting of aircraft to a secondary hub in northern U.K., which
led to a substantial reduction of losses. However, for these techniques to be
adopted at wider scale, it is necessary to forecast expected impacts and plan
response strategies and mitigation measures. At present, there are no such
methodologies for vulnerability and impacts assessment on air traffic network
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in case of volcanic eruptions.
• Existing tools. Recent regulations and new protocols are expected to support
an effective response during volcanic eruptions, but need to be implemented and
automated effectively and in a timely manner. Normally, aviation stakeholders
involved in ATM make use of specific software and tools, but at the beginning
of this research, there was only one tool specifically developed for ATM during
explosive volcanic eruptions, discussed below.
The spatial dimension of hazard and vulnerability is recognized as a relevant aspect
to be taken into account, and many authors suggest the use of Geographic Informa-
tion System (GIS) for vulnerability analyses (Fekete et al., 2009; Lirer et al., 2010;
Biass et al., 2012). GIS can be defined as “computer-based information systems
that enable capture, modeling, storage, retrieval, sharing, manipulation, analy-
sis and presentation of geographically referenced data” (Worboys and Duckham,
2004). GIS are thus particularly suitable for multi-layered visualization (Maguire
et al., 2005) and spatial decision-making (Eldrandaly, 2007), and in particular for
risk management (Radke et al.; Pareschi et al., 2000). GIS were developed in
the 60s but their scientific use strongly increased during the 80s when computer
became widely available. Nowadays, GIS have a wide range of applications (Good-
child, 1993).
There are a few examples of application of GIS to the vulnerability assessment
in case of volcanic hazards (Spence et al., 2005b; Spence et al., 2005a). VORIS
(Felpeto et al., 2007) was the first GIS-based tool that allowed performing a multi-
hazard assessment of volcanic hazards through the use of different models. First
examples of integration of GIS-based hazard and vulnerability assessment were
can be found in Biass et al. (2012) and Scaini et al. (2014).
The attention posed by aviation stakeholders on spatially-based analysis and GIS
tools has been increasing in the last decades. GIS have been traditionally used
for local issues such as airport management (Hamzawi, 1986; Rong and Songchen,
2005; Du and Yuan, 2009). Wilkinson et al. (2011) suggest the use of GIS for
vulnerability analyses of air traffic network in case of spatially-based hazards.
However, GIS applications in ATM are very rare, mainly because atmospheric
processes involve large amounts of data and 3D analyses. ATM operations, in
fact, are in general based on Decision Support Systems (DSS), a specific type of
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computer-based Information Systems (IS) that support decision-making activities,
introduced in the latest 60s (Ferguson and Jones, 1969) and widely adopted since
the 80s for ATM support (Keen, 1987; Deguang, 2001; Ma et al., 2004). Nowadays,
ATM systems have reached a high level of complexity, and specially designed DSS
systems have been developed for flight allocation, departures management, delay
minimization and re-routing (Leal de Matos and Powell, 2003; Dell’ Olmo and
Lulli, 2003; Castelli and Pellegrini, 2011; Andreatta et al., 2011).
DSS systems for aviation are very specialized, and its use is limited to specific
operators (e.g. controllers) and tasks (e.g. traffic direction). The main limita-
tion of DSS is that, in general, are not suitable for advanced data visualization or
management of different sources of spatial data (Lilburne et al., 1997; Eldrandaly,
2007). However, this capability is not required for safety-related tasks performed
by controllers. Spatially-based DSS can also be applied to ATM for solving spe-
cific problems, for example planning of atmospheric research flights (Rautenhaus
et al., 2012). Tools for ATM anr risk-management tasks during volcanic eruptions
would have a different set of target users, some of them interested in analyzing
different hazard and impact scenarios. Their requirements may be fulfilled by GIS
tools, that allow supporting decision-makers in spatially-based problems (Eldran-
daly, 2007). However, GIS tools also have limitations in exploring different choices
(Malczewski, 1999). Table 2 presents a general comparison of GIS and DSS (Ta-
ble 2.4). The coupling between DSS and GIS seems to be a good solution for
the support of spatially-directed decisions (Chang et al., 1997; Sugumaran et al.,
2004; Eldrandaly, 2007). In particular, GIS tools for aviation management during
eruptions can be interfaced or complemented with other aviation-related DSS, The
increasing use of spatial DBMS (Database Management Systems) together with
the diffusion of web-based map services may in future enhance the integration of
DSS and GIS into more powerful GIS-based DSS.
The only example of a GIS-based ATM tool for short-term analysis is the SAAM
model (System for traffic Assignment and Analysis at a Macroscopic level, Euro-
control, 2014c), developed by EUROCONTROL for private use. After the 2010
volcanic crisis, a map-based tool was developed specifically for volcanic-ash visual-
ization: EVITA, the European Crisis Visualization Interactive Tool for ATFM (Air
Traffic Flow Management), developed by EUROCONTROL (Eurocontrol, 2014a).
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Table 2.4: Differences between GIS and DSS
GIS DSS
Quantitative and suitable for struc-
tured problems
Qualitative and suitable for non-
structured problems
Use geometric features Use symbols
Integrate data Integrate knowledge
Do not easily handle incomplete data Handle incomplete data and knowledge
Spatial analysis capability No spatial analysis capability
No inference/reasoning capabilities Inference/reasoning capabilities
Variety of output maps/graphics Very specific mapping capabilities
EVITA is a GIS-based tool specifically designed to support aviation management
in case of ash-contaminated in airspace. At the moment EVITA is mainly a visu-
alization tool (Fig. 2.1) with reduced analysis functions, rather than a complete
tool to support decision-makers. For this reason, the portal is activated during
aviation crises and allows airlines to gather some relevant information but the tac-
tical choices are to be made independently by airlines (Sivcˇev, personal comm.,
2012). This tool has been tested and used during the VOLCEX exercise obtaining
Figure 2.1: Screenshot of EVITA tool, showing the ash cloud from a NOP map.
Figure from Bolic´ and Sivcˇev (2011).
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positive results (Bolic´ and Sivcˇev, 2012). However, user feedback underlined the
low user-friendliness of the EVITA Graphical User Interface (GUI). Another im-
portant instrument, with a more general purpose, is the NOP (Network Operation
Portal), the EUROCONTROL central repository for all relevant information (Eu-
rocontrol, 2014b). This web-based portal is currently used by most civil aviation
stakeholders to manage their operations. The NOP portal played a central role
during the Eyjafjallajo¨kull volcanic crisis, when it received more than 13 million
hits per day (EUROCONTROL) pointing out the need for stakeholders to refer to
a common, reliable repository at European level.
These few existing map-based tools could enhance ATM capabilities during erup-
tions, as confirmed by the massive use of NOP portal and the overall positive
feedback on the EVITA tool. However, at the moment each airline has a differ-
ent approach for flight dispatch and related tasks (the flight planning in presence
of ash being one of them). The tools and services adopted by airlines, including
weather forecast services, depend on the specific business model and cost-benefit
analysis implemented. Therefore, different airlines use different software packages
to create and visualize their own flights. At the moment, the only free tool for
ATM is EVITA, in Europe. There is also a WSI (WSI - professional division of
the Weather Company, 2014) aviation forecast service that allows visualizing in
Google Earth format the information from VAACs and/or other providers of ash
dispersal forecast.
Since 2010, the attention to impacts caused by explosive eruptions on aviation has been
increasing together with the interests of aviation community in impact assessment tools
and mitigation strategies for loss reduction. However, there are very few vulnerability
and impact assessment methodologies developed for this specific topic, and the applica-
tion of new regulations requires the introduction of specific tools. This overview shows
that vulnerability and impact assessment of air traffic system due to volcanic eruptions
is a wide field that comprises many aspects (physical, systemic, socio-economic) and
aims at supporting many different stakeholders. Although the initial concern was posed
on the physical dimension of vulnerability, new regulations were defined in 2010 based
on systemic and economic considerations (Ulfarsson and Unger, 2011). In fact, besides
physical impacts, it is important to consider the systemic dimension of impacts of nat-
ural hazards on anthropic and infrastructural system, that can affect all branches of
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society (Birkmann, 2006; Birkmann, 2013).
Finally, it is worth noting that, when a volcanic crisis occurs, specific ATM tools are
interfaced with the volcanic ash forecast coming from the VAACS at 6-hours interval.
However, many stakeholders aim at using different sources of information for their anal-
yses (outcomes from other TTDMs, satellite retrievals, private products), as underlined
by an end-user survey performed by the VAST (Volcanic Ash Strategic Initiative Team)
project (Prata and Zehner, 2013). The relationship between ash dispersal modelers and
aviation stakeholders is thus very relevant for a correct aviation management during
eruptions. Prior to 2010, there were no examples of surveys performed amongst the
community involved in aviation management during eruptions, and when this research
began (November 2010) the attention to end-users was still limited. The surveys per-
formed on EVITA (Bolic´ and Sivcˇev, 2012) and by the VAST community (Prata and
Zehner, 2013), together with the outcomes of other specific meetings (Bonadonna et al.,
2011a; Bonadonna et al., 2013) pointed out the need for enhancing communication be-
tween aviation managers and scientific community. At the moment, there are still no
examples of end-user surveys that can support the development of specific impact as-
sessment tools aimed at supporting aviation stakeholders during volcanic eruptions.
2.2.2 Open issues and specific objectives
The summary of the state-of-the-art of aviation vulnerability assessment to volcanic ash
dispersal underlines some open issues. This PhD research intends to answer to some of
these issues with specific objectives defined in Table 2.5. The distinction between short
and long-term timescale (section 1.2) is maintained here, although most of the concepts
are applicable at both timescales.
One of the objectievs of this research is to propose a methodology for assessing vul-
nerability of the air traffic system to volcanic ash. The aim is to define indicators
and techniques to estimate the two main types of vulnerability: physical and systemic.
Moreover, this research attempts at estimating socio-economic vulnerability, currently
not taken into account when managing aviation during volcanic eruptions. The proposed
vulnerability and impact assessment methodology will be applied to the case study of
the European air traffic network, where most of the new strategies are being applied.
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Table 2.5: Specific objectives regarding vulnerability and impact assessment
TIMESCALE OPEN ISSUES SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
Long-term Vulnerability assessment of air
traffic
Vulnerability assessment
methodology of air traffic
Systemic and socio-economic im-
pacts
Methodology that accounts sys-
temic and socio-economic im-
pacts
Short-term Impact assessment for air traffic Impact assessment methodology
for air traffic
Few tools for ATM during erup-
tions
Development of a tool for ATM
purposes
Both New regulation under definition Account for possible regulation
developments
Critical thresholds for aviation
not defined
Include different thresholds
Regarding short-term, there is a strong need for defining impact assessment methodolo-
gies in order to estimate expected impacts, and for specific tools to automate the impact
analysis and support ATM stakeholders. This research will design a GIS-based tool to
support civil aviation management during volcanic eruptions.
In addition, at both short and long-term, it is important to account for new regulation
and open issues. In particular, a strong limitation in the development of this research is
that the definition of ash concentration thresholds is still under debate. For this reason
this research accounts for many quantitative thresholds that have been proposed after
2010.
A secondary aim of this research is to enhance the existing strategies for managing in-
formation flow between scientific and air traffic management communities during emer-
gencies.

Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Modeling strategies for tephra dispersal hazard assess-
ment
This section presents contributions of this PhD to the existing strategies for tephra
dispersal hazard assessment, describing the methodologies at both long and short-term.
The novel approaches introduced in this section have been applied to four case studies:
Concepcio´n volcano (Nicaragua), Vesuvius (Italy), Popocatepetl (Mexico) and 4 active
volcanoes in Iceland. Results are respectively described in paper I, Sulpizio et al.
(2012), Paper II and Paper III. Main results are summarized in this manuscript
(chapter 4). Since 2010, the importance of long-term tephra dispersal hazard assessment
for improving preparedness has been underlined by a growing fraction of the community
(Bonadonna et al., 2011a). However, there is a clear need for producing long-term hazard
assessment at active volcanic areas, in order to produce results tailored to aviation
purposes.
This PhD proposes the application of methodologies that allow a better definition of
TTDM inputs for the probabilistic tephra hazard assessment, which consists in running
several TTDM simulations initialized with different combinations of input parameters.
Long-term strategies, aimed at producing tephra dispersal hazard assessment, rely on
meteorological data and eruptive scenarios (Fig. 3.1, left). Tephra dispersal hazard
maps are produced by merging TTDM outputs produced by varying both volcanological
and meteorological inputs (Fig. 3.1, right).
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Figure 3.1: Long-term modeling strategy for probabilistic tephra dispersal hazard
assessment. Inputs (left) are sampled in order to initialize several runs of the TTDM
model (sim1...n), subsequently merged into probabilistic hazard maps (right).
In order to produce hazard maps, it is also necessary to select threshold values of the
parameter for which probabilistic maps are built (in this case, ash concentration). Given
that there is no consensus on the value to be adopted (Section 2.2.1 and Table 2.3),
the quantitative thresholds introduced by CAA and used for quantitative ash dispersal
forecasts in 2010: 0.2 and 2 mg/m3 are adopted. It is worth noticing that before 2010,
the range of thresholds adopted in ash dispersal hazard assessment was very wide: Papp
et al. (2005) refer to a high concentration value but without quantifying it, while Folch
and Sulpizio (2010) adopted values of 0.1 and 0.01 mg/m3 and Leadbetter and Hort
(2011) used lower values (10−12 to 10−15 mg/m3). However, the avoidance criterion is
still applied in many areas of the word. For this reason, probabilistic hazard assessment
is also performed for a threshold of 10−6 mg/m3, assumed for the zero-tolerance criterion.
This PhD research contributes to the production of probabilistic tephra dispersal hazard
assessment by proposing strategies focused on the characterization of meteorological
representative conditions, eruptive scenarios and ESPs.
3.1.1 The Typical Meteorological Year (TMY)
One of the required inputs for performing a probabilistic tephra dispersal hazard assess-
ment is the definition of representative meteorological conditions for the area at stake.
The selection of long-term representative conditions at regional and global scale usually
relies on a random sampling of meteorological conditions in a given time interval. For
example, Papp et al. (2005) perform the simulations over 7-years meteorological data,
and Leadbetter and Hort (2011) extract 17.000 samples within a 5-years meteorological
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database. The existing examples of hazard assessment for tephra fallout (e.g. Macedo-
nio et al., 2008, Costa et al., 2009) and the two example of tephra hazard assessment
prior to the beginning of this research (Folch and Sulpizio, 2010; Leadbetter and Hort,
2011) apply different methods to select the long-term representative meteorological con-
ditions. In particular, Folch and Sulpizio (2010) use a meteorological mesoscale model,
WRF-ARW (Michalakes et al., 2001), for a year known a priori to be representative.
The choice of meteorological conditions is particularly critical at local scale, due to the
high computational cost of running NWPM models prior to TTDM, that increase the
computational cost of the hazard assessment. An output file produced by the WRF-
ARW model for 72 hours occupies indicatively 5 Gb of disk space. Thus, running
meteorological simulations at local scale for a long-term period (e.g. 10 years) can take
produce more than 3 Tb of data and require considerable computational resources.
This research proposes a new method for defining representative meteorological condi-
tions at local scale making use of the Typical Meteorological Year (TMY). The advan-
tage of the TMY is that it reduces the number of meteorological simulations necessary to
compute a hazard map at high resolution (i.e. at spatial resolutions for which mesoscale
meteorological modeling is required). A TMY consists of 12 representative months se-
lected from individual years of a time period (typically several decades) and collated in
a meteorological database. This concept, introduced by Finkelstein and Schafer (1971),
has been used in other fields such as climatology (Kalogirou, 2003) and solar energy
characterization (Bulut, 2004; Bulut, 2010).
The original definition of TMY is for one meteorological variable and at a given point.
The TMY has subsequently been adapted to the definition of a climatic TMY based
on several variables, merged using a set of weights (Lam et al., 1996). However, it has
never been used for the definition of a typical conditions for vectorial variable such as
wind. The TMY is defined based on the Filkenstein-Schafer (FS) method, a statistical
method selecting the 12 months with minimum difference from the long-term conditions
(long-term makes reference to the whole temporal series of meteorological data used, for
example 10 years). This research proposes an adaptation of the FS method to account
for both wind speed and direction.
The FS method consists on:
1- Calculating the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF ) for each meteorological
parameter. The procedure consists on grouping the values under a number of bins,
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and counting the frequency within each bin. The long-term CDF (CDFl) is obtained
considering the whole temporal series of the parameter (in our example, 10 years). The
specific CDF for each month and year (CDFs) is calculated separately for each month
of data (for instance, the CDFs of the wind speed of January of a given year). The first
step is the minimization of the FS factor, defined as the mean difference of the CDFl
and the CDFs over the total number of bins Nb. The FS factor is calculated for each
month as:
FS =
Nb∑
i=1
|CDFl − CDFs|/Nb (3.1)
To take into account the relative importance of the different meteorological parameters,
a Weighted Factor (WF) is defined. The WF factor is calculated as the weighted sum
of the FS factor calculated for wind speed (FS1) and direction (FS2), having weights
w1 and w2 respectively:
WF = FS1w1 + FS2w2 (3.2)
This allows ordering the months in the time period based on the WF value. The 5
months with lower WF are selected as candidates for the TMY.
2- The second step allows choosing which of the 5 selected months will be part of
the TMY. To this aim, the Root Mean Square Difference (RMSD) is computed for
each month having Nd days for each meteorological parameter (for example, for wind
horizontal component vi having average vim):
RMSD =
√√√√ Nd∑
i=1
(vi − vim)2/Nd (3.3)
Weighted Mean Square Difference (WMSD) is defined as the weighted sum between
RMSD1 (relative to wind speed) and RMSD2 (relative to wind direction) having respec-
tively weight w1 and w2.
WMSD = RMSD1w1 +RMSD2w2 (3.4)
The month having the lowest value of WMSD is considered the most representative of
the long-term conditions.
The TMY method has been applied to the case-study of Concepcio´n volcano (Nicaragua)
as described in Paper I. In particular, TMY has been defined for vertical levels above the
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Figure 3.2: Comparison between the long-term CDF of hourly wind direction (left)
and the TMY (right) at a given height above the Concepcio´n volcano vent (i.e. 10 km
s.l.m.).
volcano, corresponding to the average column height for the eruptive scenarios defined
at the considered volcano (Paper I). Thus, a TMY has been associated to each scenario.
Figure 3.2 shows the comparison between the CDF of hourly wind direction for the long-
term temporal interval considered (left) and within the TMY (right) at a given height (10
km s.l.m.), showing a similar shape. Then, numerical simulations have been performed
over the TMY, running the WRF model at 00.00 and 12.00 UTC. Each WRF simulation
lasts 10 days and occupies approximately 12 Gb of disk space. The entire TMY thus
occupies less than 500 Gb. The use of the TMY constrains the mesoscale meteorological
simulations to one year (statistically representative of a much longer period) and makes
the computation of hazard maps less computationally expensive. The TMY is therefore
a good solution to decrease computational cost and storage constraints in case of local
scale tephra dispersal hazard assessment. However, this method has some limitations,
discussed in Paper I, and shall be improved in future, for example accounting for local
variability of wind conditions in the surroundings of the volcano vent. To this aim, a
TMY may be defined, for example, using not one but many points around the volcano.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the adoption of this technique is increasing, due to its
applications to renewable energy design and management (Al-Salihi, 2014; Ohunakin
et al., 2014). Applications to wind speed have been proposed (Maklad, 2014) for wind
energy generation, but do not account for wind direction.
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3.1.2 Stratified sampling of ESPs using probability density functions
(PDFs)
Probabilistic hazard assessment is build upon several runs of TTDMs, initialized with
a set of ESPs corresponding to a given eruptive scenarios or multiple scenarios. Several
runs of TTDM are then initialized with a set of ESPs and merged in order to build
probabilistic hazard maps (Fig. 3.1).
The concept of probabilistic hazard assessment, initially developed for tephra fallout
hazard assessment (Barberi et al., 1990; Bonadonna et al., 2005), is based on the defini-
tion of eruptive scenarios characterized by ranges of Eruptive Source Parameters (ESPs).
Bonadonna et al. (2005) proposed the use of Probability Density Functions (PDF) in
order to account for uncertainties associated to the ESPs. It is worth noticing that
the definition of the PDF depends on the eruptive record, and that there are different
approaches depending on the richness of field data and tephra stratigraphical studies.
ESPs are selected by a random sampling within their probabilistic distribution, in order
to produce probabilistic tephra fallout hazard assessment. However, exploring all the
possible combinations of ESPs requires running thousands of simulations (Bonadonna
et al., 2005), increasing the computational cost of the hazard assessment (Folch and
Sulpizio, 2010). For this reason, the adoption of a statistical technique (i.e. the strat-
ified sampling) is proposed, in order to reduce the representative population used for
tephra dispersal assessment.
This sampling method is very common in social sciences because it allows identifying
a representative subset of a population, assuming prior knowledge on its distribution
(Sa¨rndal et al., 2003). Using the stratified sampling, this research produced probabilis-
tic tephra dispersal hazard assessment based on PDF for ESPs. This technique has been
applied to the probabilistic tephra dispersal hazard assessment at Concepcio´n volcano,
Nicaragua (Paper I) and Popocate´petl volcano, Mexico (Paper II.
The stratified sampling (Rao and Krishnaiah, 1994) is a statistical sampling method
that allows the number of samples representatives of a given population to be reduced.
This method assumes a previous knowledge about the probability distribution of a ran-
dom variable. Having discretized each PDF into bins with an associated probability, the
stratified sampling allows extracting ESPs according to the relative probability of each
bin.
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Figure 3.3: The stratified sampling technique allows extracting a representative subset
of the input parameters (top) to reduce the number of TTDM runs (bottom) and
maintain the representativeness of ESPs.
The main application of the stratified sampling is the definition of a statistically rep-
resentative subset of ESPs from a given probabilistic eruptive scenarios. Inputs for the
TTDM are in fact selected amongst the range of input parameters. Figure 3.3 shows
an example for three input parameters (eruption starting date, column height and av-
erage particle size). However, this technique can be ideally applied to a wider set of
parameters. In addition, the stratified sampling may be used to define the representa-
tive meteorological conditions at regional/global scale sampling within a time interval
(similarly to Leadbetter and Hort, 2011). The fact of sampling over a long time-period
ideally guarantees a statistical representation of the long-term meteorological conditions,
but only with a high number of samples. The application of this sampling technique
allows sampling the date of the eruption amongst a long-term time interval, for example
hypothesizing a constant probability distribution over time. This results in a represen-
tative subset containing an equal number of samples for each month of the time interval,
as performed in Paper II for selecting the meteorological conditions within a long-term
period. The stratified sampling may also be used for studying specific months of interest,
for example for seasonal patterns or extreme climatic conditions. Seasonal maps have
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been produced in Paper I and II dividing the simulations in different subsets. However,
seasonal maps in future may be based on the prior selection of input parameters through
ad-hoc stratified sampling.
3.1.3 Tephra dispersal hazard maps tailored to aviation
As underlined in section 2.1, one objective of this research is to enhance ash concentration
charts in order to support aviation stakeholders. A complementary aim of the research
is to improve the communication of outcomes of hazard assessment and its associated
uncertainties.
This research contributed to the production of new types of maps of averaged persistence
and arrival time, that allow visualizing the temporal distribution of expected hazards.
Maps of averaged persistence and arrival time have been introduced in the coauthored
work of Sulpizio et al. (2012) and Biass et al. (2014), respectively. Such maps are
complemented with the calculated standard deviation of these parameters, in order to
account for uncertainties (Biass et al., 2014, Appendix B). All maps are produced by
merging several modeling outputs and calculating final values over the computational
grid (Fig. 3.1).
The different types of maps produced during this research are:
• Probabilistic hazard maps of ash concentration. The probability of overpassing a
given critical ash concentration threshold in each cell is defined as:
P [C(x, y, z, t)] ≥ CT |eruption] (3.5)
where C(x,y,z,t) is the tephra mass concentration in the atmosphere at a given
point and time and CT is the chosen mass concentration threshold. For a given
eruption scenario, the probability of disruption Pc at a point P(x,y,z) is quantified
by counting the number of times the considered threshold is exceeded over the
total number of runs performed in the hazard assessment (N):
Pc(x, y, z) =
∑N
i=1 ni
N
(3.6)
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where
ni(x, y, z) =
1 if Ci(x, y, z) ≥ CT |eruption
0 otherwise
 (3.7)
being Ci(x, y, z) the concentration at a given point P(x,y,z) and at time step i.
It is worth noticing that for a given run, the occurrence of critical conditions (e.g.
overpassing critical concentration) is accounted as a positive event for the prob-
abilistic hazard assessment regardless of the number of model time steps during
which the condition is verified.
• Maps of averaged persistence time. Persistence time is calculated by counting,
for each run, the number of model time steps in which the critical concentration
threshold is exceeded at a point P(x,y,z) of the computational domain. The average
persistence time is then calculated over the values estimated for each run. Note
that persistence time is accounted only if the overpassing of the ash concentration
occurs for a minimum number of times (e.g. 5% of the total number of simulations
performed).
• Maps of averaged arrival time. The first arrival time (hereafter referred to as
arrival time) computes the time from the beginning of the eruption to the first
detection of the critical concentration at a point P(x,y,z) of the computational
domain. The average arrival time is then calculated over the values estimated for
each run.
• Standard deviation maps for average arrival/persistence time. Both persistence
and arrival time are quantified as mean (i.e. average value at a pixel over the entire
number of runs) and standard deviation. The standard deviation is calculated over
the average values estimated for each run, and allows estimating the uncertainty
associated to the averaged persistence/arrival times.
All these types of maps can be produced at each FL of interest. However, maps com-
prehensive of all results at different FL are also useful to aviation stakeholders (Biass
et al., 2014). Figure 3.4 shows an example of the different types of maps for the case of
Katla volcano (Iceland). Results are comprehensive of all FLs. Such maps have been
produced for 4 active Icelandic volcanoes (Biass et al., 2014, Appendix B).
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Figure 3.4: Maps introduced during this research: average persistence time and stan-
dard deviation (top, left and right respectively) and average arrival time and standard
deviation (bottom, left and right respectively).
3.2 Vulnerability and impact assessment
This section describes the methodologies proposed for assessing vulnerability of the air
traffic network to volcanic ash dispersal and to estimate its expected impacts. Following
the distinction between short and long-term risk management, the vulnerability and
impact assessment is performed at two temporal scales: long-term for territorial planning
and short-term for crisis management. For the long-term case, a methodology has been
developed to estimate and visualize the expected impacts of explosive eruptive scenarios
on European air traffic network (Paper III). For the short-term case, this research
produced a tool to quantify the expected impacts of volcanic ash on aviation. The tool
has been applied to eruptive scenarios at two active Icelandic volcanoes: Eyjafjallajo¨kull
( Scaini et al., 2011) and Katla (Paper IV). The definition of scenarios used for both
applications is described in the coauthored paper of Biass et al. (2014), attached in
Appendix B.
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3.2.1 Instruments and methods
This section presents the main instruments and method that form the basis for the de-
velopment of the vulnerability and impact assessment methodology. The methodology is
based on two tasks: spatial data management and spatial analysis. These operations are
performed using two main instruments: spatial Database Management Systems (DBMS)
and Geographical Information Systems (GIS). The use of these two instruments has been
recommended by the scientific community and the aviation stakeholders (section 2.2).
In this research, they are used for a specific aim: building a tool to support ATM during
explosive volcanic eruptions.
DBMS systems allow storing, modifying and extracting information from a database
through the universal SQL (Structured Query Language) language (Date, 1990). DBMS
are widely used in several fields (Ramakrishnan and Gehrke, 2003) and in particular for
supporting decision making (Marakas, 2003). GIS and DBMS are deeply interfaced, as
GIS uses DMBS to store spatial entities and perform operations. The connection be-
tween GIS and databases is extremely important in terms of performance and efficiency
of spatial operations. Most GIS rely on underlying DBMS, but only few allow direct
interaction with DBMS functionalities. For example ArcGIS (Environmental Systems
Research Institute (ESRI), 2011) is based on Microsoft Access or Oracle DBMS, while
most open-source GIS are fully interfaced with open DBMS software (Neteler et al.,
2012). Amongst open source GIS currently available (http://opensourcegis.org/), one
of the most powerful is GRASS, initially developed by the US Army and then main-
tained and developed by the open source community (Westervelt, 2004). The specific
GIS functionalities used in this research are:
• Pre-processing. GIS can be used to import and pre-process input data such as
probabilistic ash concentration maps or ash dispersal forecasts. Usually, results
of numerical simulations are binary files (grib, NetCDF and HDF5), which allow
storing large amount of data in the form of time dependent variables (e.g. ash
concentration) defined over a 3D grid, for each time step (Fig. 3.6). Although these
formats are very compact and extremely useful for meteorological and numerical
modeling communities, their low friendliness reduces their usability for most end-
users, including aviation stakeholders. There are many tools that allow extracting
information from NetCDF files, and amongst them libraries (for example nco,
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Figure 3.5: The overlap is a typical spatial analysis operation performed by GIS and
allows combining different sources of information on a cell-by-cell basis.
Figure 3.6: Typical structure of a NetCDF, that allows storing many variables (some
of them time dependent) in a 3D grid, for each time step.
http://nco.sourceforge.net/) and programs such as GRASS (Neteler et al., 2012).
In particular, GRASS allows the automated extraction of relevant information
and enables the production of hourly ash dispersal charts. GIS can also be used
to import and pre-process air traffic data. Air traffic features contained in the
Chapter 3. Methodology 49
air traffic database can be converted into spatial entities that support spatial
operations such as intersection or union. Airports are stored as points, flights
are stored as lines constituted by segments that connect waypoints (Scaini et al.,
2011, Appendix B), and airspace sectors are stored as polygons.
• Data management. GIS systems rely on specially designed DBMS that allow
storing and managing spatial elements, stored into two main data types: vector and
raster data (Rigaux et al., 2001). Both data types allow the representation of real
elements. Vectorial features are represented through points, lines and polygons,
while raster features are constituted by pixels. All spatial elements are associated
to coordinates (stored as attributes of the elements) and metadata (e.g projection).
• Spatial analysis. One of the most important tasks performed by GIS programs is
spatial analysis, that is, cell-by-cell operations over digital maps. A typical spatial
analysis operation is an overlap (Fig. 3.5). The overlap is widely used in the
impact assessment methodology, for example, for assessing expected impacts by
overlapping hazard and vulnerability characteristics. Spatial analysis is also used
for combining several maps into a final maps, performing operations on a cell-by-
cell basis. For example, it allows producing maps containing the average value of
a specific set of maps. Another typical GIS operation used in this research is the
buffering, that is, the creation of a zone (normally radial) around a map feature
measured in units of distance or time.
• Automation. A main advantage of using GRASS GIS is that it is scriptable, and
allows automating procedures withing shell scripts. GRASS has a very efficient in-
terface with the most powerful SQL DBMS (Neteler et al., 2012), while a limitation
is the low user-friendliness compared to other GIS programs.
• Visualization. Many GIS enhance visualization of scientific datasets and spatial
operations through a user-friendly GUI that allows performing spatial analysis
from a friendly graphical environment, producing different outputs. For example,
Quantum GIS (or Qgis) is a very diffused Open Source GIS due to its friendly
and popular GUI. Nowadays, GRASS and QGIS are integrated (Neteler et al.,
2012), making possible for an end-user to perform GRASS analysis through QGIS
friendly environment. In this research, vulnerability and impact assessment results
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are produced in form of maps and tables. Maps are visualized through QGIS
software.
During the initial phase of this research, a comparison of the existing open source DBMS
(e.g. SQLlite, PostgreSQL and MyQSL) was performed. The selected DBMS has been
SQLite (http://www.sqlite.org/) and its spatial extension Spatialite (http://www.gaia-
gis.it/gaia-sins/). SQLite is a server-free database, and its structure allows to store
all data into one file, making it easily portable and suitable for desktop applications.
However, the methodologies presented in this research could be easily implement using
other SQL-based DBMS. Spatialite is used for storing air traffic data: airports, routes
and airspace sectors are stored respectively as points, lines and polygons. The spatial
DBMS contains also hazard information (in raster format) imported from the TTDM
output and results of vulnerability and impact assessment. The spatial database is
interfaced with GRASS GIS, that allows performing spatial analysis operations. QGIS,
that acts as GUI, allows visualization of results and further post-processing of results.
In conclusion, the combined use of GRASS, QGIS and SQLite/Spatialite is the most
suitable choice for the development of this research.
3.2.2 Long-term vulnerability and impact assessment of air traffic net-
work
This section presents a methodology for long-term vulnerability and impact assessment
of air traffic networks in case of explosive volcanic eruptions. The proposed methodology
relies on the availability of hazard assessment results (Fig. 3.7, right). The long-term
analysis is constituted by three main steps (Fig. 3.7): exposure analysis, vulnerabil-
ity assessment and estimation of expected impact. Results of the application of this
methodology to the European air traffic network are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5
presents a final discussion of the results and propose further developments.
1. Exposure analysis. Exposure analysis consists in identifying the elements of the
system that can be affected by the hazardous phenomenon.
On one hand, airports play an important role in the air traffic network providing
a service to the surrounding areas. These features are exposed to both ash fallout
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Figure 3.7: Long-term vulnerability and impact assessment methodology, constituted
by exposure and subsequent vulnerability analysis (left) and hazard assessment (right),
whose outcomes are combined to estimate expected impacts (bottom).
and dispersal. On the other hand, aircraft can be disrupted by ash in the atmo-
sphere, disrupting relevant traffic connections and indirectly impacting local and
regional economies. Based on these considerations, the exposed targets for the
systemic vulnerability analysis are airports and routes in the area under study.
Aerial sectors represent a key component of the air traffic network because each
sector has an associated capacity, which is the main parameter for air traffic man-
agement (Leal de Matos and Ormerod, 2000; Leal de Matos and Powell, 2003;
Dell’ Olmo and Lulli, 2003). Thus, in order to have a vulnerability assessment
meaningful to civil aviation stakeholders, airspace sectors are also considered in
the analysis, following in the case of Europe the current classification (EURO-
CONTROL, 2005).
Finally, the choice of exposed assets to be considered in the analysis accounts also
for the socio-economic context. For example, the territorial context of an airport
or a connection is relevant for the estimation of socio-economic vulnerability and
impact. In addition, many population and productive activities rely on air traffic
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and are thus indirectly exposed to its disruption, and are therefore included in the
analysis.
2. Vulnerability assessment. The objective of vulnerability analysis is to define
indicators to measure the systemic vulnerability of air traffic network to tephra
dispersal. As clearly demonstrated during the Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption in 2010,
the European air traffic system is largely vulnerable to loss of functionality of its
elements when exposed to volcanic ash. Impacts of ash clouds can occur very far
from the source, and their magnitude depends on the relevance of the disrupted
elements (Ceudech et al., 2011).
The first step is therefore to identify the strategic elements amongst those identified
by the exposure analysis. The analysis of the network structure allows the main
elements that are critical for the system as a whole to be recognized (Wegner and
Marsh, 2007; Hustache et al., 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2011). This section presents
the criteria and assumptions for the identification of the critical elements for the
system.
• The main assumption is that the higher the traffic of an airport, the higher
its relevance and, consequently, the higher the vulnerability of the system
to its potential disruption. Strategic airport hubs are identified in terms
of passengers and goods transported. Paper III classifies all European air-
ports according to traffic of passengers and freight during 2012 (EUROSTAT,
2013). All European airports are classified in order to identify the most im-
portant for the whole European area. The analysis is performed also for the
North-Western Europe, expected to suffer impacts due to ash dispersal from
Icelandic volcanoes according to the probabilistic hazard assessment results
(Biass et al., 2014).
• Similarly, the assumption is that the higher the traffic of passengers and
freights on a given route, the higher its relevance and, consequently, the
higher the vulnerability of the system to its potential disruption. Paper III
classifies routes based on the average number of connections between each
pair of European airports in 2012, identifying the main city pairs. In addi-
tion, it also classifies routes based on air traffic (passengers and freight) for
each city pair, that is, for the main routes between a considered airport and
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its partners (Eurostat). This allows accounting the relevance of European
routes for a selected sub-system constituted by the considered airport and
its main European partners.
• Highly congested airspaces (i.e. those more relevant for the air traffic system)
are identified based on the level of traffic in each airspace sector. Paper III
identifies the strategic European airspace sectors based on the number of
daily European flights in each sector. Traffic data correspond to the peak
day of 2012 (29 June), under the assumption that this particular day is
representative of high-traffic situations in Europe. Each airspace sector is
assigned a vulnerability value according to the number of times per day the
sector is crossed by flights at any FL. This analysis could also be performed
with different datasets (i.e. peak days, projections, average values) and at
different timescales.
• The main assumption is that socio-economic vulnerability of the air traffic
system is proportional to the level of dependency of a territory on air trans-
portation. The socio-economic vulnerability is high at areas that strongly
rely on air traffic system, or in correspondence of special territorial condi-
tions (e.g. islands). The vulnerability of air traffic network is low in case
of high redundancy of the transportation network (e.g. in presence of other
transportation infrastructures that can replace air traffic in case of disrup-
tion). Areas having low multi-modal accessibility are more vulnerable to
the failure of one transportation mode due to the limited variety of alterna-
tive transportation modes. Paper III identifies the European regions that
have a high dependency on air traffic combining four indicators: population,
passengers and freight transported by air and multi-modal accessibility. In
particular, multi-modal accessibility takes into account the presence/absence
of alternative transport modes and their cost (Espon, 2003; Espon, 2013, p.
17). These indicators are combined on a cell-by-cell basis using GIS spatial
analysis functions. The analysis is based on average yearly data for 2012,
gathered from the Eurostat database (EUROSTAT, 2013). This simplified
but novel approach poses the basis for including these aspects in long-term
territorial risk management. All indicators are referred to the 2003 NUTS-
2 regions (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics), a hierarchical
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system for dividing the economic territory of the EU for the application of
regional policies.
Based on these considerations, vulnerability values are associated to the exposed
elements, using a qualitative scale in order to allow a first-order comparison.
3. Impact assessment. Once the strategic elements and their relevance are iden-
tified, it is possible to assess the expected impacts produced by different eruptive
scenarios based on hazard and vulnerability maps. Given the differences in the
indicators of vulnerability, it is not possible to merge the different thematic vul-
nerability maps into a single map. Expected impacts are thus assessed separately
for each single vulnerability feature.
The combination of hazard and vulnerability results allows the expected impacts
in case of occurrence of a considered scenario to be identified. Paper III proposes
three methods for estimating long-term impacts of tephra dispersal on European
air traffic:
• Qualitative GIS-based visual overlap of hazard and vulnerability maps. The
graphical overlap allows visual identification of the routes that have the high-
est probability of being disrupted for each eruptive scenario. Visual overlap
can improve risk communication showing the spatial distribution of variables
that contribute to the occurrence of disruptions (i.e. hazard, exposure and
vulnerability).
• GIS-based overlap of hazard and vulnerability information. This corresponds
to a spatial analysis operation that, having converted the maps into raster
format, calculates the impact as product of hazard and vulnerability on a
cell-by-cell basis (similarly to Fig. 3.5). This analysis has been performed for
Flight Information Regions (FIRs) associated to a constant value of vulnera-
bility (as described in previous subsection) and covered by different values of
hazard (contained in the hazard map). The impact value for the FIR is the
maximum value encountered amongst the cells within its airspace. Impact
maps allow identifying which airspaces would be impacted, and the spatial
extent of impacts.
• A third way of assessing impacts is calculating the expected disruption for
given features, for example at given airports, based on average data on a
Chapter 3. Methodology 55
given time interval (hourly, daily, yearly). For example, impact at given
airports (i.e. movements disrupted, passengers and freight stranded) can be
estimated by multiplying the persistence time for a given eruptive scenario
by the hourly-averaged traffic (based on daily average data). The underlying
assumption is that if the critical ash concentration is reached at any FL over
an airport, all flight operations are disrupted. Examples for the airports of
London Heathrow and Keflav´ık are presented in Paper III. This method
could be based on critical thresholds in terms of arrival and persistence time
(e.g. assuming a strong economic impact if the disruptions last more than 6
hours at a given airport).
Each of the above impact assessment methods focus on producing specific results,
and could be used to support risk management strategies at different levels. In
addition, these methods can be applied to any area for which a hazard and vul-
nerability assessment has been previously performed.
This work presents the first example of a vulnerability and impact assessment method-
ology of air traffic network in case of explosive volcanic eruptions. Results produced
for the European air traffic system are presented in Paper III. Results of the analysis
are vulnerability maps for the main analyzed features (airports, flights, airspace sectors,
European regions) and impact maps for airspace sectors. Such maps put the basis for
long-term aviation management and allow identifying areas that are likely to suffer im-
pacts in case of occurrence of the considered eruption. Finally, based on long-term air
traffic data, it is possible to quantify expected disruptions at relevant airports.
It is worth noticing that a full characterization of physical vulnerability is beyond the
scope of our research, that is mainly focused on identifying the systemic vulnerability
of air traffic system. Regarding physical vulnerability of elements, it is assumed that all
exposed elements are equally vulnerable to the occurrence and overpassing of critical ash
concentration values (section 3.2.1), following a common approach presented by Douglas
(2007).
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Figure 3.8: Short-term impact assessment methodology, constituted by exposure and
vulnerability analysis (left) and ash dispersal forecast (right), whose outcomes are com-
bined by a GIS-based overlap to estimate expected impacts (bottom).
3.2.3 Short-term impact assessment on air traffic network
This section presents a methodology for the short-term impact assessment of air traffic
networks in case of explosive volcanic eruptions. Exposed elements are identified accord-
ing to the methodology presented in the previous section. Given that short-term analysis
is focused on the quasi-real-time estimation of impacts, a value of constant maximum
vulnerability is traditionally associated to the exposed elements (Douglas, 2007).
The proper impact assessment consists essentially in a GIS-based overlap of ash con-
centration maps and air traffic features (Fig. 3.8) that allows identifying which ones
may suffer disruptions. However, prior to these operation, an important task has to be
performed: the pre-processing of input data (i.e. air traffic data and TTDM outputs).
The aim of pre-processing is preparing the input data for the impact assessment.
The impact assessment methodology is automated into a GIS-based tool that performs
all the steps of the impact assessment and estimates the impacts, producing outputs in
different formats. The tool has been applied for assessing expected impacts in case of
occurrence of explosive volcanic eruptions at 2 active Icelandic volcanoes (Scaini et al.,
2011; Paper IV).
1. Pre-processing of TTDM outputs. Outputs from ash dispersal models contain
values of ash concentration at discrete points and at regular time intervals, which
typically range from 1 to 6 or 12 hours depending on the model configuration.
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Figure 3.9: Spatial structure of data sources. Forecasted concentration values are
interpolated at regular non-overlapping slabs, and each concentration threshold value
defines a time-dependent contaminated volume (shaded in light blue). A flight tra-
jectory is constituted by a series of segments, each with an average FL (bottom right
zoom). The impacted segments are shown in red.
Normally, these points conform 2D regular longitude-latitude grids that contain
values of concentration at discrete Flight Levels (FLs) or values of concentration
vertically averaged across slabs (e.g. from surface to FL200, from FL200 to FL300,
etc.). Hourly maps of ash concentration are extracted at given vertical levels, that
correspond to contiguous intervals of Flight Levels (FLs), that is, non-overlapping
slabs within which ash concentration is assumed constant along the vertical and
for each time interval (Fig. 3.9).
The pre-processing operations allow accounting for temporal and spatial uncer-
tainties related to the TTDM output through temporal and spatial buffers (Fig.
3.10). First, the “temporal buffer” creates a new contour map considering, for
each spatial point, the maximum value of concentration between the current time
and at previous/successive time steps (i.e. from t − nt to t + nt, where n defines
the extent of the temporal buffer). Then, a “spatial buffer” further increases the
area of the polygon by a quantity that increases with time in order to reflect the
loss of forecast accuracy with time. The user can configure both buffers depending
on the degree of confidence on the forecasts.
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Figure 3.10: (a) A temporal buffer can be applied to the model outputs to account
for time uncertainty in cloud location. For each vertical slab, concentration contours
are compared with those of previous/successive time steps and a new map containing
the maximum value for each cell is produced. (b) A spatial buffer can be applied to
account for spatial uncertainty in cloud location. The buffer enlarges the contaminated
region to an extent that increases with time. Both buffers can be switched on/off by
the user and configured depending on the model level of uncertainty.
The pre-processing stage extracts automatically ash concentration values at dis-
crete FLs, applies the temporal and spatial buffers and builds ash dispersal poly-
gons. Each contour (one for each threshold) delineates an area in which ash con-
centration overpasses the corresponding threshold. Tephra dispersal forecasts may
be stored in different formats, depending on the TTDM used. Currently, only
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Figure 3.11: Structure of the spatial database that stores the air traffic elements
(airports, airspaces, routes and segments). Each element is associated to an unique
identifier (ID) and several attributes.
Fall3d model is supported, but this can be easily resolved by modifying the script
to import data at different FLs and time intervals.
2. Air traffic data management. The short-term impact assessment methodology
relies on a DBMS to support automated queries at a given temporal resolution.
This research proposes and adopts a structure (i.e. a template) for storing air traf-
fic data that are taken as input for the short-term impact assessment (Fig. 3.11).
Air traffic data are automatically imported into the template and interfaced with
the GIS to perform impact assessment operations. Each entity is associated with
the unique identifier (ID) of the original air traffic database.
This template is the first database produced for the purpose of assessing impacts of
volcanic ash dispersal on air traffic during volcanic eruptions. Besides its function
in storing air traffic data (Fig. 3.11), the DBMS also contains also ash concentra-
tion data, and stores the results of the impact assessment analysis. The impact
assessment methodology has been applied to the European case-study (Scaini et al.
(2011); Paper IV) using air traffic data from EUROCONTROL Demand Data
Repository (DDR, EUROCONTROL, 2010). This database contains the last filed
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flight plans, constituted by way-points and connection segments. The analysis of
Scaini et al. (2011) is based on a representative day for April air traffic in Europe
in order to reproduce the 2010 aviation breakdown, while for Paper IV a day
that corresponds to worst-case meteorological conditions has been selected.
All the pre-processing and data management operations are automatically per-
formed by scripts that act as an interface between different tools (GIS, libraries,
DBMS). The methodology for extracting ash concentration and air traffic data
from the respective data sources is described in detail in Paper IV. Currently,
only the EUROCONTROL database used in Scaini et al. (2011) and Paper IV is
supported. A similar procedure could be applied to other data sources (different
TTDM outputs and air traffic datasets), increasing the usability of the tool for
different end-users. Air traffic could be available in different formats depending
on the used software package. Thus, air traffic data are not necessarily in the
same format that the tool can process. This can be easily resolved by writing a
dedicated script to import data in the required format.
3. Impact assessment. This section describes the methodology that allows identify-
ing features (airports, routes, sectors) that are expected to be affected by volcanic
ash dispersal. A first version of the impact assessment methodology has been
presented by Scaini et al. (2011) and it has subsequently improved it into a new
version (Paper IV).
Impact and disruptions are defined as situations in which the elements at stake
may suffer a loss of functionality. This may be due to the presence of volcanic
ash in critical concentrations (i.e., overpassing a given ash concentration thresh-
old) or to indirect effects (e.g. the disruption of an airport can influence airborne
operations). Similarly to the long-term methodology, in absence of physical vulner-
ability characterization for the exposed elements, it is assumed that all elements
are equally vulnerable to critical ash concentration values. The analysis is per-
formed at each time step of the analysis, that can vary depending on the temporal
resolution of data and, in particular, on the frequency at which ash concentration
is estimated by the TTDM model.
• Airports. Impact assessment of airports is based on identifying airports
expected to have critical ash concentration in the close airspace. Given
that most of take-off, landing and approach operations occurr at lower FLs,
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operations at airports having critical ash concentration at any of these FLs
are considered as potentially disrupted. In order to account for the spatial
extent of airports, a radial buffer is applied to the point features, at an extent
that can be selected by the user. The buffer accounts for the spatial extent of
airports control areas and may be in future replaced by other spatial units,
depending on forthcoming regulations.
• Routes. Regarding routes, the methodology refers to impacts on flights as
possible cancellations or modifications (rerouting, delay) that may be oper-
ated by the stakeholder responsible of taking the final decision on whether
to fly or not through ash-contaminated airspace. Flights expected to be
impacted are identified distinguishing two main cases: flights can be im-
pacted due to the expected closure of the arrival/departure airport or to
the presence of ash clouds along their path. This research also proposes a
new methodology for impact assessment based on the overall amount of ash
ingested by an aircraft over his path. In addition, Scaini et al. (2011) (Ap-
pendix B) show that, for intra-European flights, upper FLs are much less
congested than lower FLs. Also, in case of long-lasting eruptions with low
eruptive columns, upper FLs are in some cases free of ash. This suggests that
a flight disrupted at requested FL may be operated at upper FLs performing
a rerouting procedure. In order to support such operation, the methodology
allows identifying routes impacted at low FLs not expected to intersect the
ash cloud at upper FLs.
• Airspace sectors. If airspaces are affected by critical ash concentration they
are expected to be impacted. The percentage of sector affected by ash can
support a qualitative impact classification. Paper IV, for example, a high
impact on airspaces is associated to more than 50% of the sector surface
covered by ash. If the are affected is lower than 10% of the total area, impact
on airspace is considered low. These criteria have been chosen according to
personal experience and practical considerations, and may be changed in the
future according to end-user requirements.
Finally, given that airspaces have vertical extension and, in terms of ATM,
are considered as a single spatial feature, a final assessment is produced
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considering as potentially impacted all sectors where ash is forecasted at any
of the considered FLs.
The impact assessment methodology is then automated into a GIS-based tool that
performs all the steps automatically, producing outputs in different formats.
4. The GIS-based tool. A first version of the tool was presented by Scaini et al.
(2011) and then improved in a new version (Paper IV). The tool takes as inputs
air traffic data and TTDM outputs and applies the methodology described previ-
ously and showed in Figure 3.12.
The tool is constituted by several programs that post-process input data, overlap
TTDM outputs and air traffic data and estimate expected impacts. The user intro-
duces parameters for the analysis, such as the temporal resolution for the impact
assessment (Table 3.1). The tool automatically produces impact assessment out-
put in different formats. Graphical output is exported in two formats: shapefile,
that can be visualized through GIS, or kml files, for Google Earth. The tool can
also export the temporal series of impacts, for example the number of flights can-
celed over time, allowing the user to identify expected impact peaks. Examples of
outputs are presented in Scaini et al. (2011) and Paper IV. Thus, the tool favors
the visualization of TTDMs outputs and impact assessment results, recognized to
be crucial in order to improve the aviation management during crises.
The tool runs under Unix/Linux/Mac OX systems using shell scripting and needs
the installation of some software packages (GIS, DMBS and some processing li-
braries), all open source. Details are available in Paper IV.
This section presents the first impact assessment methodology specifically designed to
identify expected impacts of explosive eruptions on air traffic network. In addition, the
GIS-based tool allows the end-user to implement new spatial analyses not available with
existing tools in an automated and flexible way.
Results of its application can be found in Scaini et al. (2011) and Paper IV. These works
estimate expected impacts in case of occurrence of eruptive scenarios at Eyjafjallajo¨kull
and Katla volcanoes. Results are presented in Chapter 4 and provide useful insights for
the definition of response strategies in case of explosive volcanic eruptions in Europe.
Finally, the main caveats of the methodology and advantages and limitations of the tool
are discussed in Chapter 5.
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Figure 3.12: Workflow of the GIS-based tool. Input data (left) are pre-processed
and imported into the GIS engine, which performs the overlap and produces impact
assessment results in different formats (right).
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Table 3.1: Input parameters of the GIS-based tool for automated impact assessment
GROUP PARAMETER DESCRIPTION UNIT/TYPE
eruption date date of eruption start YYYY-MM-DD
General time interval Time interval for analy-
sis
hours
parameters eruption start eruption starting hours Multiples of DT
(hours after 00
UTC)
run end hours after eruption
start
Multiples of DT
(hours after 00
UTC)
Home path home path for writing
results
string
Data path Path to original
database
string
Paths Hazard path Path to forecast results string
Out path Path to output folder string
Source path Path to source code string
database types air traffic database used Name
Input Tables type format to import/ex-
port data from database
format (ex. csv)
data model type TTDM used Model name
output type format of modeling out-
put
Format (e.g.
netCDF)
data path path to grass location string
Grass location name of grass location Folder name
GIS mapset name of grass mapset Folder name
SQL path path to SQLite
database
string
company Filter data by company Y/N
company code company code for filter-
ing
Company code (ta-
ble attached)
Database departure air-
ports
filter data by departure
airport
Y/N
filtering departure air-
port code
departure airport code
for filtering
ICAO airport code
arrival airport filter data by arrival air-
port
Y/N
arrival airport
code
arrival airport code for
filtering
ICAO airport code
City pair filter data by city pair Y/N
airport buffer Airport spatial buffer decimal degrees
FL buffer FL vertical distance for
extraction
FL units
Uncertainties time buffer ash cloud time buffer multiple of DT
ash cloud
buffer
ash cloud spatial buffer decimal degrees
Value for in-
creasing buffer
Increasement of spatial
buffer
multiple of time in-
terval
Rerouting Rerouting
analysis
if you want to perform
the rerouting analysis
Y/N
Chapter 3. Methodology 65
3.3 Communication during explosive volcanic eruptions
3.3.1 Motivation
The 2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption caused unprecedented disruptions of air traffic op-
erations in Europe and highlighted major weaknesses of the scientific and operational
knowledge (Bonadonna et al., 2011a; Bolic´ and Sivcˇev, 2011). In particular, communi-
cation and information flow between the actors was identified as a major concern, and
its improvement is still an open issue (Bonadonna et al., 2011a; Bonadonna et al., 2013).
Both low risk perception during “peace time” and complexity of actors and relationships
implemented during emergencies contribute in incrementing the vulnerability of the avi-
ation system (Bolic´ and Sivcˇev, 2011), that may be reduced increasing preparedness and
response capability of stakeholders.
Actors involved in aviation management during explosive eruptions are: volcanologists,
atmospheric ash dispersal modelers, meteorological offices, aviation and airline man-
agers, pilots, air traffic controllers and national authorities. Since 2010, stakeholders
involved in civil aviation management are taking into higher consideration volcanic erup-
tions and subsequent air traffic disruptions in their risk management plans. Moreover,
many sectors indirectly impacted by aviation disruptions are now interested in devel-
oping strategies to lower socio-economic impacts (Jones and Bolivar, 2011). Thus, the
range of involved actors is being enlarged to include representatives of activities and in-
stitutions (local/regional authorities, productive activities, insurance companies, citizen
organizations, service providers), which should be considered in a comprehensive impact
assessment analysis.
However, there are no comparative studies on the opinion of specific groups (e.g. mod-
elers and aviation managers). In addition, due to the complexity and multidisciplinary
nature of the topic and the wide spectrum of productive sectors impacted, the num-
ber of involved actors is growing, and involved stakeholders are fragmented and do not
constitute a proper “community”. Moreover, most on-going scientific and technical de-
velopments are mainly focused on specific aspects that concern homogeneous groups
(e.g., modelers or aviation managers), often with little transversal interaction.
This analysis aims at identifying the relationships between many actors involved in
aviation management and their priorities in order to improve in the information flow
amongst them. An anonymous on-line survey was performed in order to identify the
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Figure 3.13: Flow chart of the survey, constituted by 10 thematic sections, containing
different question focused on specific groups of respondents (right).
needs of the stakeholders. Furthermore, the survey intends to obtain participants’ opin-
ion on the outcomes of this PhD research, and in particular on the GIS-based tool to
support aviation management during volcanic eruptions.
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3.3.2 The web-based survey
The web-based survey of the stakeholders was been performed through an anonymous
on-line questionnaire. Fig. 3.13 shows the structure of the survey. Sections contain
mandatory questions are signalized by the symbol * in the figure and in the full-text
survey (attached, Appendix C). Participants were classified into 4 homogeneous groups
in order to identify the needs of each group and underline the main differences: aviation
managers and employees, modelers and field scientists and other stakeholders.
The survey questions are focused on the following topics:
• Participants
• Tephra Transport and Dispersal Models (TTDMs)
• Ash Concentration Thresholds
• Forecast Temporal Resolution
• Air Traffic Management (ATM)
• Use of GIS
• Current Research on Impact Assessment
• Recent Developments
• Probabilistic Forecast Framework
• Communication
Results provide useful insights for the development of strategies to support policy-makers
in the aviation sector during such events and give a first-order identification of end-user
requirements for the development of our GIS-based tool. Chapter 4 collects the results
of the survey, and present the main findings.

Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Tephra dispersal hazard assessment for civil aviation
purposes
This PhD research produced probabilistic tephra dispersal hazard maps based on quan-
titative ash concentration thresholds, by applying the strategies presented in Section
3.1. Hazard maps were produced for two active volcanoes: Concepcio´n (Nicaragua) and
Popocate´petl (Mexico), presented respectively in Paper I and Paper II. Tephra dis-
persal hazard maps were also produced for specific time periods (i.e. wet/dry season)
in order to underline seasonal patterns.
This research has also contributed to the co-authored work of Sulpizio et al. (2012),
which presents probabilistic tephra dispersal hazard maps for Vesuvius (Italy) and in-
troduce the first maps of persistence. This research has also contributed to Biass et al.
(2014), which performs a multi-scale hazard assessment for 4 active Icelandic volcanoes.
Having identified the eruptive scenarios for four active volcanoes in Iceland, Biass et al.
(2014) present average persistence and arrival time maps at different FLs and at points
of interest (i.e. airports). The authors also calculate standard deviation of these vari-
ables in order to quantify uncertainties related to modeling results. The work of Biass
et al. (2014) is complemented by the companion paper included in this compendium
(Paper IV).
Given the multi-hazard character of explosive volcanism, tephra fallout hazard maps for
the considered volcanoes were also produced. These maps allow identifying the airports
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that are expected to be impacted by tephra fallout. Although such impacts occur only
at close distance from the volcano, the closure of airports can indirectly impact the
air traffic network. In addition, the analysis of expected impacts of ash fallout on the
infrastructural and socio-economic system can provide useful insights for estimating the
socio-economic impacts of air traffic disruptions.
This section presents the results of the mentioned works in chronological order based on
the publication date.
4.1.1 Hazard assessment at Concepcio´n, Nicaragua
Concepcio´n volcano in Ometepe Island, Nicaragua, is a highly active volcano with a rich
historical record of explosive eruptions. Tephra fallout from Concepcio´n jeopardizes the
surrounding populations, whereas volcanic ash clouds threat aerial navigation at a re-
gional level. The assessment of these hazards is thus important for territorial planning
and adoption of mitigation measures.
Probabilistic hazard maps for Concepcio´n volcano were computed considering three dif-
ferent eruptive scenarios based on past reference events. Following the work of Delgado-
Granados et al. (2006), three different eruptive scenarios for Concepcio´n volcano were
identified for low, medium and high magnitude eruptions (See Paper I for details).
Each scenario is associated to a reference eruption in the eruptive record of Concepcio´n
volcano, and to a Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI, Newhall and Self, 2008):
• Low Magnitude Scenario (LMS) considers an eruption similar to the 2009–2011
events. The scenario is characterized by a short, very small intensity eruption
(VEI≈ 1) with gas ejection and few emission of tephra, as has been occurring
since the 1977 eruption. This kind of event has the higher probability of short-
term occurrence. The expected consequences of the LMS are low to moderate
damages to proximal crops, minor damages to structures, and partial disruption
of traffic in the island.
• Medium Magnitude Scenario (MMS) considers an eruption similar to the 1977
event documented by Delgado-Granados et al. (2006). This scenario is character-
ized by a short-duration Strombolian eruption of moderate intensity (VEI≈ 2–3)
with development of a sustained eruptive column and considerable emission of
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Table 4.1: Ranges for main eruptive parameters considered in the tephra hazard
assessment for Popocate´petl volcano. A Gaussian PDF peaking at average value is
assumed. Values of MER are obtained from column height using the BPT relationships.
Parameter LMS MMS HMS
Column height (km) Min 2 3 12
Average 2 5 20
Max 2 7 28
MER (kg/s) Min 104 105 106
Average 104 5 ∗ 105 107
Max 104 106 108
Duration (h) Min 1 0.5 6
Average 1 1.5 30
Max 1 2.5 52
Mean particle size (φ) Min 1 2 2
Average 1 1 1
Max 1 0 0
tephra. Impacts are expected not only in the island, but also across the continen-
tal shore of the Nicaragua Lake.
• High Magnitude Scenario (HMS) considers an eruption similar to the 2720 B.P.
“Tierra Blanca” event, which marked the end of the first building phase of the vol-
canic edifice (Borgia and Van Wyk de Vries, 2003). This scenario is characterized
by a sub-Plinian to Plinian eruption (VEI≈ 4) with a vigorous sustained column
lasting from several hours to few days.
These three scenarios correspond to the most significant types of events expected for
Concepcio´n volcano and allow performing a general and coherent hazard assessment.
Table 4.1 shows the ranges of main eruptive parameters for the three eruptive scenarios
defined.
The modeling strategy adopted for the hazard assessment relies on the methodologies
presented in section 3.1.1. The Eruptive Source Parameters (ESPs) of the reference
events are based on previous geological analyses, and uncertainties in the definition of
the scenarios are accounted trough the use of Probability Density Functions (PDFs).
A representative meteorological dataset was created for each scenario by running the
WRF-ARW mesoscale meteorological model over a Typical Meteorological Year (TMY),
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Figure 4.1: Probabilistic hazard maps of tephra dispersal at FL050 (left) and 150
(right) for critical concentration values of 0.2 (top) and 2 (bottom) mg/m3, in case of
occurrence of a medium-magnitude eruptive scenario at Concepcio´n volcano.
defined in terms of wind speed and direction at a given atmospheric height (different for
each scenario).
Tephra transport and deposition under different eruption and wind conditions was mod-
elled using the FALL3D dispersion model. For MMS and HMS, hazard maps were
computed performing two simulations per day (eruptions assumed to start at 06:00 and
18:00 LT) during the whole TMY. In contrast, for the LMS a full hazard assessment
was not performed, as few simulations already showed that the consequences of this
event cause only minor effects. For each scenario, simulations were combined to build
probabilistic hazard maps for critical values of tephra load and for threshold values of
airborne ash concentration at relevant Flight Levels (FLs).
Results are probabilistic hazard maps for tephra fallout and dispersal, produced at local
and regional scale. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show airborne ash concentration hazard maps
for MMS and HMS at FL050 (left) and FL150 (right). Contours give the probability to
achieve values of 0.2 (top) and 2 (bottom) mg/m3 respectively.
Fig. 4.3 shows probabilistic hazard maps for ash fallout for HMS. For each eruptive
scenario, the probability (in %) of exceeding thresholds of tephra ground load and air-
borne ash concentrations at relevant locations (e.g. main towns and airports) was also
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calculated. Such maps are useful to identify the expected impacts for each eruption
type. Main results can be summarized as follows:
• LMS (2 km mean column height, VEI≈ 1) poses little threat on communities and
air traffic. Expected impacts of fallout consist of minor road traffic disruption in
areas close to the volcano. No substantial tephra accumulation is expected in the
main villages of Ometepe. Critical airborne ash concentration values are also very
localized and have a short duration.
• For the MMS (5 km mean column height, VEI≈ 2–3) results indicate that road
traffic disruption can be expected over the whole Ometepe Island and in the main-
land, with effects extending across the provinces of Rivas and Granada. However,
the probability of tephra fallout is very low at Managua and at the international
airport (5%). Tephra deposition could damage crops and pastures and affect the
mainland province of Rivas, where agriculture is the main economical activity.
Results suggest that collapse of buildings and structures would be very localized
in the volcano flanks, affecting mostly sparse buildings. However, it is worth to
mention that MMS threats large parts of the island, not because of copious tephra
fallout, but by remobilization of deposits emplaced at the volcano flanks during
Figure 4.2: Probabilistic hazard maps of tephra dispersal at FL050 (left) and 150
(right) for critical concentration values of 0.2 (top) and 2 (bottom) mg/m3, in case of
occurrence of a high-magnitude eruptive scenario at Concepcio´n volcano.
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Figure 4.3: Probabilistic hazard maps of ash fallout in case of occurrence of a MHS
scenario at Concepcio´n volcano. Contours give the probability to achieve values of 1
(top), 50 (middle), and 100 (bottom) kg/m2 respectively
eventual strong rain episodes. For this scenario, very weak seasonal influence was
found.
• HMS (20 km mean column height, VEI≈ 4) is likely to produce generalized dis-
ruption of ground transportation systems in the whole central part of Nicaragua.
This situation could easily lead to a north–south partition of the country, with
consequent damages to the main economical activities, including agriculture and
commerce. Emergency response operations should be prepared to cope with this
situation. Collapse of buildings and structures would be massive, especially in the
island of Ometepe and in the Rivas province and, to a lesser extent, also in Granada
and Managua. For this scenario there is a strong seasonal influence caused by the
variability of the prevailing winds in the upper atmosphere.
Managua International airport is the only international airport in Nicaragua and one of
the busiest in Central America. This work assessed at first-level the expected impacts
of each scenario on air traffic. The probability of declaring a no-fly zone (airborne ash
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concentration of 0.2 mg/m3) over most of the Nicaraguan airspace is not negligible for
MMS (up to 5%) and very high for HMS (up to 57%). For MMS, the airspace above
Rivas and Granada should probably be closed and the functionality of the Managua
airport may be reduced due to ash at low FL impeding landing and take-off operations.
However, ash clouds are typically dispersed in hours and, in practical terms, the cri-
sis could be managed with flight re-routing and reallocation. In contrast, the airspace
above Managua International Airport presents a high probability of affectation during
the HMS, which may cause serious disruption of the National and Regional air trans-
portation system.
Hazard maps developed for Concepcio´n volcano underline the threat of explosive vol-
canic eruption to the exposed areas, and point out the importance of adopting specific
mitigation measures for vulnerability reduction. These maps are thus important for the
definition of a strategic plan for sustainable land development and to improve medium
and long-term risk assessment in this region.
4.1.2 Hazard assessment at Vesuvius, Italy
This co-authored work assessed the hazard for civil aviation posed by volcanic ash from a
potential violent Strombolian eruption of Somma-Vesuvius. In case of unrest at Somma-
Vesuvius volcano, according to previous geological studies (Arrighi et al., 2001; Cioni
et al., 2008) there is a high probability (38 %) for the eruption to be violent Strombolian
(Neri et al., 2008). This type of activity has been in fact common in the most recent
period of activity (between AD 1631 and 1944). The selected eruptive scenario represents
the most likely volcanic activity at Vesuvius. The definition of the violent Strombolian
eruption scenario is explained in detail in Sulpizio et al. (2012). Table 4.2 summarizes
the input parameters defined for the modeled scenario.
Given that violent Strombolian eruptions typically last longer than higher-magnitude
events (from 3 to 7 days for the climactic phases), they are likely to cause prolonged
air traffic disruptions. Such impacts are likely to reach large distances due to the high
amount of fine ash typically produced during Vesuvius eruptive activity.
In this work, similarly to Paper I, probabilistic hazard maps were produced at two
flight levels (FL050 and FL300) and for two concentration thresholds (0.2 and 2 mg/m3)
that show the probability (in %) to exceed the threshold at any time during a violent
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Table 4.2: Eruptive scenarios considered in the tephra hazard assessment for Somma-
Vesuvius volcano, Italy (Modified from Sulpizio et al., 2012.
Mean Minimum Maximum Distribution
Eruption starting time - 1 3 Uniform
Eruption duration
(days)
5 3 7 Beta
Total mass (∗1011 kg) 2.5 1 5 Beta
Mean grain size coarse
mode (φ)
-1 -2 0 Beta
Mean grain size fine
mode (φ)
3 2 4 Beta
Dispersion grain size
(φ)
2 1 3 Beta
Density coarse mode
(kg/m3)
1.600 1.400 1.800 Beta
Density fine mode
(kg/m3)
2.700 2.600 2.800 Beta
Sphericity 0.92 0.90 0.94 Beta
% Aggregates 30 10 50 Beta
Column height (km) 6 3 9 Beta
Suzuki coefficient A 4 3 5 Beta
Strombolian eruption at Somma Vesuvius. In addition, this work presented the first
example of persistence time maps for ash dispersal (Fig. 4.4). Finally, the seasonal
influence on hazard assessment results was assessed with seasonal maps.
Results show that the occurrence of the considered eruptions at Vesuvius may affect
air traffic over the Central and Eastern Mediterranean area, and in particular South-
ern Italy, Greece and the Balkans. Aerial corridors passing over Southern Italy, South
Balkans, Greece and Northern Turkey have medium–high probability of being affected
by ash concentrations exceeding 0.2 mg/m3. Most of Italy, Central–Eastern Europe,
Turkey, part of North Africa and the Middle East are within the >10 % probability
contours.
Persistence time (Fig. 4.4) reaches 10–15 % of the eruption duration in a large area
that extends from the Western Mediterranean to Central Turkey, including Italy, part
of Central Europe and part of North Africa. It means that, in case of an eruption lasting
7 days, air traffic corridors within that area would be affected for an average period be-
tween 17 and 25 h. Persistence time of more than 25 % of eruption duration affects only
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Southern Italy, causing operational problems only for domestic aerial corridors (more
than 42 h for a 7-day eruption). The no-fly condition (threshold of 2 mg/m3) has a
limited impact on air traffic corridors, with probability in excess of 10 % encompassing
only Southern Italy, Central-Southern Balkans and Northern Greece.
Persistence is also relatively low, with values between 10 and 15 % that affect only
Southern Italy and the 1 % area that encompasses Central–Southern Italy, the Balkans
and Northern Greece. Medium–low persistence will only cause the disruption of do-
mestic aerial corridors over Southern Italy, allowing the long-range international flights
to reroute their tracks over the Western Mediterranean or Balkans. Disruption of air
traffic corridors over a large area including Balkans and Greece would be limited to a
few hours, and may cause some disturbance to air traffic over the Central Mediterranean
and Eastern Europe.
Figure 4.4: Persistence of given ash concentration values (0.2 and 2 mg/m3, left
and right respectively) at two flight levels (FL050 and FL300, top and bottom respec-
tively), in case of occurrence of the selected eruptive scenario. Persistence is defined
as the percentage of eruption duration (3-7 days) in which a concentration threshold is
exceeded
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The comparison with high-magnitude but shorter explosive volcanic events at Vesuvius
(Folch and Sulpizio, 2010) shows that, although a Plinian eruption such as the one mod-
eled by Folch and Sulpizio (2010) is likely to affect a larger area, the persistence of ash
might be longer in the case of less-intense eruptions. In fact, the transit times of the
ash clouds are limited to a few hours for the Subplinian eruption, but during the violent
Strombolian the persistence can be in the order of several hours to few days. It follows
that high-intensity eruptions can provoke disruption to air traffic over larger areas but
for shorter times than lower intensity, long-lasting eruptions.
The hazard maps produced by Sulpizio et al. (2012) assess the potential impacts of
a violent Strombolian eruption at Somma-Vesuvius to civil aviation over the Central
Mediterranean area and East Europe. These results point out that even low intensity
explosive eruptions at Vesuvius can have long-range consequences for aviation.
4.1.3 Hazard assessment at Popocate´petl, Mexico
Popocate´petl volcano is one of Mexico’s most active volcanoes. Its activity can threaten
a densely populated area that includes Mexico City, having by more than 20 million
inhabitants. The destructive potential of this volcano is demonstrated by its historical
eruptive activity, which has been characterized by recurrent Plinian eruptions of large
magnitude, the last two of which destroyed human settlements in pre-Hispanic times.
Popocate´petl’s reawakening in 1994 produced a crisis that culminated with the evacua-
tion of two villages on the North-eastern flank of the volcano. Shortly after, a monitoring
system was implemented, and a civil protection contingency plan was defined based on
a hazard assessment.
The current volcanic hazard map considers the potential occurrence of different vol-
canic phenomena, including pyroclastic density currents and lahars (a type of debris
flow composed of volcanogenic pyroclastic material). However, no quantitative assess-
ment of the tephra hazard, especially related to atmospheric dispersal, existed. Given
the high number of important airports in the surroundings of Popocate´petl volcano and
considering the potential threat posed to civil aviation in Mexico and adjacent regions in
case of a Plinian eruption, a hazard assessment for tephra dispersal is required. Paper
II presents the first probabilistic tephra dispersal hazard assessment for Popocate´petl
volcano.
The reference eruption considered for defining the eruptive scenario is the Ochre Pumice
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Table 4.3: Ranges for main eruptive parameters considered in the tephra hazard
assessment for Popocate´petl volcano.
Mean Minimum Maximum
Column height (km) 30.0 27.5 32.5
Eruption duration (h) 3.75 2.25 5.25
Mean grain size (φ) 4.00 2.25 5.75
eruption (OP, Arana-Salinas et al. 2010), selected as a possible Plinian eruption sce-
nario because it represents one of the best-studied Holocene eruptions of this volcano
and because, according to Mendoza-Rosas and De la Cruz-Reyna (2008), the probability
of occurrence of at least one eruption exceeding a VEI of 4 (i.e., a magnitude similar
to that of the Ochre Pumice eruption), over a period of 100 years is 10% and over 500
years is 43%.
Tephra dispersal was simulated using the FALL3D model. ESPs were constrained
through an inversion method (see Paper II for details) The estimates of volume based
on the isopachs and inversion agree on a total ejected tephra mass of value of 0.5 km3.
However, the volume may be larger (1.2 km3) according with the inversion performed
whith the metod of Sulpizio (2005). The value of column height obtained with the inver-
sion and in agreement with the isopleths data is 32 km, lower than the value obtained by
Aran˜a-Salinas et al. (2010). This value is more consistent with a volume of 0.5–1.2 km3.
Paper II presents a comparison of the parameters obtained with different inversion
methods.
Uncertainties related to the definition of ESPs were accounted using probability density
functions (section 3.1.1). Table 4.3 contains the ranges of main input parameters for
the eruptive scenario (column height, eruption duration and mean grain size of ejected
material). Once ranges were defined for eruptive parameters, a Gaussian PDF is as-
sumed within minimum and maximum values. Input parameters for the modeling were
subsequently sampled using the stratified sampling technique, as described in Paper I
and in section 3.1.1.
Probabilistic hazard maps were computed at different FLs and for the critical airborne
concentration thresholds introduced in Europe after 2010. Figure 4.5 shows probabilistic
hazard maps of ash concentration produced at FL050 for two concentration thresholds:
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Figure 4.5: Probabilistic hazard maps of ash dispersal in case of occurrence of the
selected eruptive scenario at Popocate´petl volcano. Contours give the probability to
achieve values of 2 mg/m3 (top) and 0.2 mg/m3 (bottom).
2 mg/m3 (top) and 0.2 mg/m3 (bottom). Contours give probability, in percent, of ex-
ceeding the given threshold value.
The eruptive scenario simulated for Popocate´petl volcano is likely to affect the airspace
of the Caribbean Gulf, reaching strategic airports such as Atlanta and Miami (U.S.) and
La Habana (Cuba). The majority of the airports in North-central Mexico would have
low to moderate probability of being affected by an ash concentration threshold of 0.2
mg/m3, whereas the airports of Mexico City, Puebla, and Ciudad del Carmen would
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Figure 4.6: Location of the 4 considered active Volcanoes (Askja, Hekla, Katla,
Eyjafjallajo¨kull) and main Icelandic towns (and airports (identified by the ICAO code.
BIKF = Keflav´ık, BIRK = Reykjav´ık, BIAR = Akureyri)
have more than 80% probability of exceeding this concentration threshold. An ash con-
centration value of 0.2 mg/m3 could lead to re-routing and other operations to enhance
air traffic security. For this reason, aerial corridors, especially those passing over south-
central Mexico would have a high probability of being disrupted or even interrupted,
with strong socio-economic consequences at National and Regional scale. The selected
eruptive scenario would also affect several important US airports including Houston
(Texas), Dallas (Texas), Miami (Florida) and Atlanta (Georgia, USA), the latest being
the busiest airports of North-America, and particularly relevant for cargo operation.
Detailed results are presented in Paper II and include the probability of being affected
and the average persistence of critical ash concentrations for relevant airports.
Finally, given that the selected eruptive scenario can produce ash fallout at relevant
distance from the volcano, a probabilistic hazard map was also produced for an ash load
of 1 kg/m2, which corresponds approximately to a deposit thickness of 0.1 cm. Results
show that few millimeters ash fallout could affect many airports in the whole Mexican
country, potentially interrupting crucial communication networks.
This study assessed the impact that a Plinian eruption similar to the Ochre Pumice
eruption would have on the main airports of Mexico and adjacent areas. The hazard
maps produced can support long-term planning that would help minimize the impacts
of such an eruption on civil aviation and on the whole society.
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4.1.4 Hazard assessment at 4 Icelandic volcanoes
This co-authored work (Biass et al., 2014, Appendix B) presents a multi-scale hazard
assessment for tephra dispersal from 4 Icelandic volcanoes (Askja, Hekla, Katla, Ey-
jafjallajo¨kull, Fig 4.6). These four volcanoes were selected for their high probabilities
of eruption and/or their high potential impacts, and the associated hazard was as-
sessed for dispersal at both national and European scale for different scenarios based on
the eruptive record (documented by past geological studies). The modeling strategies
adopted (Bonadonna et al., 2005; Biass and Bonadonna, 2012) are: Eruption Range
Scenario (ERS), One-Eruption Scenario (OES), Long-Lasting Eruption Range Scenario
(LLERS), Long-Lasting One-Eruption Scenario (LLOES). Ash dispersal was assessed for
Hekla, Askja and Katla, while for Eyjafjallajo¨kull only tephra accumulation was modeled
(Biass et al., 2014, Appedix B). Scenarios are associated to a volcanic explosivity index
(VEI) as described by Biass et al. (2014). Eruptive scenarios are summarized in Table 4.4
Each scenario was modeled assuming a statistical set of inputs using TEPHRA (Bonadonna
et al., 2005) and FALL3D (Costa et al., 2006; Folch et al., 2009) models for tephra fall-
out and dispersal, respectively. The procedure for defining the range of ESPs and their
probability distribution, as well as the modeling strategy adopted, is described in detail
by Biass et al. (2014) (Appendix B).
Results of the hazard assessment at the national scale are probabilistic hazard maps
for ground tephra accumulation. Given the rich historical record and high knowledge
Table 4.4: Eruptive scenarios considered in the tephra hazard assessment for 4 active
Icelandic volcanoes: Hekla, Askja, Katla and Eyjafjallajo¨kull. ERS: eruption range
scenario; OES: one-eruption scenario; LLERS: long-lasting eruption range scenario;
LLOES: long-lasting one-eruption scenario.
Volcano Modeling
strategy
Reference
eruption
Column
height
VEI Eruption
Duration
Eyjafjallajo¨kull LLOES 2010 2.5-7.8 2 40 days
Hekla ERS 2000 6.0-16.0 2 0.5-1h
Hekla ERS 1947 16.0-30.0 3 0.5-1h
Katla LLERS Historical
moderate-
large
10.0-25.0 - 1-4 days
Askja OES 1875 (C+D
phases)
22.8-26.0 5 1+1.5h
(C+D
phases)
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Figure 4.7: Example of average persistence (top) and arrival time (bottom) maps
produced for Askja volcano. Maps of average time (left) are complemented with the
respective standard deviation (right).
of Icelandic volcanic activity, it is possible for some volcanoes (e.g. Hekla) to associate
scenarios with a “repose time”, while other volcanoes have a short documented eruptive
history or do not seem to follow evolution patterns.
Results of the probabilistic hazard assessment are tephra dispersal hazard maps for three
ash concentration thresholds (corresponding to “zero tolerance” and to the concentra-
tion values introduced after the 2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption). Similarly to Paper I
and II, probabilistic hazard maps for ash concentration and maps of average persistence
time were produced. This research also produced new maps of average arrival time,
and complement persistence and arrival time with the calculation of standard deviation
(Biass et al., 2014, Fig. 4.7). All maps are produced both at given FLs and accounting
all FLs by performing a vertical integration.
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Results of the hazard assessment show that:
• A 10-year recurrence rate eruption of Hekla (i.e., Hekla ERS 2000 type) only
produces significant tephra accumulation close to the vent and in the southern
part of Iceland. Ash concentration has a low probability (<1 %) of exceeding the
threshold of 2 mg/m3 at any flight level (FL) in the UK airspace.
• A 100-year recurrence rate eruption of Hekla (i.e., Hekla ERS 1947 type) produces
substantial tephra accumulation in the southeastern part of Iceland. However,
far-range ash concentrations still have low probabilities (<5 %) of affecting the
UK airspace, with concentrations above the 2 mg/m3 threshold at any FL.
• A moderate long-lasting basaltic eruption of Katla (i.e., Katla LLERS with tephra
production over 1–4 days) is likely to produce substantial tephra deposition in
southern Iceland. Ash dispersal has a substantial probability of reaching north-
ern Europe, the UK (5–20 %) and central Europe (∼ 5 %) with concentrations
exceeding 2 mg/m3 at any FL
• An eruption of Askja similar to that of 1875 (i.e., Askja OES 1875 type) is likely
to produce massive tephra deposition in eastern Iceland. Ash dispersal has a
substantial probability of reaching northern Europe, the UK (5–20 %) and central
Europe (∼ 5 %) with concentrations exceeding 2 mg/m3 at any FL.
• For computational reasons, probabilistic approaches to assess the airborne concen-
tration resulting from an eruption of Eyjafjallajo¨kull similar to 2010 (i.e., Eyjaf-
jallajo¨kull LLOES 2010 type) were not applied.
Finally, in order to compare the relative impact of the different scenarios, one historical
eruption was selected for each volcano for which ash dispersal and atmospheric con-
centrations were assessed using the same wind conditions of the Eyjafjallajo¨kull 2010
eruption (14-24 April 2010). The selected eruptions include Hekla 1947, Katla 1918, Ey-
jafjallajo¨kull 2010 and Askja 1875. The conclusion was that all eruptive events, if they
were to occur, would likely disrupt the European air traffic, with the most important
perturbations caused by eruptions like Katla 1918 and Hekla 1947.
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4.2 Vulnerability assessment of air traffic system
4.2.1 Vulnerability and impact assessment at Nicaragua
During this research, a first-level exposure and vulnerability assessment was performed
at local level for Ometepe Island and at National level for the Nicaraguan country.
Results allow assessing expected impacts of the high-magnitude eruptive scenario pre-
viously defined for Concepcio´n volcano (Section 4.1.1). This analysis was presented to
the “GISRUK” conference (Liverpool) and the paper was published in the conference
proceedings (Scaini and Folch, 2012). In addition, results were presented at the “Cities
On Volcanoes” conference (Colima, Mexico, November 2013).
The first step of this analysis was the identification of exposed elements, i.e. the expo-
sure analysis. Critical issues at local scale are the high vulnerability of buildings, the
lack of redundancy of the road network (constituted by one main circumvention road
and few unpaved secondary roads). The main exposed elements (strategic buildings such
as schools and health care centers), activities (agriculture) and infrastructures (roads)
of Ometepe Island are shown in Fig. 4.8. Buildings in Ometepe have a overall high
vulnerability (Paper I), due to poor construction typologies and low maintenance of
buildings. From the socio-economic point of view, agriculture has a strategic role. The
main product is plantain, a variety of banana, and the production can be strongly im-
pacted by ash fallout. Finally, tourism activities are increasing in the area, also thanks
to the new airport of La Paloma, built in 2013.
From the local point of view, ash fallout in the island can produce direct and indirect
impacts on exposed elements. Strategic buildings in Ometepe can be damaged by 100
kg/m2 load at ground, while primary roads are likely to be affected by 1 kg/m2 load. In
particular, the primary road network, which measures about 50 km, has 70% probability
of being totally impacted by ash fallout. Crops can be damaged by 1 kg/m2 tephra load
(total crops are ∼ 145 km2 and have a 50% probability of being totally disrupted by the
HMS scenario). Tephra accumulation at ground and in particular on the flanks of the
volcano increases the probability of having lahars, triggered by rain. These phenomena
may produce strong indirect impacts on population and exposed assets. Finally, tephra
fallout and dispersal can cause the closure of La Paloma airport due to tephra accu-
mulation and subsequent disruption of flights in the area. This can produce a strong
impact on socio-economic activities including tourism.
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Figure 4.8: Exposed elements considered at local scale for Nicaragua: strategic build-
ings (left), road network (middle) and (agricultural activities)right.
From the National point of view, the agricultural activity represents the 19.6 % of GDP
and employs a 30% of population. Agricultural production can be strongly affected by
tephra fallout in the central part of the country. Major Nicaraguan agricultural ex-
ports to US are coffee, spices, beef, sugar, peanuts, hardwood, shrimp and lobster, while
Nicaragua imports from U.S. mainly cereals and oil. The most important industrial cen-
ters are Managua, Leo´n, Chinandega and Granada (Fig. 4.9), and the main products
are textile and leather products, processed food and beverage and chemical products.
Most of the goods produced in the central part of the country are likely to be exported
by road and air traffic. Thus, transportation network has a high relevance for the na-
tional economy. Ash fallout from Concepcio´n volcano can affect road traffic and disrupt
road commerce. In particular, the main Nicaraguan trade vector is the Panamerican
corridor. It is worth noticing that the presence of a railway would decrease systemic
vulnerability by increasing redundancy of transportation system.
Finally, tephra produced by a high-magnitude scenario at Concepcio´n volcano can affect
substantially operations within the Nicaraguan airspace and main airports (Fig. 4.9).
In particular, Managua airport is the main of the region, and has about 20 daily con-
nections with U.S. (Miami, Houston, Atlanta) and main centro-american capitals (San
Salvador, San Jose´, Panama´). Given that U.S., Canada and El Salvador are Nicaraguan
main partners in trade (60.2, 8.3 and 4.6% of GDP, respectively), a disruption of cargo
operation main affect national economy. In addition, many touristic airports have been
opened in the relevant touristic areas, including Ometepe. The disruptions of flights
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Figure 4.9: Impact of tephra fallout on main elements considered in the exposure
analysis at National scale: airports and road network. Tephra fallout due to a high
magnitude scenario can disrupt road traffic in the Pan-American road and air traffic
at main airports (i.e. Managua) and smaller airports with imporance for tourism (e.g.
Ometepe).
may thus cause relevant economic losses to the Nicaraguan economy.
Medium and high magnitude scenarios at Concepcio´n volcano may cause partial dis-
ruption of Nicaraguan airspace due to ash-contamination, affecting local airports (e.g.
Ometepe) and the main National airport of Managua, strategic for economic activities
of the country. In addition, tephra fallout can affect local and regional economy by
disrupting roads, and amongst them the Pan-american highway, causing an internal dis-
connection in the country (as mentioned in 4.1.1). Finally, tepha fallout may impact
local population by damaging crops, highly relevant for both internal economy and ex-
portation.
Socio-economic, transportation and import-export data for the analysis were gathered
in the web pages of National and International institutions such as the Empresa Admin-
istradora de Aeropuertos Internacionales (EAAI, http://www.eaai.com.ni/), the Airport
Council International (ACI, http://www.aci-na.org/), the Office of the United States
Trade Representatives (http://www.ustr.gov/), the United States Department of Agri-
culture (USDA, http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome) and the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/).
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4.2.2 Vulnerability and impact assessment or European air traffic net-
work
This PhD research produced the first vulnerability and impact assessment methodology
specifically defined for air traffic network. Due to the high impact of the 2010 Ey-
jafjallajo¨kull eruption on air traffic network, this issue became particularly relevant at
European scale. Systemic and socio-economic vulnerability of the European air traffic
network to tephra dispersal was analyzed, estimating expected impacts in case of occur-
rence of the eruptive scenarios defined by Biass et al. (2014) for the considered Icelandic
volcanoes (Askja, Hekla, Katla and Eyjafjallajo¨kull, Fig. 4.6). The analysis has been
performed at both national and European scale.
4.2.2.1 National scale
Given the strong impacts of tephra fallout at local scale, the vulnerability and impact
assessment analysis has been also performed for tephra fallout (Biass et al., 2014, Ap-
pendix B). Hazardous scenarios considered for the Icelandic case-study, and in particular
at Hekla, Askja and Katla, are likely to produce impacts on strategic infrastructures
(i.e. electricity network and power plants). The exposed elements identified in the ex-
posure analysis are: population, strategic buildings (hospitals, local health care centers
and schools, which can be used as ash shelters), electricity network, hydroelectric and
geothermal power plants, economic activities (production sites, main cities, agricultural
areas) and presence of water supplies. The main exposed assets considered in the analy-
sis are summarized in Fig. 4.10). The vulnerability analysis, developed from a systemic
point of view, was applied only to the relevant indicators for the hazard at stake, and
limited by the data availability. In particular, the vulnerability was analyzed for electric
power plants and electricity network, road network and agricultural activities.
Eruptions at Hekla may be particularly problematic due to its proximity to most Ice-
landic power plants. Scenarios at Askja and Katla volcanoes can produce substantial
impacts on agricultural activities (mainly pastures). Finally, road network can be dis-
rupted by tephra fallout, in particular in the South-East of the country. Tephra fallout
is not likely to impact main Icelandic airports (Keflav´ık, Reykjav´ık and Akureiri, Fig.
4.6) due to the dominating Eastwards winds. Results of the national-scale analysis are
described in detail in Paper III.
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Figure 4.10: Exposure maps for (a) road network and critical infrastructures; (b)
electricity distribution network, hydroelectric and geothermal power plants, production
sites and main locations (urban areas); and (c) main transport nodes: ports and airport.
4.2.2.2 European scale
The analysis at the European scale is based on three exposed elements: airports, air traf-
fic routes and Flight Information Regions (FIRs). Results of the vulnerability assessment
at European scale (Fig. 4.11) allow identifying the strategical features (airports, routes)
for the European air traffic network. The analysis is performed for the whole system
and for specific subsystems (e.g. the air traffic between Iceland and U.K., Fig. 4.11,
bottom).
In addition, the methodology allows assessing the relevance of air traffic for European
regions, based on a combination of four regional indicators: population (Eurostat, 2013,
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Figure 4.11: Results of vulnerability assessment for exposed elements: airports (top)
and routes (bottom), for passengers (left) and freight (right) air traffic
data from 2012); total number of passengers and tonnes of freight transported by air (Eu-
rostat, 2013, data from 2011); and multimodal accessibility, which takes into account the
presence/absence of alternative transport modes and their cost (ESPON, 2004; TRACC,
2010, p. 17). This research proposed a first-level assessment of socioeconomic vulnerabil-
ity by combining these four indicators under the assumption that vulnerability increases
when the dependency on air traffic is higher and the multi-modal accessibility lower.
All indicators refer to the 2003 NUTS-2 regions (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for
Statistics), a hierarchical system for dividing the economic territory of the EU for the
application of regional policies. The combination of demographic, trade and accessibility
information identifies NUTS-2 regions with higher dependency on air traffic (Fig. 4.12),
i.e., those more vulnerable to air traffic network disruptions. For example, Ireland has
a high vulnerability because it is an island (which inherently has a low multi-modal
accessibility) and has strong social and commercial relationships with the UK, result-
ing in high socioeconomic impacts in the event of air traffic disruption. Also, Nordic
countries such as Denmark and Norway are likely to be affected, in particular those re-
gions with lower multi-modal accessibility. Flexibility of the transportation system and
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Figure 4.12: Results of vulnerability assessment for European NUTS-2 regions, ob-
tained by combining demographic, trade and accessibility information. The map allows
identifying NUTS-2 regions with higher dependency on air traffic and therefore more
vulnerable to air traffic disruptions.
multi-modal accessibility are in fact critical factors that strongly influence the societal
response to air traffic disruptions (Alexander, 2013). Moreover, a strategy that allows
taking advantage of all different transportation means can strongly reduce losses during
emergencies, as shown by Jones and Bolivar (2011) for the case study of Malta during
the 2010 aviation disruption.
Finally, the methodology allows estimating expected impacts on FIRs, the spatial unit
currently adopted for air traffic management in Europe. In fact, air traffic management
is based on the capacity of airspace sectors, which include several FLs (Cook, 2007). For
these reasons, and given that the FIRs unit is maintained in case of volcanic eruptions,
expected impact maps at FIRs may be particularly useful for aviation stakeholders. The
methodology produces comprehensive impact maps for FIRS that include the expected
impacts at all FLs and provide a synthetic, conservative and meaningful results. Such
maps can support for the development of an SRA and other risk management plans.
Results of impact assessment at European scale (Fig. 4.13) point out that the consid-
ered scenarios at Hekla volcano, characterized by lower magnitude and repose time, can
affect Icelandic and U.K FIRs, and should therefore be taken into account due to their
higher frequency of occurrence. The occurrence of higher-magnitude eruptions at Askja
and Katla, having higher repose time, may cause substantial impacts to European air
traffic, reaching strategic features in central Europe. Finally, all eruptions can cause
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Figure 4.13: Expected impact at European FIRs in case of occurrence of the con-
sidered eruptive scenario at Hekla (a,b, respectively for 2000 and 1947-type scenarios),
Askja (c) and Katla (d)
socio-economic impacts at local scale (i.e. disrupting important connections for local
economies) and, for higher-magnitude and/or long-lasting eruptions, at regional scale.
Results at the European scale show that:
• The occurrence of a low-magnitude scenario at Hekla (see Biass et al., 2014 for
details) is likely to have very high impacts on the Reykjav´ık FIR (∼ 950 passengers
stranded for at least 5 h) and high impacts for the London FIR (∼ 23000 passengers
stranded for at least 3 h).
• The occurrence of a higher magnitude scenario at Hekla is likely to have very high
impacts on the Reykjav´ık FIR (∼ 1500 passengers stranded for at least 8 h) and
high impacts for the London FIR (∼ 27000 passengers stranded for at least 4 h).
The FIR of Paris, Brest and Marseille would also be strongly impacted.
• The occurrence of considered scenario at Askja is likely to have very high impacts
on the Reykjav´ık FIR (∼ 3600 passengers stranded for at least 18 h) and high
impacts for the London FIR (∼ 60000 passengers stranded for at least 8 h). FIRs
above France, Germany and Scandinavia would also be impacted.
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• The occurrence of the considered scenario at Katla is likely to have a very high
impact on the Reykjav´ık FIR (∼ 4300 passengers stranded for at least 21 h) and
high impact for the London FIR (∼ 78000 passengers stranded for at least 10 h). It
is also likely that FIRs above France, Germany and Scandinavia would be strongly
impacted.
Results of the application of the vulnerability assessment methodology can support
decision making at both national and European scales. In particular, impact maps
on FIRs could improve preparedness and help develop risk mitigation actions in Iceland
and support longterm risk management plans of companies that operate in the European
airspace (e.g., SRA).
4.3 Impact assessment of European air traffic network
This research proposes one of the first GIS-based tools for assessing expected impacts
of volcanic eruptions on air traffic. The tool was applied to two case study: a posteriori
analysis of the Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption and its impacts, and expected impacts from a
“worst-case” eruption at Katla volcano, described respectively in Scaini et al. (2011)
and Paper IV. In particular, the first case-study makes use of a prototype of the tool,
subsequently improved for the second application. Detailed results of the application
of the tool to the eruptions of Eyjafjallajo¨kull and Katla are presented respectively in
Scaini et al. (2011) and Paper IV.
4.3.1 A posteriori analysis of the Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption and its im-
pacts
The fist application of the impact assessment was an analysis of the Eyjafjallajo¨kull erup-
tion in 2010 and its impacts on European aviation. The 2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption
has been modeled by different authors using different TTDMs. Amongst them, Folch
et al. (2012) simulated 10 days of the eruption (from 14th to 24th April 2010) using the
FALL3D model (Costa et al., 2006; Folch et al., 2009). Given that the volcanological
inputs relied on hourly-averaged radar observations of plume height and characteriza-
tion of the ejected material, and because a posteriori simulations use better-constrained
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Figure 4.14: Hourly impacts on airports from 15th and 16th April 2010 at FL050. The
plot shows the number of impacted airports for the critical ash concentration threshold
considered (zero tolerance, 0.2 and 2 mg/m3). The X-Axis origin corresponds to the
eruption onset. Note that the Y-Axis has logarithmic scale.
(defined) meteorological and volcanological model inputs, it comes at no surprise that
outcomes from reanalysis simulations can be different from those of forecasts.
This analysis was performed using the initial prototype of the GIS-based tool. At this
stage, the elements considered for impact assessment were only airports and routes. The
impact assessment procedure is similar to the one explained in section 3.2.3 for the fi-
nal version of the tool, which includes also impacts on FIRs. Results of this analysis
allow identifying hourly impacts (routes canceled and airports closed), stored into ta-
bles and maps in GIS and GoogleEarth formats. Temporal plots underline the peaks in
the number of impacted airports and routes (Fig. 4.14 and 4.15). It is worth noting
that, although based on real meteorological and air traffic data, the expected impacts
from Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption are lower with respect to those documented during the
event (Scaini et al., 2011). This is due to the high secondary impacts caused by air
traffic disruptions (e.g. disruptions of flights due to airport/airspace closure or changes
in crew/fleet allocation), not accounted by the tool. Also, the outcomes of the modeling
performed by Folch et al. (2012) are different from the ones available to aviation author-
ities during the 2010 emergency.
Finally, this initial analysis points out that upper FLs (e.g. FL400) had a lower ash-
contamination (due to the low eruptive column). It is therefore speculated that upper
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Figure 4.15: Hourly impacts for 15th and 16th April 2010 for FL 150, 200 and 250
(from top to bottom). The plot shows the number of impacted routes for the critical
ash concentration threshold in case of zero tolerance (blue) and for the thresholds of
0.2 and 2 mg/m3 (red and yellow, respectively)
FLs may host rerouted air traffic, in particular in case of low-column eruptions such as
the Eyjafjallajo¨kull event in 2010.
4.3.2 Impact assessment due to an eruptive scenario at Katla volcano
associated to “worst-case” meteorological conditions
The final version of the tool has been applied to assess expected impacts from a “worst-
case” eruption at Katla volcano, Iceland. The eruptive scenario is based on Biass et al.
(2014) for Katla volcano. Explosive activity in Iceland is likely to impact the European
air traffic network in case of winds blowing towards the main continent. Previous studies
(e.g. Leadbetter and Hort, 2011; Biass et al., 2014) have estimated that the probability
of having “unfavorable” wind conditions is of about 8-10% according to wind statistics
for the 2000-2010 period, but this percentage increases during the winter season. In
this particular example, a “worst-case” meteorological scenario is assumed, that is, a
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Figure 4.16: FALL3D model forecasts for the Katla eruptive scenario after 24, 48
and 72 hours from the eruption onset (left to right). Maps show contours of ash
concentration equal to the three considered thresholds (0.002, 0.2 and 2 mg/m3) at
FL050, FL250 and FL400 (top to bottom).
synoptic weather situation is selected in which winds at altitude blow towards U.K and
Central Europe. Ash dispersal in atmosphere was simulated using the FALL3D model
(Costa et al., 2006; Folch et al., 2009), which furnishes hourly ash concentration values
at each grid point and at equally spaced FLs (from FL050 to 400 at intervals of 5000
ft). The simulation starts on 1 January 2009 (coinciding with a “worst case” weather
scenario) and lasts for 72 hours. Ash concentration values above 2 mg/m3 are forecasted
in U.K. and Germany at different times (Fig. 4.16). The impact assessment analysis
lasts for 3 days, from the 1st to the 3rd of January 2009. Note that, in a real case, the
analysis will be constrained by the length, time frequency and spatial resolution of the
forecast(s) driving the impact analysis.
Figure 4.17 shows an example of impact maps produced for each time step of the anal-
ysis for the exposed features (airports, routes, FIRs). In addition, the tool produces
plots that summarize expected impacts, that allow identifying the peaks of expected
impacts. Fig. 4.18 show an excerpt of results, displaying total results of the impact
assessment analysis for airports, routes and FIRs (from left to right). These results are
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Figure 4.17: Impact maps in digital format (shapefiles, top, and kml, bottom) pro-
duced by the tool for the exposed elements (airports, routes, FIRs).
Figure 4.18: Impact assessment results: example of temporal series of the number of
airport closed, routes canceled and FIRS impacted (left to right, respectively).
comprehensive of all FLs, while specific plots at given FL and for given concentration
thresholds can be produced if needed. In the new prototype of the tool, the limitations
of the tool presented in the previous section were partially tackled (see Paper IV for
details). For instance, airspace contamination and flights disrupted due to airport clo-
sure were accounted. Results show that the contribution of airport closure to the total
impacted flights is quite high, and underline the importance of establishing clear proto-
cols for airport impact assessment (Fig. 4.19). In addition, based on the considerations
presented in Scaini et al. (2011), the final version of the tool includes a simple model
for re-routing of flights expected to be impacted. Results of the rerouting show that
a low portion would be reroutable. Although this methodology has many limitations,
this mitigation measure may be improved in future and would allow lowering economic
impacts of disruption of a small fraction which could still be relevant in case of strategic
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Figure 4.19: Contributions of forecasted in-flight encounters (blue) and airport dis-
ruptions (yellow) to the total number of impacted flights during the considered period
routes at regional/local level (Paper III).
Results of this analysis show that in case of “worst-case” meteorological conditions and
high-magnitude explosive scenario, volcanic ash contamination may produce substantial
impacts in most European airspace.
4.4 Aviation management during explosive volcanic erup-
tions: the stakeholders’ perspective
A publication (Scaini et al., submitted) present the results of the first specific survey
focused on different group of stakeholders involved in civil aviation management during
explosive volcanic eruptions. Results give an overview of the stakeholders’ opinion on
main scientific developments and new procedures and point out the main open issues (e.g.
definition of threshold for operating in ash-contaminated airspace, model uncertainties,
operational constraints, knowledge gaps).
• Survey respondents. 5 sub-groups were identified amongst the respondents,
which allow identifying the main opinions and needs of each group of stakeholders.
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The stakeholders involved in civil aviation management during explosive volcanic
eruptions can be divided into 3 main groups: scientific (S), aviation (A) and other
(OT) stakeholders (i.e. representatives of activities indirectly related to aviation,
such as import/export and insurances). In addition, the scientific group is con-
stituted by atmospheric modelers (SM) and field and monitoring scientists (SF),
while the aviation group (A) is constituted by aviation managers (AM) and em-
ployees (AE), including controllers, pilots and crew. A total of 115 responses were
obtained, 66 of which complete (some non-mandatory questions could be skipped).
Respondents are well distributed amongst the 5 groups.
• Tephra Transport and Dispersal Models (TTDMs). Participants belonging
to the “atmospheric modelers” and “field and monitoring” scientific groups (SM
and SF, respectively) that considered themselves familiar with TTDMs inputs
(80% of the total) were also asked to associate the perceived level of uncertainty of
each model input/output. Results are very homogeneous across these two groups,
which in general have a similar background. However, a difference exists for un-
certainties of monitored parameters such as plume vent exit velocity or ash cloud
height and load, which are associated to a “high” uncertainty by the modeling
community and to a “medium” uncertainty by monitoring community. Almost
all respondents recognize the main input parameters used by most TTDM, i.e.
wind field and the so-called Eruption Source Parameters (ESPs) such as eruption
column height, particle size distribution (including fraction of fine ash), and mass
eruption rate. However, specific answers underline that some respondents were not
aware of the need of using air humidity for quantifying ash aggregation, as well as
plume monitoring for source term assimilation.
Not surprisingly, aviation stakeholders (A) use model outputs mainly for civil avi-
ation management (36%) and airline management (26%), as illustrated in Figure
4.20. In contrast, the other groups (scientific and other stakeholders, S and OT re-
spectively) use model results mostly for research purposes (37%). Approximately
20% of both groups use model outputs for emergency management. The most used
model output format amongst all respondents consists of ash concentration maps
in graphical format, used by over 50% of aviation stakeholders. This underlies
the importance of providing ash concentration maps to the aviation stakeholders
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during a crisis, rather than or in addition to the “official” text messages (e.g. Vol-
canic Ash Advisories). Other data formats such as grib or NetCDF are scarcely
used by aviation stakeholders (only 3% of group respondents). This is relevant
because these data formats allow scientists to pack and include a large amount of
information for further model post-process. In this sense, digital maps (i.e. files
in GIS-compatible formats), used by 10% of aviation stakeholders, may act as an
intermediate format for supporting decision-makers, providing these users with a
more accessible but simultaneously detailed information on ash cloud properties.
After that, examples of several model graphical outputs were presented, including
arrival and persistence time maps (Sulpizio et al., 2012; Biass et al., 2014) or
probability maps resulting from ensemble model strategies (e.g. Folch, 2012).
All respondents were very familiar with raster images, cloud extent maps and ash
Figure 4.20: Use of tephra dispersal models amongst the survey participants and b)
preferred output formats for the participants.
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concentration charts (Fig. 4.21). With respect to usefulness, raster images and ash
concentration charts are considered the most useful, followed by cloud extent maps.
Finally, probabilistic curves are found useful by 75% of scientific stakeholders (S),
but this percentage drops to 50% for aviation stakeholders (A).
Finally, survey participants were inquired about the introduction of standardized
model outputs. 75% of respondents support the definition of standards for model
outputs, and a larger percentage (90%) considers that standard outputs would
enhance interoperability between different VAACs. The last point of this thematic
section regards SO2 and its impacts on aircraft components (Casadevall, 1994;
Osiensky and Hall, 2008). 65% of the participants consider SO2 a medium-to-high
hazard to civil aviation, while only 22% rank this hazard as low.
• Criteria for defining critical thresholds. This thematic section aims at sur-
veying about different criteria to delimit fly/no fly regions in ash-contaminated
airspaces and, in particular, on the use ash concentration thresholds considering
the current level of uncertainties. Given that this aspect is particularly critical
in Europe, the survey initially distinguished between global and European scales,
but results did not show relevant differences. Figure 4.22 shows the results for
the European scale, for the 3 main groups: aviation (A), scientific (S) and other
stakeholders (OT) in order to determine if different perspectives exist regarding
Figure 4.21: Familiarization and b) usefulness of modeling output formats according
to aviation stakeholders (A) and other groups (scientific and other stakeholders).
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the fly/no fly criteria. Results clearly show that the current “zero ash tolerance”
criterion is the less popular and considered as less applicable by all groups. The cri-
terion based on “visible ash” is particularly favored amongst aviation stakeholders,
who consider it as “highly applicable” (>75%), but not amongst scientists (only
a 22% favours this criterion). The criterion based on forecasted concentrations
combined with a threshold value (e.g. the 2 mg/m3 adopted in Europe during
2010), received an overall high consensus (> 60% of the three groups). However,
this option is associated to a low applicability by aviation stakeholders. The most
“popular” and “applicable” criterion results from a combination of different meth-
ods.
• Forecast temporal resolution. Traditionally, volcanic hazard assessment dis-
tinguishes between short and long term, where the former applies to emergencies
and response (hours to days) and the latter to planning and preparation (years
to decades). This distinction is not made by other stakeholders, for which “short-
term” and “long-term” have different meanings. In order to clarify this point,
participants were asked to indicate the temporal scales considered as short and
long-term in their everyday work. Answers for all respondents and for the aviation
Figure 4.22: Agreement and b) applicability of the methods proposed for the defi-
nition of critical thresholds for aviation operations. Answers are showed for the three
respondents groups: scientific (S), aviation (A) and other stakeholders (OT).
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group show discrepancies between the aviation group and other respondents, in
particular for long-term definition. Moreover, and given the importance of timely
information exchange during an emergency, a question was posed on the preferred
(and current) time frequency of forecasts and retrievals. All groups would like to
receive forecasts every 1 to 6 hours and a substantial percentage (approximately
45%) of both aviation groups would prefer to receive updates at time intervals of
less than 1 hour, much lower than the current ones (typically every 6 to 12 hours).
• Air Traffic Management (ATM). The two groups of participants related to
aviation (about 30% of the total survey participants) were asked to rate the use-
fulness of having different types of data before and during an eruption. At any
time, meteorological data was regarded as the most crucial one for most respon-
dents. However, ash detection and quantitative data retrievals from satellites and
on-board instrumentation were also considered as relevant. Ash dispersal maps
(intended as model outputs in some map format) were ranked as useful by over
80% of respondents. In contrast, this community considers data on ash particle
size/composition and ESPs (e.g. eruption column height) as less relevant for their
decisions.
• Use of GIS. Given that some recent improvements (Scaini et al., 2011; Paper
III; Paper IV) rely on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) for post-processing
model outputs and further assessing expected impacts on aviation, stakeholders
were asked about GIS-based software. A vast majority (85%) of the participants
that are familiar with GIS-based software (Fig. 4.23). Most consider that GIS
could support their current work and that raster data would improve their im-
pact analyses (42 and 50% of the “modeling” and “monitoring and field scientists”
sub-groups respectively). However, the percentage drops to <20-30% for aviation
employees and managers. Finally, aviation managers and monitoring communi-
ties are quite familiar with Database Management Systems (DBMS) and spatial
DBMS.
• Current research on impact assessment. Research is taking place to imple-
ment technical solutions to bridge the gap between communities. In particular, the
tool presented in section 3.2 allows assessing expected impacts on aviation features
(airports, routes, and airspace sectors) based on merging model forecasts with air
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Figure 4.23: Familiarization of participant (divided into the 5 sub-groups defined in
section 2.1) with Geographical Information Systems (GIS)
traffic data using a GIS-based environment. In order to better tailor this tool to
end-user needs, the stakeholders’ opinion was asked on different aspects.
First, aviation stakeholders (A) showed a high interest in impact assessment out-
comes, rated as useful by more than 85% (the rest of stakeholders gave a high
percentage of N/A to this question). Moreover, more than 80% considers that
hourly updates of impacts would be useful in their work, confirming that man-
agers would appreciate an increment in forecast frequency. Second, over 90% of
aviation stakeholders rate as useful the automatic generation of impact maps, ta-
bles and series, particularly in formats compatible with visualization in Google
Earth or GIS-based software. Impact results in the form of time series and hourly
tables (e.g. list of expected impacted flights and airports) were rated as useful by
90 and 70% of aviation managers and employees and by more than 45% of aviation
managers respectively. Third, given that results of impact assessments can also
be classified in a qualitative way (i.e. “high”, “medium”, “low”, etc.), the sur-
vey intends to identify which scales are more suitable to support decision-making.
More than 70% of aviation stakeholders prefer a 3-class ranking. For quantitative
assessment of impact on airplanes, a substantial fraction (39%) prefers the time
flown in the ash cloud, followed by the flown distance. Finally, a majority would
appreciate selecting input parameters for the impact assessment analysis. Higher
preferences are obtained for geographical area and ash concentration thresholds,
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but aviation mangers and employees also showed interest on choosing specific FLs,
airports and routes.
• Recent developments. This section surveys the opinion of stakeholders on dif-
ferent developments introduced after 2010. There is a general agreement on the
importance of improving monitoring techniques, deploying on-board instrumenta-
tion and perform ad-hoc or opportunistic measurements from aircraft. However,
aviation stakeholders give higher scores to specific aviation management practices
such as SRA and training, while other groups (atmospheric modelers in particular)
underline the importance of ensemble forecast and data assimilation techniques.
Volcanologists are used to deal with a priori eruption scenarios that can provide
a sort of “first-order” immediate forecast when an eruption starts. The aviation
community shows a low awareness of this possibility but, nonetheless, aviation
managers and employees consider that a priori forecasts could support air traffic
management during unrest and increase preparedness. Most aviation managers
and other stakeholders do not think that a priori forecasts can be confusing, but
many aviation employees think so.
• Probabilistic forecast framework. Meteorologists and atmospheric dispersal
models are familiar with probabilistic forecasts generated by means of ensemble
techniques (i.e. an ensemble of runs with different models or different scenar-
ios). In contrast, other communities are less used to deterministic prognostics and
may be reticent to adopt a probabilistic framework (and a cost-benefit analysis)
for decision-making. Results of the survey show that more than 65% of the re-
spondents agree with the introduction of probabilistic framework in their work.
However, 45% of respondents (mainly aviation managers and modelers) think that
deterministic approach is easier to understand, which is a strong point of criticism
against probabilistic strategies. On the other hand, given that probabilistic data
are usually classified in a qualitative scale, respondents were asked which is the
range of values commonly associated to “low” and “high” probabilities. Answers
of each group range within two orders of magnitude for low probabilities and in
one order of magnitude for high. This indicates that the eventual introduction of a
probabilistic forecast framework may require of a specific communication strategy
depending on the specific sector of application, in order to deal with the differences
between groups of stakeholders.
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• Communication. To conclude, the survey inquired if concepts commonly used
in risk management can be a source of misunderstanding when used by multidisci-
plinary groups of stakeholders. The answers showed that this has been experienced
by more than 85% of the participants. Amongst a list of terms commonly used in
risk management, the concepts prone to confusion are “uncertainty”, “acceptable
risk” and “confidence”, but most options are likely to generate misunderstand-
ing between different communities and/or personal backgrounds. Almost 90% of
the surveyed people considered that communication and information flow between
different stakeholders during explosive volcanic eruptions should be improved.
This work presents the results of a survey performed by different groups of stakeholders
involved in civil aviation management during ash-producing volcanic eruptions. Results
give an overview of the stakeholders’ opinion on scientific developments, new procedures,
and some open issues (e.g. definition of conditions for allowing aviation operations,
model forecast uncertainties, scientific and technological gaps). In particular, the need
for improving communication amongst different groups and creating a common knowl-
edge is clearly revealed. Results of the survey serve also to enhance current research,
providing useful insights for further developments and transfer into operations. End-
user feedback has allowed compiling a list of requirements for future software tools to
support aviation management and/or operations during explosive volcanic eruptions.
Finally, these results highlight the factors that influenced recent developments and put
the basis for the definition of future policies and procedures for managing air traffic
during explosive eruptions.
4.5 Conclusion
This research produced probabilistic dispersal hazard maps for active volcanic areas,
and maps of averaged arrival and persistence time and standard deviation (Paper I,
II, Sulpizio et al., 2012; Biass et al., 2014). It also proposes the use and application of
novel techniques (i.e. TMY, stratified sampling) to reduce computational cost of prob-
abilistic hazard assessment based on numerical models (Paper I). In addition, the first
methodology specifically focused on vulnerability assessment of air traffic to explosive
volcanic eruptions was developed. The methodology was applied to the European air
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traffic network (Paper III). Results can support long-term risk management and de-
sign of mitigation measures. The impact assessment methodology was automated into
a GIS-based tool (Paper IV), applied to two case-study for the European air traffic
(Scaini et al., 2011 and Paper IV). Results allow identifying expected impacts and
put the basis for the design of response strategies. Results of this research can support
aviation management during explosive volcanic eruptions.

Chapter 5
Discussion and Conclusions
This research presents novel methodologies and instruments that can support and en-
hance civil aviation management during volcanic eruptions. Table 5.1 summarizes the
main contributions of this PhD in the three main fields of research (hazard, vulnerability
and impact) at both short and long-term. This chapter discusses the main limitations
of this research, summarizes its main conclusions and points out the aspects that need
to be improved.
Table 5.1: Main contributions of the PhD thesis
SHORT-TERM LONG-TERM
Hazard Effective post-processing of
TTDM outputs
New strategies for hazard
assessment
Vulnerability/impact GIS-based tool for impact as-
sessment
Methodology for vulnerability
and impact assessment
5.1 Discussion
5.1.1 Tephra Hazard modeling strategies
This research contributes to lower the computational cost of performing long-term prob-
abilistic tephra dispersal hazard assessment using fully numerical TTDMs. The Typ-
ical Meteorological Year (TMY) allows reducing the computational cost of running
109
Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusions 110
mesoscalar meteorological models over a long time period (e.g. 10 years) by reduc-
ing the necessary number of simulations. This method is particularly suitable for local
scale assessments, for which re-analysis datasets may have insufficient resolution. In
future, this method may be improved, for example defining the TMY based on many
wind samples at different areas. The TMY methodology is discussed in detail in Paper
I.
The stratified sampling technique allows reducing the necessary number of simulations
for the hazard assessment. However, the definition of Probability Density Functions
(PDFs) for each parameter depends on the availability of data for the active volcano
considered. This work performs tephra dispersal hazard assessment based on scenarios,
defined using PDFs for ESPs. The issues related to the difficulty of choosing the ESPs,
already recognized as a main issue for the volcanological community (Mastin et al., 2009;
Bonadonna et al., 2011a; Bonadonna et al., 2013), are described in Paper I, II and
Biass et al. (2014).
Finally, tephra dispersal hazard assessment results allow producing long-term maps fo-
cused on aviation needs (i.e maps of arrival and persistence time), that contribute to
support volcanic risk management from the aviation point of view. Such maps allow
transferring more information to the involved stakeholders and put the basis for the
subsequent vulnerability and impact assessment. The potential use of these maps is
presented and discussed in Paper III.
5.1.2 Vulnerability assessment of air traffic network
This PhD research presents the first vulnerability assessment of the air traffic network
specific for volcanic ash. The main aim of the methodology is identifying which air
traffic network features are expected to suffer impacts in case of explosive eruptions. The
caveats of the vulnerability and impact assessment methodology are mostly discussed in
Paper III and synthesized here:
• The methodology is quite general and, therefore, can be adapted to the specific
characteristics of the area at stake. However, given the difficulty of gathering
specific data, the methodology does not account for physical vulnerability of most
features and for spatial inter- and intra-dependencies and cascading effects, which
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rely on the characterization of physical vulnerability, beyond the scope of this
work.
• The systemic aspect is covered only in part, by identifying which specific elements
and infrastructures are important to the system performance on a priori basis and
assessing impacts upon them.
• This analysis requires a collaboration between involved stakeholders (infrastructure
holders, service providers and end users) in order to characterize the interdepen-
dencies between elements that constitute the air traffic network. This analysis
should start identifying where, how often, and for how long the air traffic will
be interrupted. This analysis may be performed by splitting the network at spe-
cific delivery points, implying a detailed knowledge of its structure (Kjølle et al.,
2012). In order to be realistic and produce usable results, this kind of analysis
requires a collaboration between involved stakeholders (infrastructure holders, ser-
vice providers, etc.). These aspects are relevant for the definition of management
plans and response strategies of involved stakeholders.
• Eruptive scenarios used in Paper III are not associated with a probability of
occurrence, due to the high uncertainties of such an approach (Biass et al., 2014).
Thus, probabilistic hazard maps represent the expected situation conditioned to
the occurrence of the scenario, i.e., the probability of having critical tephra con-
centration at a given point and FL, if the considered scenario occurs. A direct
comparison between impact scenarios is thus possible only on a qualitative basis.
• The domain for the vulnerability analysis depends on the hazard assessment. The
analysis performed for the European air traffic network (Paper III) identifies
strategic airports both at European scale and for the North-Western European
airspace. However, depending on the final aim of the vulnerability/impact assess-
ment (e.g. analysis of a particular market segment), different study areas may
be chosen. In addition, the principles of the vulnerability and impact assessment
methodology could potentially be applied to geographic and socio-economic con-
texts different from Europe. Given that airspace classification varies substantially
between geographic areas, the spatial unit for the socio-economic vulnerability
analysis should be defined based on the administrative stucture of the studied
area.
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• The proposed methodology is focused on a specific hazard caused by explosive
volcanic eruptions (i.e. volcanic ash fallout and dispersal). However, given that at
both scales there are other hazards that potentially affect the exposed targets, out-
comes of our vulnerability and impact assessment could support multi-risk initia-
tives and be interfaced with specific analyses. This work may therefore contribute
to a multi-risk assessment including other hazards for aviation, such as extreme
meteorological events, volcanogenic SO2 or mineral dust.
This research also proposes a methodology to account, at fist-order, for indirect impacts
produced by the disruption of a single feature (e.g. an airport or a connection) on Na-
tional and Regional economies. The socio-economic vulnerability assessment method-
ology, although simplified, puts the basis for including socio-economic aspects in the
process of volcanic risk management.
Tephra fallout produced by explosive volcanic eruptions can indirectly affect the air traf-
fic system (e.g. disrupting airports). In addition, it can affect the socio-economic system
(e.g. disrupting electricity network, road and rail transportation and productive activ-
ities). For these reasons, tephra fallout hazard assessment has also been performed at
the active volcanoes considered (Paper I, II, III). Performing a multi-scale assessment,
as done for the Nicaraguan case (4.2.1), allows grasping the local impacts of volcanic
eruptions on National economies, often relevant to understand the socio-economic im-
plications of air traffic disruptions and preventing strong economic losses.
In order to enhance the validity of the vulnerability assessment methodology, Paper
III suggests a general framework for vulnerability data collection. Gathering such data
would enhance vulnerability and impact assessment at active volcanic areas for both
tephra fallout and dispersal.
The application of the vulnerability assessment methodology has given relevant results
for the European area (paper III). London is recognized to be the core of the European
aviation system, followed by Paris, Amsterdam and Frankfurt, according to the number
of connections handled. The analysis has also identified the routes that have the highest
socioeconomic relevance, and emphasizes the role of minor connections that, despite be-
ing secondary at the European level, are strategic for national economies. For example,
the analysis of air traffic at London and Keflav´ık airports showed that London–Dublin
and Reykjav´ık–Copenhagen are very important routes and their disruption could affect
national economies and those of their commercial partners.
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This analysis is also complemented by a first-level assessment of the socioeconomic vul-
nerability of Europe to air traffic disruptions. The combination of demographic, trade
and accessibility information identifies European regions with higher dependency on air
traffic, i.e., those more vulnerable to air traffic network disruptions. For example, Ireland
has a high vulnerability because it is an island (which inherently has a low multi-modal
accessibility) and has strong social and commercial relationships with the UK, result-
ing in high socioeconomic impacts in the event of air traffic disruption. Also, Nordic
countries such as Denmark and Norway are likely to suffer systemic impacts due to air
traffic disruptions, in particular at areas with lower multi-modal accessibility. Flexibility
of the transportation system and multi-modal accessibility are therefore critical factors
that strongly influence the societal response to air traffic disruptions (Alexander, 2013).
Moreover, a strategy that allows taking advantage of all different transportation means
can strongly reduce losses during emergencies, as shown by Jones and Bolivar (2011) for
the case study of Malta during the 2010 aviation disruption.
Results of the impact assessment show that all eruptive scenarios for Icelandic volcanoes
produce impacts in the London area, and that higher-magnitude scenarios can result in
major impacts for the whole European air traffic system. Low-magnitude, short-duration
activity does not result in high impacts on central European air traffic, but can disrupt
relevant connections for the national economies involved (i.e., Reykjav´ık–Copenhagen,
London–Dublin). Thus, results of this research show that long-lasting and/or weak erup-
tions can also produce substantial impacts to the air traffic system, and should therefore
be taken into account in a comprehensive risk management assessment.
5.1.3 Expected impacts on aviation
This research defines an impact assessment methodology that can improve aviation
management during explosive volcanic eruptions. Scaini et al. (2011) and Paper IV
discuss the limitations of the methodology, underlining its assumptions:
• The impact assessment for airports assumes that airport operations are disrupted
by the presence of ash at lower FLs. However, the regulation on airport operations
in case of ash contaminated airspace does not provide specific information on this
aspect. The definition of airport management strategies in case of volcanic ash
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contamination should be better defined, e.g. trough larger participation of airport
managers and representatives in the VOLCEX exercises.
• The re-routing analysis assumes that all aircraft are able to reach FL400 with-
out considering aircraft performance in presence of volcanic ash or constraints on
airspace capacity. This is a strong simplification of real flight planning, that needs
to comply with safety regulations.
• The methodology assumes that all airspace sectors extend from FL050 to 400. In
practice, a differentiation exists between upper and lower sectors.
• The qualitative impact assessment classification of routes and airspace sectors
should be defined in collaboration with the decision-makers using specific SRA.
• The eventual adoption of impact assessment criteria (both using ash concentration
thresholds or engine ingestion) would ultimately require engine manufactures to
specify engine tolerance.
• The extent of temporal and spatial buffers should be linked to forecast uncertainty
using more objective quantitative criteria.
• At the moment, input parameters for the impact analysis are introduced through
a simple configuration file. A graphical user interface (GUI) for the tool is still
missing.
The impact assessment methodology proposed here improves risk management during
explosive volcanic eruptions, accounting for current trends and developments of aviation
regulation and is open to integrate new plans and strategies that may be developed in
the future. In addition, it suggests possible mitigation measures (e.g. flights re-routing)
in order to lower disruptions and subsequent economic losses.
An advantage of the tool is that it can potentially be interfaced with results coming from
any ash dispersal model, and is therefore model-independent. In particular, the tool has
a dedicated pre-processing routine to extract ash concentration maps from available
TTDM outputs at a selected temporal resolution (depending on the temporal resolution
of the modeling output). This allows performing the impact assessment at higher tem-
poral resolution compared with the 6-hours maps issued by VAACs. The introduction of
digital formats for ash dispersal forecasts (e.g. Google Earth, Webley et al., 2009), also
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envisaged by the International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG,
2014), may enhance the accessibility to ash dispersal forecasts and ease the use of tools
like the one presented here. The tool pre-processing also accounts for uncertainties as-
sociated to the forecast, which may in future be characterized by new forecast strategies
(for example, using data assimilation and ensemble forecast techniques). The tool may
also be interfaced with many air traffic databases by loading data through the database
template.
The tool allows estimating expected impacts on European air traffic network in case of
eruption at Eyjafjallajo¨kull and Katla volcanoes, respectively (Scaini et al., 2011; Paper
IV). Results for the Eyjafjallajo¨kull case-study can not directly be compared with the
documented impacts because in 2010 the forecasts were different from the ones used in
this study (based on more reliable modeling inputs). Moreover, it has been stated that
many flight cancellations were not directly caused by the presence of ash, but were the
consequence of the airspace closures (based on the forecasted ash presence). However,
the comparison presented by Scaini et al. (2011) underlines the order of magnitude of
differences between the 2010 impacts and the ones expected today. The aim of this
comparison is not to criticize the air traffic management during 2010 but to underline
the enormous opportunities for improvement in this field.
Paper IV shows that, for the Katla eruptive scenario under “unfavorable” meteoro-
logical conditions, impacts on the European air traffic are larger than those estimated
by Scaini et al. (2011) for the 2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull event. Results confirm that explo-
sive long-lasting eruptions from Icelandic volcanoes, even if of moderate intensity, can
potentially disrupt strategic features (e.g. London and Amsterdam airports), causing
substantial systemic impacts on the European air traffic system. This short-term analy-
sis could be complemented with a long-term vulnerability and impact assessment, which
should consider multiple runs under different eruption and meteorological conditions
(Biass et al., 2014; Paper IV).
5.1.4 Communication between involved stakeholders
The improvement of communication between stakeholders was a complementary objec-
tive of this research. To this purpose, a survey comprehensive of stakeholders involved
(directly and indirectly) in aviation management during volcanic eruptions was per-
formed. This is the first survey that analyzes the differences between groups (modelers,
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field scientists, aviation managers and employees).
Results of the survey provide general insights and feedback on how to transfer on-going
research into useful operational products. In fact, the answers indicated a demand to de-
velop tools and procedures to support aviation management and/or operations in case of
ash-contaminated airspace. All the stakeholders recognize the key role played by model
forecasts. However, as already pointed out by the VAST project survey (Prata and
Zehner, 2013), some factors limit the effective use of model forecasts and volcanic ash
retrievals by end-users, e.g. the long delivery times, the time and space resolutions, or
the lack of technological solutions to allow end-users to post-process the results. Results
from the survey confirm the interest in increasing temporal resolution (frequency) of ash
forecasts and impact assessments, in particular for aviation stakeholders. In addition,
this community would welcome other types of products (e.g. maps of arrival and per-
sistence time), to complement current ash concentration charts.
In addition, it is worth noticing that most respondents identified GIS and spatial DBMS
as useful instruments to deal with spatially based hazards. However, a GUI is needed
in order to facilitate the use of such tools. Finally, the survey underlined differences in
the use of concepts like “low/high probability” or “long/short term”, that have different
meanings for each group of stakeholders. In particular, all the surveyed groups make use
of probabilistic data during eruptions. The introduction of a probabilistic framework
would help characterizing uncertainties of forecasts and subsequent impact assessments.
However, the use of probabilistic analyses is more limited during everyday work. For this
reason, common platforms for mutual knowledge transfer and cross-disciplinary training
would be useful.
Results of the survey (Scaini et al., submitted) allow producing a list of requirements
that should be considered in the design of new tools/instruments for aviation support
during explosive eruptions (Table 5.2). It is worth noticing that the impact assessment
methodology and the GIS-based tool presented in this PhD research are very flexible,
and may include most of these aspects. For example, the tool could be completed with
user-defined “rules” in order to be a real and proper DSS system. Future work should
provide a more customizable tool (e.g. for critical concentration thresholds; ingestion
or time/length indicators), in order to allow personalization of features based on user
needs.
Results of the survey (Scaini et al., submitted) support the definition of response strate-
gies and mitigation actions and the development of future research in this field.
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Table 5.2: Critical issues pointed out by the survey (left) allow the definition of
guidelines for tool development (right).
OPEN ISSUES GUIDELINES
Use of TTDM for aviation purposes Improve TTDM post-processing for
aviation purposes
Use of GIS/DMBS GIS/DMBS handling
Probabilistic framework Include probabilistic analysis
Uncertainties Account uncertainties
Customizable methodologies Customizable options
Improve communication and coopera-
tion
Integrated knowledge platform
User friendliness GUI
Integration of timescales Customizable timescales
5.2 Conclusions
The methodologies proposed in this research for hazard, vulnerability and impact as-
sessment may be applied to many practical problems and are valid at different spatial
and temporal scales.
Both long-term vulnerability and impact assessment and short-term impact assessment
show that impacts of tephra dispersal and fallout are relevant for a comprehensive risk
management at active volcanic areas. The vulnerability assessment methodology allows
identifying the strategic features of the air traffic network (airports, routes), whose dis-
ruption may cause a higher systemic impact. Results of the impact assessment show
that explosive eruptions can impact air traffic by disrupting relevant airports and their
mutual connections (Paper I, II, III, IV), causing indirect socio-economic impacts.
Results of the applications of these methodologies to the European air traffic network
(Paper III and IV) show that main hubs (e.g. London, Paris) are strategic for the
European air traffic activities. Both high-magnitude and low-magnitude long-lasting
activity can produce substantial impacts on the air traffic network. Finally, peripheral
areas of Europe (e.g. Nordic countries and islands), that rely on air traffic for import/-
export and transportation, may be indirectly impacted by air traffic disruptions.
The application of these methodologies relies on data availability, as discussed in Paper
III and IV. This limitation is valid for most existing vulnerability and impact assess-
ment performed in active volcanic areas and, in general, to most natural hazards. Paper
III provides a general framework for gathering and analyzing information related to ex-
posure and vulnerability to tephra fallout, which puts the basis for the application of
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this novel methodology to many other active volcanic areas.
In addition, the possible application of methodologies is influenced by an important fac-
tor: end-user needs, priorities and opinions. Results of the web-based survey (Scaini et
al., submitted) contribute to the definition of end-user needs and allow establishing a
list of requirements for the design of the new generation of tools to support aviation dur-
ing explosive volcanic eruptions. In particular, results underline the need for improving
communication amongst the different groups and creating a common knowledge, and
suggest the creation of infrastructure for training and information sharing. This work
strongly suggests that the further step in order to achieve an effective aviation manage-
ment during explosive eruptions is to improve multi-disciplinary collaborations.
5.3 Future work
This PhD thesis contributes to bridging the gap between groups of stakeholders in-
volved in air traffic management during volcanic eruptions. The research is focused on
a rapidly changing topic, as showed by the large number of cutting-edge techniques and
regulations introduced after 2010. Forthcoming changes may therefore influence the de-
velopment of this research in new directions.
For these reasons, the methodologies presented here are defined for the “general purpose”
of supporting air traffic management during eruptions, and provide flexible solutions
that can be adapted to specific end-user needs. However, with the necessary modifica-
tions, this work may be integrated and applied to different purposes, supporting many
stakeholders involved in civil aviation management.
Future developments of this research could allow creating a multidisciplinary group that
may proceed in the research accounting for all the stakeholders needs. Paper III and
IV and Scaini et al. (2011) suggest the main directions for future work:
• The vulnerability and impact assessment methodology should be improved in col-
laboration with stakeholders involved in air-traffic management and aviation op-
erations. The analysis should be enhanced by specific quantitative analyses, ac-
counting for spatial inter-dependencies and cascading effects. In addition, it should
include a characterization of physical vulnerability of aircraft and the definition of
reliable thresholds (still under discussion).
Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusions 119
• The vulnerability and impact assessment should be complemented with a com-
prehensive socio-economic analysis. Such analysis may support the definition of
mitigation measures and a reduction of future impacts of air traffic disruptions
on society. For example, Jones and Bolivar (2011) describe the use of alternative
transportation means as a temporary solution in case of air traffic disruptions.
Knowing in advance the expected impacts on air traffic network would allow the
definition of strategic plans.
• Both vulnerability and impact assessment methodologies could be applied to other
case-studies (if the hypothesis of scale-free network are valid, or adapting it to
different local/regional characteristics). These case-studies may include other haz-
ards (for example SO2 and mineral dust) and/or analyze their impacts on specific
segments of the aviation market (e.g. low-cost or business aviation), according to
their specific characteristics.
• The impact assessment methodology is now deterministic. In future, the tool
could be interfaced with probabilistic ash dispersal forecasts (e.g. produced by an
ensemble forecast).
• The GIS-based tool may complement existing tools such as EVITA, currently in-
terfaced only with VAAC official forecasts but that could visualize TTDM outputs
from other sources. In future, ash dispersal forecasts may be supplied by other
providers, allowing end-users to download ash dispersal modeling outputs from
repositories. It is worth noticing that a standard formats for TTDM outputs is
envisaged by many stakeholders.
• The tool may be also integrated with a proper DSS engine, supporting the decision
makers with a set of specifically defined rules. These rules should be defined based
on SRA and other official regulations for flight operations in case of volcanic ash.
• The GIS-based tool has been designed as a Desktop-GIS type, but a migration to
Server GIS is not excluded in the future. In order to increase its usability, the tool
should also have a friendly and effective GUI. Finally, the tool architecture and
design should be enhanced to fulfill operational requirements and integrated into
a broader operational framework.
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• The GIS-based tool may be enhanced in future by integrating new technologies
(e.g. mobile and monitoring) and different timescales (long and short-term) into
a comprehensive strategy.
Most of the future work will require a collaboration with other research groups with a
strong background in other branches of science (e.g. social and economic sciences, op-
erational research) and with aviation stakeholders (e.g aviation authorities, companies,
etc.). The need for collaboration between different stakeholders and scientific groups is
also underlined by the survey results and discussed in Paper IV.
In particular, the integration of different timescales (last point of the list) would support
a comprehensive risk management focused on aviation during volcanic eruptions. Before
and during unrest, the adoption of probabilistic framework would allow communicating
uncertainties related to the definition of the expected eruptive scenario. Prior impact
assessment analysis could be performed for a range of possible scenarios. The acceptable
risk and the actions to take may be defined for each specific case.
Thus, future developments of long-term vulnerability and impact assessment method-
ologies will require the cooperation between scientific community, air traffic managers
and other stakeholders (productive activities, governments, etc.).
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Abstract. We perform a multi-scale impact assessment of
tephra fallout and dispersal from explosive volcanic activity
in Iceland. A companion paper (Biass et al., 2014; “A multi-
scale risk assessment of tephra fallout and airborne concen-
tration from multiple Icelandic volcanoes – Part I: hazard
assessment”) introduces a multi-scale probabilistic assess-
ment of tephra hazard based on selected eruptive scenarios
at four Icelandic volcanoes (Hekla, Askja, Eyjafjallajökull
and Katla) and presents probabilistic hazard maps for tephra
accumulation in Iceland and tephra dispersal across Europe.
Here, we present the associated vulnerability and impact as-
sessment that describes the importance of single features at
national and European levels and considers several vulnera-
bility indicators for tephra dispersal and deposition. At the
national scale, we focus on physical, systemic and economic
vulnerability of Iceland to tephra fallout, whereas at the Eu-
ropean scale we focus on the systemic vulnerability of the air
traffic system to tephra dispersal. This is the first vulnerabil-
ity and impact assessment analysis of this type and, although
it does not include all the aspects of physical and systemic
vulnerability, it allows for identifying areas on which further
specific analysis should be performed. Results include vul-
nerability maps for Iceland and European airspace and allow
for the qualitative identification of the impacts at both scales
in the case of an eruption occurring. Maps produced at the na-
tional scale show that tephra accumulation associated with all
eruptive scenarios considered can disrupt the main electricity
network, in particular in relation to an eruption of Askja. Re-
sults also show that several power plants would be affected if
an eruption occurred at Hekla, Askja or Katla, causing a sub-
stantial systemic impact due to their importance for the Ice-
landic economy. Moreover, the Askja and Katla eruptive sce-
narios considered could have substantial impacts on agricul-
tural activities (crops and pastures). At the European scale,
eruptive scenarios at Askja and Katla are likely to affect Eu-
ropean airspace, having substantial impacts, in particular, in
the Keflavík and London flight information regions (FIRs),
but also at FIRs above France, Germany and Scandinavia.
Impacts would be particularly intense in the case of long-
lasting activity at Katla. The occurrence of eruptive scenarios
at Hekla is likely to produce high impacts at Keflavík FIR and
London FIRs, and, in the case of higher magnitude, can also
impact France’s FIRs. Results could support land use and
emergency planning at the national level and risk manage-
ment strategies of the European air traffic system. Although
we focus on Iceland, the proposed methodology could be
applied to other active volcanic areas, enhancing the long-
term tephra risk management. Moreover, the outcomes of this
work pose the basis for quantitative analyses of expected im-
pacts and their integration in a multi-risk framework.
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1 Introduction
Tephra dispersal and deposition during explosive volcanic
eruptions can produce impacts at different scales, from local
to continental. Compared to other volcanic hazards, tephra
fallout is unlikely to cause casualties, but, nonetheless, it of-
ten produces high systemic and socioeconomic impacts (e.g.,
Wardman et al., 2012; Biass et al., 2012). Moreover, the pres-
ence of volcanic ash in the atmosphere disrupts aerial navi-
gation and may produce additional socioeconomic impacts
at larger scales, from regional to continental, depending on
the eruption intensity and duration, ash properties and atmo-
spheric circulation. For these reasons a comprehensive risk
assessment of active explosive volcanoes that are located in
areas with high population and flight density should always
include the hazard associated with both tephra dispersal and
accumulation. Iceland is amongst the most active volcanic ar-
eas in the world, hosting more than 30 volcanic systems that
display different eruptive styles and a wide range of volcanic
products (Thordarson and Larsen, 2006). In a companion pa-
per, Biass et al. (2014) present a probabilistic tephra haz-
ard assessment from four Icelandic volcanoes (Hekla, Askja,
Katla and Eyjafjallajökull) selected for showing recent ac-
tivity, different levels of historical record, and a variety of
eruptive styles and activities. In this manuscript we present
the associated vulnerability and impact assessment in order
to support more effective mitigation strategies in Iceland and
Europe. As for other natural risks, volcanic risk evaluation
builds upon three factors: hazard, exposure and vulnerabil-
ity (e.g., De la Cruz Reyna and Tilling, 2008). Exposure is
a key element in risk assessment, since it “encompasses all
elements, processes, and subjects that might be affected by
a hazardous event. Consequently, exposure is the presence
of social, economic, environmental or cultural assets in areas
that may be impacted by a hazard” (Birkmann, 2013, p. 305).
Thus, the identification of exposed targets largely depends on
their location with respect to the impacted area for the con-
sidered hazard and to the type of hazard at stake. Finally, the
exposure, although crucial for an effective risk assessment,
does not account for the variability of response of people,
infrastructure, goods or ecosystems to the hazardous event:
such response depends on their susceptibility to be harmed
or, in other words, on their vulnerability. Vulnerability can be
defined as the potential of exposed targets to be directly or
indirectly damaged by a given hazard. Definitions, concep-
tual frameworks and methodologies for analyzing and assess-
ing vulnerability are very heterogeneous, although “there is a
clear recognition of the importance of place-based studies in
examining vulnerability” (Cutter, 2013, p. 1089). In the last
decade, vulnerability has been largely recognized as a multi-
dimensional concept, comprising different aspects (physi-
cal, systemic, social, economic, environmental, institutional,
etc.) constantly interacting in time and space (Birkmann,
2006; Galderisi et al., 2008; UNISDR, 2009; Menoni et al.,
2011). In particular, the concept of systemic vulnerability is
becoming more widespread in the scientific literature and
refers to the fragilities arising as a consequence of interde-
pendencies among elements and systems within a given ter-
ritory, which can reduce its overall functioning in the face
of a hazardous event (Rashed and Weeks, 2003; Menoni,
2005; Galderisi et al., 2008; Pascale et al., 2010; Ensure,
2011). Territorial systems are characterized by a dense net-
work of physical and functional interdependencies (Paton
and Johnston, 2006; Hellstrom, 2007), and the potential im-
pact of a hazard on a given element may reverberate on to
others that are physically or functionally connected to the
former. The concept of systemic vulnerability has been ap-
plied in several areas of natural hazards such as floods, earth-
quakes, tsunamis, etc. (e.g., Minciardi et al., 2005; Pascale
et al., 2010), but in volcanology this concept has been in-
troduced only recently (e.g., Galderisi et al., 2013). Sys-
temic vulnerability has a particular relevance in the case of
tephra fallout, which may produce much higher secondary
than primary impacts; that is, the physical failure of an el-
ement may also impact other connected activities and in-
frastructures (Biass et al., 2012). For example, the failure of
the electrical network can cause cascading effects on several
productive activities, such as manufacturing, power gener-
ation, agriculture or tourism. Furthermore, tephra dispersal
and deposition largely affect transportation networks, which
are crucial for accessibility to urban areas and emergency fa-
cilities. Finally, social and economic aspects of vulnerability
have been deepened in scientific literature since the 1990s,
but an unequivocal definition of both social and economic
vulnerabilities and of their mutual relationships is still miss-
ing (Parker and Tapsell, 2009; Tapsell et al., 2010). The aim
of this analysis is performing a vulnerability and impact as-
sessment analysis at national and European levels. Due to the
large scale of the analysis and the lack of specific data, phys-
ical vulnerability is not considered in our assessment, with
the exception of few specific elements of particular relevance
(i.e., electric power plants and distribution network). A com-
prehensive assessment of physical vulnerability is beyond the
scope of this paper. Moreover, we consider only one aspect
of the systemic vulnerability, i.e., the a priori identification
of elements and systems that are particularly relevant from
a systemic point of view. We do not account for the cascad-
ing effects and spatial interdependences that may take place
during the emergency. Through this simplified approach, the
vulnerability and impact assessment presented here aims at
identifying the areas that are likely to suffer the higher im-
pacts, where more specific research should be performed.
This approach is commonly adopted in risk management for
hazardous phenomena whose physical impact on elements
are not yet quantified, and in particular for those which do
not cause large losses of life and socioeconomic impacts
(Douglas, 2007). Iceland is considered a well-prepared and
highly resilient country, but the traditional risk management
strategies of the Icelandic Civil Protection have traditionally
focused on the short-term reaction rather than on long-term
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 2289–2312, 2014 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/14/2289/2014/
C. Scaini et al.: Part 2: Vulnerability and impact 2291
land use planning (Jóhannesdóttir and Gísladóttir, 2010). As
a consequence, there is a lack of specific studies on vulner-
ability of the Icelandic territory to tephra deposition, even
though tephra fallout is a relatively frequent phenomenon in
Iceland. Here we perform a vulnerability assessment taking
into account that, according to the analysis of past events
(Biass et al., 2014), agriculture, transportation and energy
sectors are the most vulnerable to tephra accumulation. We
focus on systemic and economic dimensions of vulnerability.
To this aim, we define exposed targets, estimate vulnerability
for each considered target, and evaluate the expected impacts
for all the eruptive scenarios defined in the previous hazard
assessment. Physical vulnerability of buildings is not con-
sidered because, according to the hazard analysis of Biass
et al. (2014), expected tephra accumulations are unlikely
to cause significant damage to buildings for the volcanoes
and activity scenarios considered (proximal areas around the
selected volcanoes are mostly uninhabited). Moreover, our
analysis is performed at a national scale (the whole island),
while physical vulnerability assessments require detailed on-
site surveys, for example on building stock, which are usually
performed at the local scale. However, we consider physical
vulnerability of the electricity network because its failure can
trigger relevant impacts on the whole of society. We also fo-
cus on the potential for temporary or permanent loss of eco-
nomic activities, which is relevant to the maintenance of the
level of welfare of the population. The disruption of flights
caused by the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull event was economically
significant for both Europe and Iceland (Sammonds et al.,
2010; Oxford Economics, 2010; Alexander, 2013). Using the
last 10 years of the ERA-Interim reanalysis data set, Biass
et al. (2014) conclude that the probability of having upper-
troposphere winds blowing towards central and northern Eu-
rope is 6–8 %, a value consistent with the 6 % found by Sam-
monds et al. (2010). Given the experience from 2010, these
probabilities suggest that assessing the vulnerability of the
European air traffic system to Icelandic ash dispersal is rel-
evant for the management of volcanic risk in civil aviation,
particularly since no vulnerability assessment of any air traf-
fic system specifically focused on volcanic ash hazard exists.
Wegner and Marsh (2007) and Wilkinson et al. (2001) un-
derlined some relevant aspects of the European air traffic net-
work and showed that it is a scale-free network highly vulner-
able to the disruption of the main hubs. Based on this finding,
we develop the first assessment of vulnerability of the Euro-
pean airspace to tephra dispersal. The analysis is based on
the systemic approach and aims to identify the critical fea-
tures for the system, i.e., the elements that can produce the
highest systemic impacts on the whole European air traffic
system in the case of failure. As we did at the national scale,
we identify the distribution and the features of the exposed
targets and define vulnerability indicators in order to evalu-
ate the expected impact for the different eruptive scenarios
considered in the hazard assessment.
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Figure 1. Map of Iceland showing the location of the four volcanoes
considered in the hazard assessment and the main cities and towns.
The administrative units (municipalities) used for the national vul-
nerability analysis are given in the Supplement.
This manuscript is arranged as follows. Section 2
overviews the eruptive scenarios for the selected volcanoes
and the findings from the hazard assessment of Biass et
al. (2014). Section 3 presents the vulnerability and impact
assessment of tephra fallout at the national scale, and Sect. 4
presents the vulnerability and impact assessment of tephra
dispersal at the European scale. Section 5 discusses the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the proposed methodology
and the future research developments required to improve it.
Finally, Sect. 6 concludes the paper with a summary.
2 Eruptive scenarios and results from the hazard
assessment
A companion paper (Biass et al., 2014) presents a multi-scale
probabilistic tephra hazard assessment for different eruptive
scenarios of four highly active Icelandic volcanoes (Hekla,
Askja, Katla and Eyjafjallajökull; Fig. 1). These four vol-
canoes were selected for their high probabilities of eruption
and/or their high potential impacts, and the associated haz-
ard was assessed for dispersal at both national and European
scale for different scenarios based on the eruptive record (Ta-
ble 1). Scenarios are associated with a volcanic explosivity
index (VEI) as described by Biass et al. (2014). Each sce-
nario was modeled assuming a statistical set of inputs using
TEPHRA (Bonadonna et al., 2005) and FALL3D (Costa et
al., 2006; Folch et al., 2009) models for tephra fallout and
dispersal, respectively. Results of the hazard assessment at
the national scale are probabilistic hazard maps for ground
tephra accumulation. Given the rich historical record and
high knowledge of Icelandic volcanic activity, it is possible
with some volcanoes (e.g., Hekla) to associate scenarios with
a “repose time”, while other volcanoes have a short docu-
mented eruptive history or do not seem to follow evolution
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Table 1. Synthesis of the eruptive scenarios considered in the tephra hazard assessment (Biass et al., 2014). ERS: eruption range scenario;
OES: one-eruption scenario; LLERS: long-lasting eruption range scenario; LLOES: long-lasting one-eruption scenario. Tephra accumulation
and dispersal was assessed for Hekla, Askja and Katla, while for Eyjafjallajökull only tephra accumulation was modeled (Biass et al., 2014).
Volcano Modeling Reference Column VEI Eruption
strategy eruption height (km a.s.l) duration
Eyjafjallajökull LLOES 2010 2.5–7.8 2 40 days
Hekla ERS 2000 16.0–30.0 2 0.5–1 h
Hekla ERS 1947 6.0–16.0 3 0.5–1 h
Katla LLERS Historical moderate/large 10.0–25.0 – 1–4 days
Askja OES 1875 (C+D phases) 22.8–26.0 5 1 h+ 1.5 h (C+D phases)
patterns. Scenarios used in this work are not associated with
a probability of occurrence, due to the high uncertainties of
such an approach. Thus, probabilistic hazard maps represent
the expected situation conditioned to the occurrence of the
scenario, i.e., the probability of having critical tephra load at
a given point if the considered scenario occurs. Probabilistic
hazard maps were computed for tephra load thresholds of 1,
10 and 100 kg m2, which correspond to approximately 0.1,
1 and 10 cm of accumulation on the ground. At a European
scale, results are probabilistic hazard maps (giving the prob-
ability of “disruption”) for ash mass concentration thresholds
of 2 and 2×10−3 mg m−3. The second value (corresponding
to a negligible mass concentration) was considered in order
to estimate the impact in the case of a zero-ash-tolerance cri-
terion. Moreover, Biass et al. (2014) provide maps of disrup-
tion mean persistence (according to Sulpizio et al., 2012) and
arrival times for the 2 mg m−3 concentration threshold. The
main findings from the hazard assessment are (scenarios and
their acronyms are described in Table 1) as follows:
– A 10-year recurrence rate eruption of Hekla (i.e., Hekla
ERS 2000 type) only produces significant tephra ac-
cumulation close to the vent and in the southern part
of Iceland. Ash concentration has a low probability
(< 1 %) of exceeding the threshold of 2 mg m−3 at any
flight level (FL) in the UK airspace.
– A 100-year recurrence rate eruption of Hekla (i.e.,
Hekla ERS 1947 type) produces substantial tephra accu-
mulation in the southeastern part of Iceland. However,
far-range ash concentrations still have low probabilities
(< 5 %) of affecting the UK airspace, with concentra-
tions above the 2 mg m−3 threshold at any FL.
– A moderate long-lasting basaltic eruption of Katla (i.e.,
Katla LLERS with tephra production over 1–4 days) is
likely to produce substantial tephra deposition in south-
ern Iceland. Ash dispersal has a substantial probabil-
ity of reaching northern Europe, the UK (5–20 %) and
central Europe (∼ 5 %) with concentrations exceeding
2 mg m−3 at any FL.
– An eruption of Askja similar to that of 1875 (i.e., Askja
OES 1875 type) is likely to produce massive tephra de-
position in eastern Iceland. Ash dispersal has a substan-
tial probability of reaching northern Europe, the UK (5–
20 %) and central Europe (∼ 5 %) with concentrations
exceeding 2 mg m−3 at any FL.
– An eruption of Eyjafjallajökull similar to 2010 (i.e., Ey-
jafjallajökull LLOES 2010 type) is likely to produce
moderate tephra accumulation south of the volcanic edi-
fice around the town of Vìk. For computational reasons,
probabilistic approaches to assess the airborne concen-
tration resulting from such a long eruption were not
applied.
Finally, in order to compare the relative impact of the differ-
ent scenarios, one historical eruption was selected for each
volcano for which ash dispersal and atmospheric concen-
trations were assessed using the same wind conditions of
the Eyjafjallajökull 2010 eruption. The selected eruptions
include Hekla 1947, Katla 1918, Eyjafjallajökull 2010 and
Askja 1875. The conclusion is that all eruptive events, if they
were to occur, would likely disrupt the European air traffic,
with the most important perturbations caused by eruptions
like Katla 1918 and Hekla 1947.
3 National-scale vulnerability and impacts
3.1 Exposed targets
In order to assess vulnerability and estimate potential impacts
of tephra fallout in Iceland, one needs first to identify the
“social, economic, environmental or cultural assets in areas
that may be impacted by a hazard” (Birkmann, 2013, p. 305).
The main exposed targets have been identified based on the
scientific literature on tephra fallout impacts. In detail, the
exposed targets that we consider are as follows:
1. Population: Iceland has 320 000 inhabitants, of which
120 000 live in Reykjavìk, the capital. About 60 % of the
total population lives in the so-called Greater Reykjavìk
(Supplement Table S1). Recent trends (Byggdastofnun,
2012) show that the population is growing around the
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capital and in the eastern part of the country, where
tephra fallout has high probabilities of occurrence for
some of the eruption scenarios considered (Biass et al.,
2014). The central part of the island is mostly uninhab-
ited. Approximately one-quarter of the population has
reduced mobility: 15 % of inhabitants are under 10 years
old and 9 % are over 70 (Statice, 2012). This segment
of the population is potentially more exposed to suffer-
ing respiratory difficulties due to the presence of sus-
pended PM10 (Baxter et al., 1983; Horwell and Baxter,
2006). In addition, all of the population is exposed to
indirect impacts due to failure of services (water and
electricity supply, transportation, access to health care).
Data on population for each municipality and percent-
age of exposed people are available in Table S2 in the
Supplement.
2. Emergency facilities, (e.g., hospitals, emergency shel-
ters, police and fire stations): the two main Icelandic
hospitals are located in Reykjavìk, but other hospitals
and local health centers, also considered in our anal-
ysis, exist in relevant towns such as Akureyri, Isafjor-
dur, Nordfjordur and Selfoss. Police and fire stations are
quite well distributed amongst the main towns. Finally,
shelters are usually public buildings located close to ar-
eas of interest (monuments, touristic attractions) and
towns, but for simplicity we only consider schools as
possible shelters.
3. Mobility network (e.g., road network and mobility nodes
such as ports and airports): the road network is di-
rectly exposed to tephra fallout, which may disrupt traf-
fic, reducing the capability of the population to reach
critical facilities and indirectly affecting services and
productive activities. In the absence of a railway net-
work in Iceland, the road network is extremely impor-
tant for internal mobility. A main primary road cir-
cles Iceland along the coast. Disruption of the mobil-
ity network, even if temporary, can trigger relevant cas-
cade effects. Ports are extremely important for the im-
port/export activities in Iceland. In 2006, a total of 6 Mt
of freight passed through Icelandic ports, which mainly
export marine products (25 %) and import/export “other
goods” (49 and 51 %, respectively), including textiles
and manufacturing goods (Statice, 2012). Finally, air-
ports are also important mobility nodes. The main air-
port in Iceland is Keflavìk, which accounts for more
than 97 and 99 % of international passengers and freight
traffic (Isavia, 2012), respectively. Important airports for
domestic routes are Reykjavìk and Akureyri, account-
ing for approximately 25 and 50 % of domestic passen-
gers and 47 and 20 % of freight (goods and mail), re-
spectively (Isavia, 2012). Other smaller airports, includ-
ing Egilsstadir, account for 12.5 % of domestic traffic
of passengers. The volume of the domestic air traffic
is modest (around 800 000 passengers per year; Isavia,
2012) but nonetheless important for the national econ-
omy, given the absence of a railway.
4. Electricity network: the electricity network is a criti-
cal infrastructure for economic activities and society in
general. Electricity networks are very vulnerable to vol-
canic fallout (Wilson et al., 2009a, 2011), and conse-
quences of a disruption of power generation and dis-
tribution are potentially dramatic. In Iceland, around
85 % of the primary energy is produced domestically
from renewable energy sources. In 2011, electricity
was produced almost entirely from hydroelectric (73 %)
and geothermal (27 %) plants. More than 30 hydroelec-
tric plants are spread across the country, except in the
southern area of the Vatnajökull ice cap (Icelandic Na-
tional Energy Authority, 2012a), and up to 7 geothermal
plants are located around the capital and in the northeast
(Icelandic National Energy Authority, 2012b). Some of
them are combined heat and power plants, which utilize
geothermal water and steam.
5. Economic activities: the main economic activities in
Iceland are services and industry, which in 2011 em-
ployed 75.7 and 18.4 % of the working population,
respectively (Landshagir, 2012). Comparison between
Greater Reykjavìk and other regions shows that ser-
vices in the capital region share a higher percent-
age of employees while industry dominates elsewhere
(Landshagir, 2012). In particular, aluminum smelters
are strategic components of the Icelandic economy,
constituting 37.6 % of the total Icelandic exports and
placing the country in the top-20 aluminum-producing
nations worldwide. In 2011, aluminum smelting ac-
counted for approximately 73 % of the gross electricity
consumption (Landshagir, 2012).
6. Agriculture: the main agriculture activities are related to
the production of wool and milk, which only account for
a small percentage of the national GDP (Johánnesson,
2010). The distribution of the main agricultural areas
(extracted from the Corine Land Cover raster map; see
the Supplement Fig. S1) shows that a substantial part of
the island is covered by snow and ice, and the few agri-
cultural areas are barely visible and located in the prox-
imity of main villages and coastal areas. Nevertheless,
agriculture is important for local development, being
the main economic resource for people living in small,
isolated villages. Crops can suffer from short- to long-
term impacts due to tephra accumulation (Wilson et al.,
2009b). Fluoride absorption can impact cattle due to its
toxicity and, unless direct inhalation is not a large con-
cern, its ingestion through plants and water can cause
diseases (Dawson et al., 2010).
7. Water supplies: Tephra fallout can disrupt water sup-
ply networks and water treatment plants (Stewart et al.,
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2006). In Iceland, the areas close to active volcanoes are
not densely populated and the disruption of water sup-
ply in urban areas seems not to be a large issue. How-
ever, tephra fallout can contaminate ground and sur-
face waters, which are in some cases used for domes-
tic/agricultural use (about a 95 % of the national wa-
ter consumption relies on high-quality groundwater and
only a 5 % on surface water; Gunnarsdóttir, 2012). This
is usually the case for isolated farms, where no official
quality controls are performed and, consequently, more
are exposed to this hazardous phenomenon. Moreover,
farms can suffer the indirect impact of tephra fallout on
livestock, as it can contaminate water used for drinking
(Wilson et al., 2009a; Dawson et al., 2010).
This list of exposed targets is not exhaustive but accounts
for the main aspects generally considered in the literature.
Amongst all these exposed targets, we selected the most sig-
nificant for the national context based on practical consider-
ations and data availability. Figure 2 shows maps of the con-
sidered features, based on several data sources: the national
GIS data set (Landmælingar Islands, 2012), the European
statistics database (Eurostat, 2013) and the Iceland National
Statistics (Statice, 2012). In detail, Fig. 2a shows the loca-
tion of the critical features considered (hospitals and schools
that could be potentially be used as shelters), as well as the
national road network. Our systemic vulnerability analysis
is based on how easy it is for the population to reach crit-
ical facilities using the road network. Figure 2b shows the
location of hydroelectric power plants and the electricity dis-
tribution network. The most densely populated areas and the
main productive activities (aluminum smelters) are also dis-
played on the map. Figure 2c shows the location of mobility
nodes relevant for the Icelandic socioeconomic system. Air-
ports can be directly disrupted not only by tephra fallout but
also by tephra dispersal in the atmosphere, which may cause
airspace closure. Import/export activities at ports and airports
can suffer indirect damage due to the disruption of the road
network, power plants and productive activities.
3.2 Vulnerability assessment
As mentioned, our vulnerability assessment focuses on the
systemic and economic dimensions of vulnerability. This
choice results from numerous factors, related partly to scien-
tific and methodological aspects, including (i) the low prob-
ability of the exposed population suffering from relevant
structural failure of buildings, and human casualties resulting
from tephra accumulations suggested by the hazard analysis;
(ii) the scale of the vulnerability and impact assessment (i.e.,
the whole country); (iii) the priorities for improving effective
mitigation strategies in Iceland, defined through close coop-
eration between local stakeholders and the Icelandic Civil
Protection; and (iv) the availability of accurate and up-to-
date data. As a result, based on the different categories of
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Figure 2. Exposure maps for (a) the road network and critical in-
frastructures (hospitals, local health care centers and schools, which
can be used as ash shelters); (b) electricity distribution network, hy-
droelectric and geothermal power plants, production sites and main
locations (urban areas); and (c) main transport nodes: ports and
airport.
exposed targets, we defined vulnerability themes and indica-
tors (Table 2), focusing on the following aspects:
– physical vulnerability, limiting the analysis to electric
power plants and distribution networks;
– systemic vulnerability, which refers to the interdepen-
dencies among exposed targets capable of reducing the
overall functioning of the system itself and thus its ca-
pacity to react in the emergency phase following an
event;
– economic vulnerability, which refers to the potential
for temporary or permanent loss of economic activities
and assets which are crucial for the Iceland economy
and, consequently, for the maintenance of the level of
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Table 2. Indicators (and estimators) defined for the systemic vulnerability from tephra fallout.
Category Theme Indicator (at municipality level)
Physical Electric power plants and Constant vulnerability= 1
distribution network
Systemic Accessibility Travel time to critical facilities, energy
production sites and mobility nodes
Socioeconomic Agricultural areas Combination of three factors: agricultural
area, milk and wool production
welfare of the population. It is worth noting that eco-
nomic activities (such as agricultural activities) or eco-
nomic assets (industries, energy production sites etc.)
can be indirectly affected by, for example, the interrup-
tion of transportation services.
Physical vulnerability has been quantified considering the
hydroelectric power plants and the electricity distribution
network due to their high vulnerability to tephra fallout
(Wardman et al., 2012). Geothermal and combined-power
plants are not considered because they are a priori much less
vulnerable to tephra fallout given their thick reinforced con-
crete structure with few or no openings. We assign a vul-
nerability value of 1 to all exposed hydroelectric plants and
aerial sections of the distribution network because detailed
data to rank the vulnerability of each particular plant were
not publicly available. The electricity distribution network
has significant interdependencies with information infras-
tructures, other utilities and services, and economic activ-
ities (Pederson et al., 2006; Laprie et al., 2007; Beccuti
et al., 2012). As a result, a disruption of hydroelectric plants
and/or the distribution network may result in severe failures
of dependent sectors, as demonstrated by the blackouts in
Italy (2003) and Germany (2006), which impacted large ar-
eas of western Europe (Menoni and Margottini, 2011).
The systemic vulnerability assessment has been performed
considering accessibility, which is a key issue during emer-
gency situations. According to Bertolini et al. (2005), ac-
cessibility can be defined as “the amount and diversity of
places that can be reached within a given travel time and/or
cost”. During a crisis, bidirectional accessibility is crucial for
both evacuating the population to safe areas and dispatch-
ing rescue teams (Galderisi and Ceudech, 2010). Although
the disruption of the mobility networks due to tephra accu-
mulation is generally temporary, it can result in significant
cascade effects reducing accessibility to and from inhabited
areas, emergency facilities, mobility nodes, power plants or
industrial sites, with relevant consequences in terms of in-
creasing losses and slower recovery. Here we consider the
accessibility to emergency facilities (hospitals and shelters)
for using the road network. The driving time is assessed us-
ing the Spatial Analyst toolbox in Esri ArcMap 10.2 (Esri,
2012). The hierarchy of the road network is accounted for
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Figure 3. Accessibility to critical facilities: (from top to bottom)
hospitals, schools and police/fire stations. All maps display the time
in minutes required to reach a given facility by road.
using the official speed limits. Figure 3 shows the analysis of
accessibility from inhabited areas to shelters, hospitals and
fire stations. Based on this accessibility analysis we obtain
the map of the most vulnerable areas.
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Figure 4. Thematic vulnerability map for agriculture. The five-class
qualitative ranking is based on a combination of three indicators:
production of milk, production of wool and percentage of agricul-
tural area, all available at a municipality level. Maps for each indi-
cator are given in the Supplement.
Finally, and given its complexity, quantity and diversity
of data, the economic vulnerability assessment has been
performed considering the agricultural sector only, assess-
ing its relevance at a municipality level (Fig. 4). In or-
der to estimate the importance of agricultural activities, we
combine three different types of data: percentage of agri-
cultural area, production of milk and production of wool.
The percentage of agricultural area for each municipality
was estimated by extracting pastures and crops from the
CORINE Land Cover map (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/
publi/landscape/about.htm), containing an inventory of soil
use information at high resolution (100 m). The produc-
tion of milk (L year−1) and wool for each municipality dur-
ing 2012 was provided by the Icelandic Regional Develop-
ment Institute (Byggdastofnun, 2012). Wool production is
expressed in terms of “support entitlements”, i.e., the na-
tional entitlements that municipalities receive from the cen-
tral government for their wool production and according to
their percentage of the total production of the municipal-
ity (Á. Ragnarsson, personal communication, October 2012).
Values of these three agricultural indicators have been clas-
sified in a five-class vulnerability ranking (very low, low,
medium, high and very high vulnerability) using the natu-
ral breaks method (Jenks, 1967), commonly used in most
GIS software and especially suitable for visualizing differ-
ences between classes (maps for each indicator are given in
the Supplement Fig. S1).
3.3 Impact assessment
Before performing an impact analysis, it is necessary to de-
termine the link between a quantitative hazard value (thresh-
old) and each vulnerability indicator. Regarding the elec-
tricity network, there are two main impacts of tephra fall-
out: collapse/failure of network elements and flash-over of
components. Wilson et al. (2011) define critical values of
ash deposition for infrastructures based on well-documented
impacts of past eruptions, and propose the value of 10 cm as
a threshold for producing medium to high damages on net-
work elements (towers, poles and lines). Moreover, Wilson et
al. (2011) show that collapse of lines has happened for tephra
fallout of a similar magnitude, while impacts on transform-
ers can happen for lower fallout values. There is little evi-
dence of impacts on power plants, but it is known that tephra
fall is likely to cause disruption or shutdown (Wardman et
al., 2012). In particular, coarse ash is more likely to cause
tephra-induced abrasion on turbines, whereas a deposition of
fine ash as thick as 50–100 mm may not cause strong abra-
sion. Moreover, in hydroelectric plants, tephra can engulf
water channels and affect the turbines, limiting power plant
functionality. Finally, Wardman et al. (2012) show that lower
values of tephra fallout (5–10 mm) can cause tephra-induced
insulation flash-over of components and provide a fragility
curve for such a phenomenon. Thus, in order to include all
effects, and according to the fragility curve, we assume that
1 cm tephra fallout has a 60 % probability of causing disrup-
tions of components. It is worth mentioning that we used a
fragility curve for wet tephra, adopting a conservative ap-
proach, while dry tephra is not likely to produce flash-over.
Regarding the road network, tephra depositions > 1 mm
(∼ 1 kg m−2) can cause a lack of visibility and disorient
drivers, and can cause significant damage to vehicles’ com-
ponents and eventual engine failure (Wilson et al., 2011).
However, this value does not take into account differences in
road design, typology of vehicles, and other aspects such as a
population’s preparedness and coping capacity, which are be-
coming an important element in risk analysis (Frischknecht
et al., 2010). In the case of Iceland, critical deposition thresh-
olds for road disruption could be considerably higher due
to the characteristics of the fleet of vehicles and the re-
silience of the population, who are used to coping with road
traffic disruptions during winter snowfalls. We assume that
a moderate disruption of the road network may happen with
∼ 10 kg m−2 tephra accumulation, while 100 kg m−2 would
cause the total blockage of road transportation (Biass et al.,
2012). Finally, we consider that an accumulation of 1 cm
(∼ 10 kg m−2) can cause damages to agriculture and impact
livestock (Wilson et al., 2009a; Biass et al., 2012), as has
occurred during past eruptions in Iceland (Thorarinsson and
Sigvaldason, 1971; Gudmundsson et al., 1992; Höskuldsson
et al., 2007).
Overlapping probabilistic hazard maps with vulnerable
features allows for the identification of potential impacts,
which is conditioned to the occurrence of the considered
eruptions (Biass et al., 2014). We estimated the number of
power plants and the total length of the electricity network
with respect to 5, 10 and 20 % probabilities of being im-
pacted (i.e., covered by a critical tephra load > 10 kg m−2)
if each scenario were to occur. Impacted features are iden-
tified by performing a GIS-based overlap of a probabilistic
hazard map and an exposed target map (Fig. 2b). We assume
that vulnerable parts of the network (Sect. 3.2) covered by
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Table 3. Estimated impacts on electricity generation and distribution systems for different eruptive scenarios. For each eruptive scenario, we
calculated the length of the electricity distribution system and the number of power plants having 5, 10 and 20 % probability of being affected
by a critical ash fallout of 10 kg m−2. Note that the 1947-type Hekla ERS has the highest impact on power plants due to the location of the
volcano, close to five power plants.
Probability (%) for 10 kg m−2 5 10 20 5 10 20
Eruptive scenario Length impacted (km) Number of power plants
Hekla EES 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hekla ERS 500 263 106 6 5 4
Askja OES 1400 655 109 5 4 1
Katla LLERS 671 267 135 6 4 0
Eyjafjallajökull LLOES 207 122 73 2 0 0
tephra load greater than 10 kg m−2 (i.e., approximately 1 cm
thickness) are expected to be disrupted, and contribute to the
systemic damage. Impacts of lower tephra fallout values are
not considered here, also accounting for the fact that not all
components are necessarily directly exposed to tephra fall-
out. Expected impacts are displayed in Table 3. We partially
account for the uncertainties related to the critical threshold
choice by varying the probability of overpassing it between 5
and 20 % (Tables 3 and 4). Note that Katla has a high impact
on power plants at any value of probability considered, due
to its close proximity to five power plants. Moreover, tephra
fallout from a Hekla 1947-type eruption can impact impor-
tant electricity lines that connect power plants to the rest
of the network, while the occurrence of a Hekla 2000-type
scenario has a low probability (< 5 %) of impacting power
plants and electrical infrastructure. Both the Hekla 1947 and
the Katla scenario have a high probability (up to 20 %) of
impacting important power lines that bring electricity to the
southeastern region. An eruption at Eyjafjallajökull similar
to that of 2010 could also impact these power lines (with a
10 % probability). Finally, in the event of an 1875-type erup-
tion at Askja, power lines may also suffer strong impacts.
The occurrence of such a scenario may in fact disrupt an
important line that connects the eastern part of the country
with geothermal and hydroelectric power plants located in
the north and provides electricity to an important aluminum
smelter (Fig. 2b). Note that, although a Hekla 2000-type
eruption does not seem to affect any power plant, Biass et
al. (2014) show that low tephra accumulations (∼ 1 kg m−2)
can be produced in the area surrounding the volcano, and
thus the possibility of having impacts due to a Hekla 2000-
type scenario should not be discarded.
Biass et al. (2014) show that, if the considered eruptive
scenarios defined for Katla and Askja were to occur, the
probability of having tephra deposition of 10 and 1 kg m−2 in
southern Iceland (ranging between 20 and 50 %) is substan-
tial, while in eastern Iceland it is somewhat lower (5 to 20 %).
Thus, agricultural activity in these areas can be impacted and
livestock can suffer from fluorine intoxication due to wa-
ter and soil contamination. We estimated the area devoted
0 50 100 150 200 250
100
102
104
106
Driving time (min)
Nu
m
be
r o
f p
eo
pl
e
 
 
Hospitals
Police/Fire stations
Schools
Figure 5. Number of people as a function of driving time to reach
the closest critical infrastructures (i.e., hospital, police/fire station
and schools).
to agricultural activities that has 5, 10 and 20 % probability
of being impacted (i.e., covered by a critical tephra load
> 10 kg m−2) in the case of each eruptive scenario occur-
ring. Results are summarized in Tables 4 and 5 and can be
compared with the corresponding tephra accumulation haz-
ard maps and vulnerability maps (Fig. 4 and Supplement
Fig. S1). The highest impacts on crops are caused by the
occurrence of the considered LLERS at Katla, followed by
a 2010-type LLOES at Eyjafjallajökull, while pastures are
expected to be particularly impacted in the case of an 1875-
type OES at Askja and the considered LLERS at Katla. A
2000-type ERS eruption at Hekla is not likely to impact agri-
cultural activities.
Impacts are also estimated on the basis of the accessi-
bility analysis using least-cost-distance models (Wood and
Schmidtlein, 2012). Using the census contained in the official
GIS database (i.e., polygons of inhabited areas; Landmælin-
gar Islands, 2012), we calculated the size of the population
located in areas classified in terms of travel time (Fig. 5) to
critical facilities: schools (Fig. 3a), hospitals (Fig. 3b) and
police/fire stations (Fig. 3c). The Spatial Analyst toolbox of
the ESRI ArcMap 10.2 software was used to calculate the
shortest travel time from any pixel on the map to reach a crit-
ical facility using the road network. The hierarchy of the
official road network (Landmælingar Islands, 2012) and the
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Table 4. Estimated impacts on agricultural activities for different eruptive scenarios. Area of crops and pasture having 5, 10 and 20 %
probability of being affected by a critical ash fallout of 10 kg m−2. Katla LLERS and Eyjafjallajökull LLOES 2010-type scenarios cause the
greatest impacts on crops, while pastures are particularly affected by eruptions of types Askja OES 1875 and Katla LLERS.
Probability (%) for 10 kg m−2 5 10 20 5 10 20
Eruptive scenario Crops impacted (km2) Pastures impacted (km2)
Hekla EES 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hekla ERS 10 0 0 281 13 0
Askja OES 10 1 0 586 287 26
Katla LLERS 14 7 1 361 125 101
Eyjafjallajökull LLOES 12 9 7 12 9 7
Table 5. Indicators (and estimators) defined for systemic vulnerability of the European air traffic system to tephra dispersal.
Vulnerability category Vulnerability theme Vulnerability indicator Vulnerability estimator
Systemic Airports (all of Europe and Passengers (n day−1)
relevance of features northwestern Europe) Good (t year−1)
Routes (all of Europe) Number of average daily
connections
Main Routes (northwestern Europe) Passengers (n day−1)
Goods (t year−1)
Airspace sectors (FIRS, all of Europe) Traffic rate per FIR
Socioeconomic Air traffic and Population Population/NUTS-2
development Air traffic Goods/NUTS-2
passengers/NUTS-2
Accessibility Multi-modal accessibility/NUTS-2
speed limit for each road class were respected and imple-
mented in a cost raster for accessibility analysis.
4 European-scale vulnerability and impacts
As clearly demonstrated during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption
in 2010, the European air traffic system is largely vulnera-
ble to loss of functionality of its elements when exposed to
volcanic ash. The magnitude of systemic impacts depends on
the relevance of the disrupted elements, and impacts of ash
clouds can occur very far from the source (Ceudech et al.,
2011). Here, we analyze the systemic vulnerability of Euro-
pean air traffic system and the socioeconomic vulnerability
of the areas hosting its main airports.
4.1 Exposed targets
We define vulnerability indicators based on the analysis of
European air traffic system, including main exposed airports
and aviation routes. The analysis is performed at the Euro-
pean scale, but we focus on those regions where our hazard
assessment indicates that impacts from ash dispersal can be
significant.
The European air traffic network has more than 2000 in-
ternational airports handling approximately 170 000 overall
daily flights on average (Wegner and Marsh, 2007). However,
over 50 % of the European air traffic is concentrated in the
top 35 airports (Wegner and Marsh, 2007). The European air
traffic network is scale-free (Wilkinson et al., 2001), mean-
ing that these main hubs are the most relevant to the system,
and therefore highly vulnerable to its failure. The main Euro-
pean hub is London Heathrow, with 61 million terminal pas-
sengers on international flights in 2010 (Heathrow Airports,
2013), followed by Paris Charles de Gaulle. The five London
airports (Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and London
City) account together for more than 60 % of the total num-
ber of UK passengers according to the UK Department of
Transport. In 2011, London’s airports handled more than 120
million passengers and 1.7 Mt of freight (CAA, 2012). More-
over, the most intense freight traffic in Europe during 2009
was between the UK and four European states: Germany,
Netherlands, France and Belgium (PricewaterhouseCoopers,
2011). The London area is therefore one of the most critical
and strategic points within the European air traffic network,
and the airspace between London, Paris, Frankfurt and Ams-
terdam constitutes the densest part of the European civil avia-
tion network. It therefore follows that the European air traffic
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network is particularly vulnerable to the failure of some of
these strategic hubs.
At a national level, Keflavík airport is also strategic for
the Icelandic economy. In 2011, Keflavík handled 97.5 % of
all international passengers (1.75 million; Keflavík Interna-
tional Airport, 2012), 49.2 % of domestic passengers (0.75
million), and more than 99 % of all cargo operations. Air-
based commercial relationships with Europe are very im-
portant for the Icelandic socioeconomic system. In fact, the
European Economic Area market (i.e., the 27 EU countries
plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein) accounts for 82.7
and 61.9 % of total Icelandic exports and imports, respec-
tively. The main commercial partners are Netherlands, Ger-
many, the UK, and Norway. Iceland’s imports come mainly
from Norway, USA, Germany, Netherlands and the UK (Stat-
ice, 2012). According to the 2011 statistics, Keflavík’s most
important passenger destinations were Copenhagen, London
and Oslo. During the period of 2010–2011 the Icelandic
airspace experienced a 9 % growth in traffic (counting over-
flights) (Isavia, 2012), and, although peripheral in the Euro-
pean network, it is strategic for intercontinental flights from
and to the USA and Canada. Disruption of air traffic con-
nections can therefore substantially impact on both local and
regional economies.
Based on these considerations, the exposed targets for
our systemic vulnerability analysis are the main airports and
routes to north and central Europe and the most relevant so-
cioeconomic features of the areas where the main airports are
located. In order to have a vulnerability assessment mean-
ingful to civil aviation stakeholders, we consider European
airspace sectors, following the current classification (EURO-
CONTROL, 2005). Flight Information Regions (FIRs) are
subdivided according to their specific role into CTA (control
area), OCA (oceanic control area), ACC (area control cen-
ter) and UAC (upper area control), which are airspace sec-
tors not hosting airports (EUROCONTROL, 2005). Aerial
sectors represent a key component of the air traffic network
because each sector has an associated capacity, which is the
main parameter for air traffic management (Leal de Matos
and Ormerod, 2000; Leal de Matos and Powell, 2002; Dell’
Olmo and Lulli, 2003).
Finally, we note that the territorial context of an airport
is also relevant for the estimation of socioeconomic vulner-
ability and impact because the vulnerability of a region is
proportional to its dependence on air traffic.
4.2 Vulnerability indicators
Table 5 summarizes the systemic and socioeconomic vulner-
ability indicators defined for the European air traffic system.
Figures 6–10 show vulnerability maps produced for the con-
sidered features (airports, routes, airspace sectors and Euro-
pean regions). Visualization is performed through the open
source GIS Qgis (http://www.qgis.org/en/site/), using the Eu-
ropean GIS database (GISCO, 2013) and European air traffic
database (courtesy of EUROCONTROL). Unless specified
otherwise, all indicators are reclassified into a qualitative
five-class ranking, ranging from very low to very high, us-
ing the natural breaks method (Jenks, 1967). Vulnerability
indicators include the following:
1. Strategic airports. We assume that the higher the traffic
of an airport, the higher its relevance and, consequently,
the higher the vulnerability of the system to its poten-
tial disruption. We classified all European airports ac-
cording to traffic of passengers and freight during 2012
(Eurostat, 2013), and this identified Frankfurt, London
Heathrow, Amsterdam and Paris Charles de Gaulle as
the strategic elements for the European air traffic sys-
tem in terms of passengers and goods. Given that the
probability of ash dispersal affecting southeastern Eu-
rope is low (Biass et al., 2014) and that we aim to assess
the vulnerability within a more constrained domain, we
performed the same analysis for central and northwest-
ern Europe. Having selected the most relevant airports
in central and northern Europe in terms of air traffic val-
ues (Supplement Table S3), we ranked them according
to passengers and freight values (Fig. 6). The most rel-
evant airports are London Heathrow, Paris Charles de
Gaulle, Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Munich, which have
already been identified as main hubs at the European
level. Copenhagen airport also has a high relevance for
traffic to northern Europe (including Iceland).
2. Strategic routes, classified in two ways. The first
classification builds upon the average number of
connections between each pair of European airports
in 2012 (courtesy of EUROCONTROL). We assume
that the higher the number of connections the higher
the importance of the route and the higher the sys-
temic vulnerability of the system to its failure. This
classification reveals that the top five connections are
Madrid–Barcelona (Spain), Istanbul–Izmir (Turkey),
Paris–Toulouse (France), Oslo–Bergen (Norway) and
Barcelona–Palma de Mallorca (Spain). Constraining
the analysis to central and northwestern Europe,
the most relevant connections are London–Paris,
Paris–Frankfurt, London–Edinburgh, London–Dublin,
Munich–Frankfurt, Copenhagen–Aalborg, Oslo–
Trondheim, Oslo–Bergen and Oslo–Stavanger. This
analysis underlines that the main city pairs are often
composed of national connections between first- and
second-largest cities, as described by Wegner and
Marsh (2007). The second classification is based
on air traffic (passengers and freight) for each city
pair, i.e., for the main routes between a considered
airport and its partners (Eurostat, 2013). This kind
of classification considers the relevance of European
routes for a selected sub-system constituted by the
considered airport and its main European partners.
For example, we show two relevant cases: the London
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/14/2289/2014/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 2289–2312, 2014
2300 C. Scaini et al.: Part 2: Vulnerability and impact
Figure 6. Main airport hubs in central and northwestern Europe depending on the traffic of passengers (a) and goods (b) during 2010
(Eurostat, 2012). The values represent the relevance of these airports for passengers and freight air traffic. The most relevant airports are
London Heathrow, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Munich.
Figure 7. Main European routes from/to London Heathrow (top) and the rest of the airports in Greater London (Gatwick, Luton and Stansted,
displayed together, bottom). Routes are ranked according to their importance in terms of passengers (left) and freight (right) traffic. The
vulnerability classification is based on the whole range of air traffic data between main London airports and the considered European airports
in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012). The same classification criterion is used for all figures and the comparison underlines that Heathrow airport handles
the most strategic routes (corresponding to more than 1.2 million passengers per year).
Figure 8. Main European routes of passengers (a) and freight (b) from/to Keflavík airport. Analysis is performed for the routes connecting
the main airports shown in Fig. 6. The vulnerability classification is based on 2010 data (Eurostat, 2012).
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hub, strategic for European air traffic, and Keflavík
airport, the most important in Iceland. The relative
importance of routes is a measure of the vulnerability
of the sub-system to the disruption of that particu-
lar route. In our analysis, the London hub includes
the city’s four main airports: Heathrow, Gatwick,
Stansted and Luton. Figure 7 shows strategic routes
of London airports for passengers (left) and freight
(right), for Heathrow airport (top) and for the other
three airports, displayed together (bottom). The top
London destinations (> 1.2 million passengers year−1)
are Dublin, Edinburgh, Paris and Frankfurt. London
Heathrow–Dublin is the most important connection,
with more than 1.5 million passengers per year. In
terms of cargo, Stansted is also an important hub with
main destinations to Frankfurt, Brussels, Stockholm
and Paris. Figure 8 shows the most important partners
for Keflavík airport in terms of passengers (a) and
goods (b). Copenhagen, London and Oslo are strategic
destinations for passengers, whereas Amsterdam,
London, Paris, and Cologne–Bonn are main nodes for
freight transportation. It is worth noting that the main
passenger routes from Keflavík airport have the same
order of magnitude as the less relevant route for the
London hub (∼ 300 000 passengers per year). Keflavík
routes, if classified using the same range used for the
London airports, would fall into the low-vulnerability
class, and their relevance would be diminished in the
subsequent impact analysis. Using a scale-dependent
classification criterion allows for identification of routes
that can be secondary at a broader European scale but
are strategic for the national scale.
3. Number of daily European flights in each airspace sec-
tor, which gives a measure of the airspace congestion.
For simplicity, our analysis uses data of one of the peak
days during 2012 (29 June) and assumes that this par-
ticular day is representative of high-traffic situations in
Europe. For each airspace sector, we counted how many
times per day the sector is crossed by flights at any FL
and assign a vulnerability value accordingly. Figure 9
shows that the most congested airspace sectors are lo-
cated in France (Brest, Paris and Marseille FIRs), the
southern UK (London FIR), Germany (Langen, Bremen
and Hannover FIRs), Netherlands (Amsterdam FIR),
and Italy and Spain (Milan, Rome and Madrid FIRs).
Some FIRs show lower traffic rate compared to the sur-
rounding areas, for example Ireland (Shannon FIRs) and
other regions of France (Bordeaux and Reims FIRs).
4. Relevance of air traffic for European regions, based
on a combination of four regional indicators: popu-
lation (Eurostat, 2013, data from 2012); total num-
ber of passengers and tonnes of freight transported
by air (Eurostat, 2013, data from 2011); and multi-
modal accessibility, which takes into account the
Figure 9. Vulnerability classification of the European airspace sec-
tors based on the air traffic rate in the sector during a peak day of
2012 (source: EUROCONTROL, 2012). FIRs with very high vul-
nerability values (blue) are London, Paris and Munich.
presence/absence of alternative transport modes and
their cost (ESPON, 2004; TRACC, 2010, p. 17). We
use multi-modal accessibility produced by the ESPON
project (ESPON©, 2013) as an indicator of vulnerabil-
ity: areas with low multi-modal accessibility are there-
fore more vulnerable to the failure of one transportation
mode due to the limited variety of alternative transporta-
tion modes available. According to Fürst et al. (2000),
multi-modal indicators have much more explanatory
power with respect to regional economic performance
than any accessibility indicator based only on a single
mode. We propose a first-level assessment of socioe-
conomic vulnerability by combining these four indica-
tors under the assumption that vulnerability increases
when the dependency on air traffic is higher and the
multi-modal accessibility lower. All indicators refer to
the 2003 NUTS-2 regions (Nomenclature of Territo-
rial Units for Statistics), a hierarchical system for di-
viding the economic territory of the EU for the appli-
cation of regional policies. We combine the four indi-
cators by summing the values for each NUTS-2 region,
and reclassifying the resulting map into five vulnerabil-
ity classes. Population, air traffic and multi-modal ac-
cessibility are classified into five equal interval classes,
while the multi-modal accessibility database produced
by the ESPON project is already ranked into five qual-
itative classes, ranging from 1 (highly below average)
to 5 (highly above average). Air traffic data show that
the areas which most rely on air traffic correspond to
the regions hosting the main European cities of Lon-
don, Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam. But socioeco-
nomic vulnerability is not only related to the volume
of air traffic: for example, Ireland has a low multi-
modal accessibility (Supplement Fig. S2) but a consid-
erable population (Supplement Fig. S2). The resulting
vulnerability map (Fig. 10) facilitates recognition of the
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Figure 10. Vulnerability of the NUTS-2 regions, calculated as
a combination of population, air traffic values and multi-modal ac-
cessibility value (see the Supplement Fig. S2 for individual maps).
High-vulnerability areas are those having high population and low
accessibility rates, for example Ireland and Norway.
areas most dependent on air traffic, where a relatively
high population and/or air traffic values are associated
with low multi-modal accessibility. The most vulner-
able NUTS-2 areas are therefore the ones hosting the
cities of London, Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam. Also,
Ireland, Norway and northern France show a medium–
high vulnerability. Due to the intrinsic nature of being
an island, air traffic cannot easily be substituted by al-
ternative transportation means. For this reason, Ireland
has medium vulnerability to air traffic disruptions.
Given the differences in the indicators of vulnerability, we
evaluate the expected impacts for each single vulnerability
feature, i.e., for the national-scale assessment, we do not
merge the different thematic vulnerability maps (Figs. 6–
10) into a single map. However, once the strategic elements
and their relevance are identified, it is possible to assess the
expected impacts of each eruptive scenario through a GIS-
based overlap of hazard and vulnerability maps.
4.3 Impact assessment
We propose three different methods for assessing the impacts
of tephra dispersal on European air traffic. Each method fo-
cuses on producing specific results, and could be used to sup-
port risk management strategies at different levels. It should
be kept in mind that impact assessment results are condi-
tioned to the occurrence of the eruptive scenario (Biass et
al., 2014).
The first method consists of a qualitative GIS-based vi-
sual overlap of hazard and vulnerability maps. The graphical
overlap allows for an immediate identification of the routes
that have the highest probability of being disrupted for each
scenario. For example, the overlap of the Askja hazard map
for all FLs and the main passenger routes between London
Heathrow and Europe (Fig. 7a) reveals which routes would
have the highest probability of being disrupted in this sce-
nario. The overlap of hazard and vulnerability can also be
performed using hazard maps for specific FLs and averaged
arrival time and persistence maps, which allow for the poten-
tial duration of a disruption to be inferred.
The second method estimates the impact (movements dis-
rupted, passengers and freight stranded) at given airports
by multiplying the average atmospheric persistence time of
a given hazardous ash concentration for a given eruptive sce-
nario by the hourly averaged traffic. Here, we assume that, if
the critical ash concentration is reached at any FL over an air-
port, all flight operations are disrupted. For example, Tables 6
and 7 show the expected impacts at London Heathrow and
Keflavík airports for the different eruptive scenarios consid-
ered, respectively. Air traffic values for London Heathrow are
estimated dividing yearly averages (CAA, 2012; Heathrow
airport, 2013) by 365. Keflavík air traffic values are inferred
from the Keflavík airport 2011 facts and figures document
(Keflavík International Airport, 2011). According to Biass
et al. (2014), the conditional probability of having more than
24 h of disruption at London airports from Askja 1875 and
Katla 1918 scenarios is about 5 and 1 %, respectively. The
conditional probability of having more than 24 h of disrup-
tion due to Hekla activity is lower than 1 %. Thus, there is
a substantial probability of having strong disruptions in the
London area due to high-magnitude explosive volcanic erup-
tions at Askja and Katla, and a low probability of having im-
pacts at London due to lower magnitude events at Hekla.
Finally, the third method consists of overlapping hazard
and vulnerability data and combining the values on a cell-by-
cell basis, i.e., multiplying hazard and vulnerability values
within each cell. To do that, hazard and vulnerability maps
are converted to raster format (GeoTIFF) using GRASS GIS
(Neteler et al., 2012). We use probabilistic hazard maps for
each scenario that account for the probability of disruption
at any FL (Biass et al., 2014) and vulnerability maps of the
airspace sectors (Fig. 9). Such maps are then overlapped on
a cell-by-cell basis and the resulting impact map is recon-
verted to vector format, aggregating the maximum impact
value over FIRs areas. The final results are impact maps con-
taining impact values for each FIR, reclassified into five qual-
itatively impact classes (very low to very high impact) using
the natural breaks method. These results are shown in Fig. 11.
It has to be stressed that the resulting impact represents rela-
tive comparison between FIRs rather than a quantitative im-
pact. The Hekla ERS 2000-type scenario (Fig. 11a) produces
very high impacts in the Reykjavík FIR, high impacts in the
London FIR and low impacts in the Shanwick OCA and the
Norway FIRs, but is not expected to affect central Europe.
The Hekla ERS 1947-type scenario (Fig. 11b) produces very
high impacts in the Reykjavík FIR, and Paris, Brest and Mar-
seille FIR; high impacts in the London FIR; and low impacts
in the Shanwick, Norway and Sweden FIRs. Such a scenario
is also likely to result in low impacts in the northern Ger-
many and Poland FIRs. Both the Katla LLERS (c) and the
Askja OES 1875-type (d) scenarios are likely to produce high
impacts in the Keflavík FIR as well as the southern UK and
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Table 6. First-order estimation of expected impacts at London Heathrow airport for different eruption scenarios based on the averaged
persistence. Air traffic values are based on yearly averages (CAA, 2012).
Eruptive scenario Mean persistence Movements Passengers Freight
all FLs (h) disrupted (n) stranded (n) stranded (t)
Hekla-2000 ERS ∼ 3 ∼ 160 ∼ 23000 ∼ 600
Hekla-1947 ERS ∼ 4 ∼ 180 ∼ 27000 ∼ 700
Katla LLERS ∼ 10 ∼ 530 ∼ 78000 ∼ 2000
Askja OES ∼ 8 ∼ 410 ∼ 60000 ∼ 1500
Table 7. First-order estimation of expected impacts at Keflavík airport for different eruption scenarios based on the averaged persistence. Air
traffic values are based on the Keflavík airport 2011 facts and figures document (Isavia, 2012).
Eruptive scenario Mean persistence Movements Passengers Freight
all FLs (h) disrupted (n) stranded (n) stranded (t)
Hekla-2000 ERS ∼ 5 ∼ 20 ∼ 950 ∼ 20
Hekla-1947 ERS ∼ 8 ∼ 30 ∼ 1500 ∼ 40
Katla LLERS ∼ 21 ∼ 90 ∼ 4300 ∼ 110
Askja OES ∼ 18 ∼ 70 ∼ 3600 ∼ 90
France FIRs, mostly due to their high traffic rates (and there-
fore high vulnerability). These scenarios can also produce
high impacts in the Norway, Sweden, Austria and Germany
FIRs. Low impacts are expected in the rest of Europe.
5 Discussion
Outcomes of our impact assessment are derived from proba-
bilistic analysis, which are conditioned to the occurrence of
specific eruptions at specific volcanoes described in the haz-
ard scenarios of Biass et al. (2014). Volcanoes were selected
based on the probability of eruption and significance of asso-
ciated impact, while the hazard scenarios were derived from
field observations to be statistically representative. However,
an eruption at a different volcano or a different type of activ-
ity at the selected volcanoes cannot be excluded, and there-
fore the impact in zone other than those identified in our as-
sessment cannot be discarded. The main value of our work is
the new multi-source, multi-scale strategy introduced to as-
sess both hazard and impact at different scales that can be
easily applied to other volcanoes and other hazard scenarios.
Nonetheless, considering the wide range of hazard scenarios
investigated and the statistically representative meteorologi-
cal conditions analyzed at the European scale, our hazard and
impact assessments can be considered as a first-level evalua-
tion for the whole Icelandic region.
5.1 National-level vulnerability and impact assessment
The methodology presented here to assess vulnerability to
tephra fallout at a national scale was developed for the par-
ticular case of Iceland in cooperation with local stakeholders
and the Icelandic Civil Protection Department, and uses only
publicly available data. However, the method could poten-
tially be applied in different geographic and socioeconomic
contexts where similar public censuses are available. The list
of exposed features identified in Sect. 3.1 is valid elsewhere
and Table 8 lists the type of data that, ideally, should be in-
cluded in any comprehensive vulnerability assessment. For
example, from a socioeconomic point of view, the role of pro-
ductive activities and the number of employees for activity
or sector should be taken into account. Industrial and tertiary
activities, for example, often constitute the backbone of the
socioeconomic system, driving local development and distri-
bution of resources. In terms of transportation, one inconve-
nience is that national statistics are rarely given by transport
mode, making it difficult to identify the precise contribution
of air traffic to the socioeconomic system. Also, water supply
has been recognized as an exposure target in a few isolated
cases (Sect. 3.1) but is not taken into account for the esti-
mation of impacts, because it needs to be treated at a more
local scale. A census of water supply systems (for example,
water quality control and monitoring) may support response
strategies, in particular for areas with strong agricultural sec-
tors (Fig. 4) that can suffer substantial impacts from tephra
fallout (Sect. 3.3). Finally, only a few data sets were avail-
able at a municipality level or in the form of disaggregated
data (that is, data available at the same administrative level
used for collection). For example, most economic and labor
market indicators were produced at the national level. This
lack of disaggregated data is a common problem in most risk
assessments, and the availability of disaggregated data sets,
or data sources defined at lower administrative levels, would
improve the vulnerability assessment presented here.
Figures 3 and 4 allow for the spatial distribution of the
most vulnerable areas and targets to be identified according
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/14/2289/2014/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 2289–2312, 2014
2304 C. Scaini et al.: Part 2: Vulnerability and impact
Figure 11. Expected impacts of tephra dispersal on European airspace sectors (FIRs) if the different scenarios considered were to occur: (a)
Hekla 2000 type, (b) Hekla 1947 type, (c) Askja 1875 type and (d) Katla scenarios.
Table 8. Availability, sources and type of data used for the vulnerability assessment to tephra fallout at the national scale.
Data Available Source Coverage Type
Population Yes Statice Municipalities Number
Population trends Yes Byggðastofnun Municipalities Percentage
Population age Yes Statice Municipalities Number
Power plants Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
http://www.or.is/en/about
Aluminum smelters Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
Hospitals Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
Shelters Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
Police stations Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
Fire stations Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
Road network Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Digital map
Electricity network Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Digital map
Ports (import/export) Yes Statice Disaggregated Import/export values
Airports (air traffic) Yes Isavia Disaggregated Passengers/freight values
Land use Yes Corine Land Cover Homogeneous areas Corine classification
Milk production Yes Byggðastofnun Municipalities Liters/support entitlements
Wool production Yes Byggðastofnun Municipalities Support entitlements
Civil protection units No – – –
Productive activities No – – –
Employees for productive
activities/sectors
Average income No – – –
Water supply No – – –
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to the considered vulnerability themes. It is important to
stress that the vulnerability scores, expressed either as nu-
merical scores or qualitative judgments, normally represent
comparative (i.e., relative) values. This makes the merging
of different vulnerability maps into a single final map a com-
plex process. On the one hand, the perspective of single indi-
cators can be lost when combined with others. On the other
hand, single merged maps are more synthetic and workable
if they involve no loss of information. In this work, and given
the very different nature of the indicators considered, we pre-
fer not to overlap maps of different vulnerability categories.
Nonetheless, the comparison of information related to each
vulnerability indicator can provide a significant support both
to land use and emergency planning.
Results from national vulnerability and impact assess-
ments allow for definition of priority areas for risk mitiga-
tion strategies. Comparison of population values with other
vulnerability indicators can support the prioritization of in-
terventions for long-term vulnerability mitigation plans. For
example, northeastern Iceland has a substantial probability of
being affected by deposition of tephra in the case of an OES
occurrence at Askja, and this hazardous phenomenon should
be considered in long-term territorial plans. Recent popula-
tion statistics (Byggðastofnun, 2012) show a positive trend
in this area due to the construction of a dam and the conse-
quent generation of employment. The increase in population
and the arrival of non-local workers, less familiar with an
active volcanic environment, should be taken into account,
e.g., through educational programs. The results of the impact
assessment can also support Icelandic policies in the main
strategic sectors such as transportation, economic activities
or location of critical facilities. Table 3 shows that the largest
impacts are expected from the occurrence of selected erup-
tive scenarios (Table 1) at Askja, Katla and Hekla, due to the
presence of power plants and a main power line in their sur-
roundings. Results suggest that moderate tephra fallout from
a 1947-type ERS at Hekla can have major impacts on the sur-
rounding power plants. Occurrence of low-magnitude 2000-
type ERS activity at Hekla does not seem to produce such
major impacts but, given its very high frequency (10-year re-
pose time; Höskuldsson et al., 2007), should also be taken
into account. In fact, repeated tephra fallout could have long-
term impacts on power plant equipment and external com-
ponents. Expected impacts on agricultural activities are in
general limited to the few crops located in the southeast of
the island. Table 4 shows that the major impacts on crops
are expected in the case of an LLERS at Katla and a 2010-
type LLOES at Eyjafjallajökull. Moreover, ash fallout from
the occurrence of eruptive scenarios at Askja and Katla is
expected to cover several square kilometer of pasture in the
south and east of Iceland (Table 4). Due to the importance
of agricultural activities (wool in particular) for the Icelandic
economy, these results should be taken into account in order
to improve preparedness and reduce impacts on the national
socioeconomic system. Finally, results of the accessibility
analysis (Figs. 3, 5) help the identification of zones with lim-
ited access to critical infrastructure by classifying the pop-
ulation in terms of travel time to strategic features (hospi-
tals, police/fire stations and potential shelters). This analy-
sis accounts for the travel speed of the road network, where
pixels outside the road network are only allowed an average
walking speed. Note that unlike agent-based strategies, the
resulting model is time-independent and does not attempt to
account for dynamic travel time costs due to route capacity
or road congestion (Wood and Schmidtlein, 2012). However,
least-cost-distance models still provide key information for
preparedness and planning by identifying heterogeneities in
the accessibility over the entire territory rather than model-
ing the behavior of individuals. A combined look at Figs. 1
and 3 highlights how most of the critical infrastructures are
clustered around the main towns, with the main zone of low
accessibility being the Vatnajökull area. Figure 5 is a combi-
nation of the analysis performed in Fig. 3 and the population
census, and helps visualize the number of people as a func-
tion of the travel time to critical infrastructures. Figure 3c
also shows that although uninhabited, Vestfjörður, the north-
westernmost peninsula, has a low accessibility to police/fire
stations. This is clearly reflected in Fig. 5, where a travel time
greater than 3 h is associated with thousands of people. As a
result, such a method is valuable to plan the implementation
of additional critical infrastructures for future crises.
The analysis of impacts performed here is essentially qual-
itative. The underlying vulnerability assessment does not in-
clude a physical vulnerability analysis of the elements at
stake, due to the limited availability of data at the scale of
the analysis. The definition of critical ash load thresholds
does not rely on fragility curves, instrument commonly rec-
ognized amongst the risk management community but hav-
ing a very limited application to volcanology (ENSURE, WP
1 – Del. 1.1.1). In particular, fragility curves to tephra fall-
out are available for building typologies (associated with a
given physical vulnerability), but are still not well charac-
terized in the case of ash fallout on main infrastructures, for
which there are many factors (composition, humidity) that
play an important role (Wilson et al., 2011). In addition, ash
load thresholds can vary with weather conditions. For exam-
ple, wet tephra has a higher impact on electric components
(Wardman et al., 2012) and enhances the effects of ash cover-
age on road traffic (Wilson et al., 2011). Wilson et al. (2009b)
pointed out the seasonal character of vulnerability, an im-
portant factor for certain activities such as agriculture and
farming that have a seasonal character (Johánnesson, 2010).
For example, the same hazardous phenomenon could have
higher impacts on crops during the sowing, growth and flow-
ering phases, while less impacts are expected on unplowed
fields. Adapting thresholds to seasonal and weather varia-
tion would support the definition of specific seasonal strate-
gies. Finally, we adopted the same threshold for all eruptive
scenarios, ignoring that impacts can depend on many factors
such as ash grain size and composition (Wilson et al., 2009b).
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Even though we adopted different grain-size distributions for
each eruptive scenario (Biass et al., 2014), no study exists on
ash load threshold dependency on granulometry and compo-
sition. Identifying critical ash load thresholds with single val-
ues introduces limitations into the usage of results. But given
that the main aim of this work is identifying the areas and fea-
tures that are expected to be impacted, results can support de-
tailed impact assessment analysis at specific areas, necessary
in order to produce more reliable results. Nowadays there is
a growing need for specific studies to be performed in order
to define quantitative thresholds that produce physical dam-
ages of elements and, eventually, systemic impacts. In future,
fragility curves would allow hazard intensity and probability
of damage to be accounted for, and our impact assessment
methodology would be developed accordingly.
5.2 Vulnerability and impact assessment of European
air traffic
We have proposed a vulnerability assessment that identifies
the elements (airports, routes and airspace sectors) likely to
have major impacts on the European air traffic system in
the case of tephra dispersal from eruption of an Icelandic
volcano. London is recognized to be the core of the Eu-
ropean aviation system, followed by Paris, Amsterdam and
Frankfurt, according to the number of connections handled
(Fig. 6). Our analysis has also identified the routes that have
the highest socioeconomic relevance, constrained to central
and northwestern Europe based on the outcome of the haz-
ard assessment (Biass et al., 2014). The analysis emphasizes
the role of minor connections that, despite being secondary
at the European level, are strategic for national economies.
For example, the analysis of air traffic at London and Ke-
flavík airports showed that London–Dublin and Reykjavík–
Copenhagen are very important routes (Figs. 7 and 8) and
their disruption could affect national economies and those of
their commercial partners. We also estimated vulnerability
of FIRs (Fig. 9) based on traffic data from a peak day. This
first-order estimation could be enhanced using air traffic data
during a larger time interval to account for weekly/seasonal
traffic variability. Moreover, other indicators for FIRs, for ex-
ample accounting for the different types of flights (charter,
commercial, business, cargo), could also be considered. De-
spite these methodological limitations, the identification of
strategic airspace sectors is an important result itself given
that current air traffic management procedures are based on
airspace capacity (Cook, 2007).
The methodology proposed in this work is flexible enough
to include new administrative boundaries and new proce-
dures in the vulnerability assessment. This is important if,
as expected, regulation changes occur. At a European level,
new trends in air traffic management are driven by the Sin-
gle European Sky Commission Project (SESAR, http://ec.
europa.eu/transport/modes/air/sesar/), aimed at ensuring ca-
pacity and safety needs to European aviation. The SESAR
program includes the constitution of functional airspace
blocks (FABs), expected to be operative in the next few years,
which would reduce airspace fragmentation and support in-
tegrated airspace management (Arroyo, 2008). In the case
of ash-contaminated airspace, the new SESAR regulation
framework could be included in the analysis to support the
development of new centralized strategies. It has also been
suggested that the short-term capacity of sectors may be ne-
gotiated in order to allow rerouting of flights to opened FIRs,
thus improving the performance of the network. However,
procedures to be adopted in the case of ash-contaminated
airspace (e.g., the possibility of overflying ash clouds) are
still under discussion. The idea that the airlines will be able
to decide whether to fly or not in ash-contaminated airspace
has been proposed by EUROCONTROL and implemented
during the 2011 VOLCEX exercise, as described in the fi-
nal report (ICAO, 2011). This new paradigm could be im-
plemented in the EUR/NAT region by several stakeholders
that, after the approval of a safety risk assessment (SRA;
Bolic´ and Sivcˇev, 2011; EASA, 2012), would be able to de-
cide whether to fly or not through ash-contaminated airspace
sectors. The introduction of SRA underlines the importance
of having a long-term perspective in risk-management pro-
cedures and plans. Long-term risk management plans could
also avoid secondary impacts, e.g., the lack of fleet at non-
contaminated areas during the closure of main airports. For
example, Icelandair managed to move aircraft from Keflavík
to a secondary hub in the UK (Ulfarsson and Unger, 2011)
to maintain operations in non-contaminated areas (and, in
particular, intercontinental routes). Long-term hazard assess-
ment and vulnerability and impact analysis can therefore sup-
port SRAs and mitigation measures and enhance the response
in the case of volcanic ash contaminated airspace. It is worth
noting that there is still no agreement on critical ash concen-
tration thresholds or any other method (retrievals, measure-
ments, ingestion rate) that may be used to characterize criti-
cal conditions for aircraft. This poses a high limitation to the
application of impact assessment methodologies such as the
one presented here. Further work should support the defini-
tion of thresholds and fragility functions in order to increase
reliability of results.
In this work, we have proposed several ways of estimating
impacts on the air traffic system, and our results give a wide
perspective of the spatial and temporal magnitude of impacts.
According to Fig. 11, all eruptive scenarios produce impacts
in the London area, but the Askja OES 1875-type and Katla
LLERS scenarios can result in major impacts for the whole
European air traffic system. Low-magnitude, short-duration
activity such as a 2000-type Hekla ERS does not result in
high impacts on central European air traffic, but can disrupt
relevant connections for the national economies involved
(i.e., Reykjavík–Copenhagen, London–Dublin). The proba-
bility of having hazardous mass concentrations for more than
12 h (Biass et al., 2014) shows that high-magnitude scenar-
ios such as the 1875-type Askja OES event can cause major
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 2289–2312, 2014 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/14/2289/2014/
C. Scaini et al.: Part 2: Vulnerability and impact 2307
disruptions (> 1 % probability) to London air traffic. Also,
lower-magnitude but long-lasting activity such as a Katla
LLERS scenario has a > 1 and > 5 % probability of pro-
ducing 12 h lasting disruption to London and Scotland, re-
spectively, where the important airports of Glasgow and Ed-
inburgh could be affected. Tables 6 and 7 show expected
disruptions to Keflavík and London airports, based on av-
eraged data. Note that this first-level impact assessment does
not take into account the hour of the day and/or the day of
the year in which a disruption occurs, which neglects dif-
ferences between peak and off-peak (night and early morn-
ing) times. Average persistence times give information on
the expected duration of disruptions, but given that the stan-
dard deviation for persistence time is on the order of 5–10 h
(Biass et al., 2014), a high uncertainty is associated with
these values. Nevertheless, this analysis allows for estimation
on the order of magnitude of expected impacts and may sup-
port the definition of an “acceptable risk” based on averaged
long-term values, which could eventually support a practi-
cal framework for risk management. Finally, average arrival
time maps identify which airports and areas may need re-
sponse plans and gives an idea of how much time is available
for operations such as moving aircraft into hangars or part
of the fleet to other airports. In fact, Guffanti et al. (2010)
have shown how most damaging incidents during the last 60
years occurred within the first 1000 km from source volca-
noes and within the first 24 h after eruption onset. The results
of this impact assessment may therefore support the defini-
tion of strategies for many stakeholders involved in air traffic
management during volcanic eruptions.
We also estimated impacts on FIRs (Fig. 11), accounting
for the presence of ash at all FLs. The same impact analy-
sis has been performed at specific FLs (Supplement Fig. S3),
leading to significantly different results. In fact, impacts at
a given FL strongly depend on the range of column heights
of each eruption scenario, which in turn influences the prob-
ability of having ash at different FLs. For example, the Hekla
ERS 2000-type scenario does not cause impacts at FL300
but only at lower levels. Consequently, a long-term impact
assessment based on FL300 underestimates the expected im-
pacts of low-magnitude eruptions such as the 2000- and
1947-type Hekla ERS scenarios. Analogously, impact assess-
ment at airports (Tables 6 and 7) could be done consider-
ing all FLs or restricted at FL050, where most takeoff and
landing operations take place. Given that air traffic manage-
ment is based on the capacity of airspace sectors and these
include several FLs (Cook, 2007), the second option seems
more useful for decision making. For these reasons, we en-
courage the use of expected impact maps at FIRs, which are
comprehensive of all FLs and provide a synthetic, conserva-
tive and meaningful support for the development of an SRA
and other risk management plans.
Finally, this work has estimated the socioeconomic vul-
nerability of Europe to air traffic disruptions. The 2010 erup-
tion of Eyjafjallajökull demonstrated that impacts at strategic
airports such as London produce major systemic impacts on
the rest of the European air traffic network and indirect so-
cioeconomic impacts at a global scale (Oxford Economics,
2010). One example is the interruption of Kenyan exports to
the UK (BBC News, 2010), which caused an economic im-
pact on Kenyan agricultural sectors (Alexander, 2013). Here
we did not describe such interactions but instead proposed
a methodology to compare different sources of information
that quantify the dependency of European areas on air traf-
fic. The combination of demographic, trade and accessibility
information (Supplement Fig. S3) identifies NUTS-2 regions
with higher dependency on air traffic (Fig. 10), i.e., those
more vulnerable to air traffic network disruptions. Moreover,
the comparison of vulnerability maps for NUTS-2 regions
and impact assessment results (Fig. 11 and Tables 6 and 7)
identifies the most impacted areas from explosive eruptions
in Iceland. For example, Ireland has a high vulnerability be-
cause it is an island (which inherently has a low multi-modal
accessibility) and has strong social and commercial relation-
ships with the UK, resulting in high socioeconomic impacts
in the event of air traffic disruption. Also, Nordic countries
such as Denmark and Norway are likely to be affected, in
particular those regions with lower multi-modal accessibil-
ity. Flexibility of the transportation system and multi-modal
accessibility are in fact critical factors that strongly influence
the societal response to air traffic disruptions (Alexander,
2013). Moreover, a strategy that allows taking advantage of
all different transportation means can strongly reduce losses
during emergencies, as shown by Jones and Bolivar (2011)
for the case study of Malta during the 2010 aviation dis-
ruption. Finally, civil aviation disruption is not only a prob-
lem for private stakeholders – it affects all of society, requir-
ing procedures to mitigate the socioeconomic risk (Vainikka,
2010). Results of the vulnerability and impact assessment
performed at the European level can support a socioeco-
nomic impact analysis and the development of risk manage-
ment plans. Data from European projects such as Eurostat,
ESPON and TRACC are extremely relevant to support this
analysis.
5.3 Caveats
First, the main aim of this work is identifying the areas that
are expected to suffer impacts in the event of the selected
scenarios occurring, at both the national and European scale.
Given the difficulty in gathering specific data, our analysis
does not account for physical vulnerability of most features.
Thus, our simplified approach does not include an analysis of
spatial inter- and intra-dependencies and cascading effects,
as it relies on the characterization of physical vulnerability,
which is beyond the scope of this work. The systemic aspects
is covered only partially, by identifying specific elements and
infrastructures that are important to the system performance
on an a priori basis and assessing their expected impacts.
This limitation is particularly important with regards to road
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/14/2289/2014/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 2289–2312, 2014
2308 C. Scaini et al.: Part 2: Vulnerability and impact
and electricity network disruptions, whose failure may cause
the disruption of dependent services and infrastructures and
eventually lower the capacity of response of areas. Studies on
electricity infrastructure vulnerability suggest that this anal-
ysis should start identifying where, how often, and for how
long the electricity supply will be interrupted. This analy-
sis should be performed by splitting the network at specific
delivery points, implying a detailed knowledge of its struc-
ture (Kjølle et al., 2011). In order to be realistic and pro-
duce usable results, this kind of analysis requires therefore a
collaboration between involved stakeholders (infrastructure
holders, service providers and end users). The same con-
clusion can be drawn at the European scale, where interde-
pendencies between elements are closely related to specific
management plans of stakeholders involved (airlines, service
providers). Thus, our work poses the basis for a specific anal-
ysis of these interdependencies by performing the first vul-
nerability and impact assessment for tephra fallout and dis-
persal in Iceland and Europe, and pointing out this issue to
the stakeholders involved in territorial planning and long-
term risk management. Second, the methodology proposed
here is focused on a specific hazard caused by explosive vol-
canic eruptions (i.e., volcanic ash fallout and dispersal). But,
given that there are other hazards at both scales that poten-
tially affect the exposed targets, outcomes of our vulnera-
bility and impact assessment could support multi-risk initia-
tives and be interfaced with specific analyses. For these rea-
sons, we base our methodology on an integrated framework
for vulnerability assessment proposed within the European
project ENSURE (Menoni et al., 2012). At the European
scale, this work may contribute to a multi-risk assessment
including other hazards for aviation, such as volcanogenic
SO2 or mineral dust. At the national scale, volcanic erup-
tions are the hazardous phenomenon that poses the higher
threat to societies by means of many hazardous phenomena
such as lava flow and jökulhaups (glacial outburst floods).
In particular, in 1996 and 2011, jökulhaups in southern Ice-
land destroyed parts of Route 1 (main Ring Road) and two
bridges. It is worth noting that these events usually happen
at the very local scale, while ash fallout and dispersal have
a wider spatial range. For these events to be analyzed in a
multi-risk framework, eruptive scenarios should be modified
and/or complemented in order to include these events. Fur-
ther work is therefore required in this field and may enhance
the integration of our results in a multi-risk framework.
6 Conclusions
This work represents the first example of a strategy that can
be applied to various volcanic settings for the multi-scale im-
pact assessment for tephra dispersal and deposition. The out-
comes of such a strategy are designed to support decision
making at both the national and the European scale. In par-
ticular, impact maps could improve preparedness and help
develop risk mitigation actions in Iceland and support long-
term risk management plans of companies that operate in the
European airspace (e.g., SRA). Based on our analysis of the
economic system at the national level and of critical airports,
FIRs and air traffic routes at the European scale, we can draw
the following conclusions:
At the national scale:
– In the case of an 1875-type OES occurring at Askja, the
electricity network has a 10 % probability of being im-
pacted for 700 km. The occurrence of LLERS at Katla
and a 1947-type ERS at Hekla have a 10 % probabil-
ity of impacting more than 250 km of the national elec-
tricity network. Finally, the occurrence of a 2010-type
LLOES at Eyjafjallajökull has a 10 % probability of dis-
rupting 122 km of the electricity network.
– In the case of a 1947-type ERS occurring at Hekla, five
power plants have a 10 % probability of being affected
by ash fallout. If selected scenarios at Askja or Katla
were to happen, four power plants would have a 10 %
probability of being affected by ash fallout, while other
eruptive scenarios (2000 type at Hekla and 2010 type at
Eyjafjallajökull have a low, but not null, probability of
having impacts on power plants.
– In the case of any of the selected eruptive scenarios oc-
curring, 1–10 km2 of Icelandic croplands have a 10 %
probability of being affected by ash fallout. Occurrence
of eruptive scenarios at Askja and Katla have a 10 %
probability of affecting 287 and 125 km2 of pasture
lands, respectively.
At the European scale:
– The occurrence of a 2000-type ERS at Hekla is likely
to have very high impacts on the Reykjavík FIR (950
passengers stranded for at least 5 h) and high impacts
for the London FIR (∼ 23 000 passengers stranded for
at least 3 h).
– The occurrence of a 1947-type ERS at Hekla is likely to
have very high impacts on the Reykjavík FIR (∼ 1500
passengers stranded for at least 8 h) and high impacts for
the London FIR (∼ 27 000 passengers stranded for at
least 4 h). The FIR of Paris, Brest and Marseille would
also be strongly impacted.
– The occurrence of an 1875-type OES at Askja is likely
to have very high impacts on the Reykjavík FIR (∼ 3600
passengers stranded for at least 18 h) and high impacts
for the London FIR (∼ 60 000 passengers stranded for
at least 8 h). FIRs above France, Germany and Scandi-
navia would also be impacted.
– The occurrence of an LLERS scenario at Katla is
likely to have a very high impact on the Reykjavík
FIR (∼ 4300 passengers stranded for at least 21 h) and
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high impact for the London FIR (∼ 78 000 passen-
gers stranded for at least 10 h). It is also likely that
FIRs above France, Germany and Scandinavia would be
strongly impacted.
The Supplement related to this article is available online
at doi:10.5194/nhess-14-2289-2014-supplement.
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Abstract. In order to assist the elaboration of proactive mea-
sures for the management of future volcanic eruptions in Ice-
land, we developed a new scenario-based approach to assess
the hazard associated with tephra dispersal and sedimenta-
tion at various scales and for multiple sources. The target
volcanoes are Hekla, Katla, Eyjafjallajökull and Askja, se-
lected either for their high probabilities of eruption and/or
their high potential impact. By coupling tephrostratigraphic
studies, probabilistic techniques and modelling, we devel-
oped comprehensive eruption scenarios for both short- and
long-lasting eruptions and compiled hazard maps for tephra
ground deposition at a national scale and air concentration at
a European scale using the TEPHRA2 and FALL3D models,
respectively. New algorithms for the identification of realis-
tic sets of eruptive source parameters are investigated, which
assist the generation of probability density functions of erup-
tion source parameters for the selected scenarios. Aggrega-
tion processes were accounted for using various empirical
models. Outcomes, i.e. probabilities conditioned to the oc-
currence of an eruption, help the assessment and compar-
ison of hazard levels at different scales. For example, at a
national scale Askja has a 5–10 % probability of blanketing
the easternmost half of the country with a tephra accumula-
tion of at least 1 kg m−2. At a continental scale, Katla has
a 5–10 % probability of producing ash clouds with concen-
trations of 2 mg m−3 over the UK, Scandinavia and north-
ern Europe with a mean arrival time of 48–72 h and a mean
persistence time of 6–18 h. In a companion paper, Scaini et
al. (2014) present a vulnerability assessment for Iceland to
ground deposition of tephra and for the European air traf-
fic to airborne ash which, combined with the outcomes of
the present paper, constitute one of the first comprehensive
multi-scale risk assessment associated with tephra dispersal
and sedimentation.
1 Introduction
Evaluation of the tephra hazard is necessary to carry out com-
prehensive risk assessments of explosive volcanoes. The pro-
cess is commonly divided into a succession of logical steps,
including the identification and the characterization of erup-
tive deposits in the field, the development of comprehensive
eruptive scenarios based on field observations and the use of
models to quantify the hazard related to each eruptive sce-
nario (e.g. Biass and Bonadonna, 2013; Biass et al., 2013;
Bonadonna, 2006; Bonasia et al., 2011; Cioni et al., 2003;
Connor et al., 2001; Costa et al., 2009, 2012; Jenkins et al.,
2012a; Leadbetter and Hort, 2011; Macedonio et al., 2008;
Scaini et al., 2012; Volentik et al., 2009).
Although the hazard related to tephra dispersal and fallout
rarely constitutes a direct threat to human lives, tephra can
deposit on the ground up to hundreds of km away from the
source and be dispersed thousands of km in the atmosphere.
As a result, the impact from tephra varies with distance
from the vent, resulting in complex vulnerability patterns of
exposed elements (Blong, 1984; Connor et al., 2001). On
the ground, tephra fallout can affect aspects such as human
Published by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the European Geosciences Union.
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health, buildings, lifelines, economy or the environment. In
the atmosphere, the residence time of ash can be as long
as weeks, thus able to paralyse air traffic far away from the
source, as demonstrated by the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull and the
2011 Puyehue–Cordón Caulle eruptions (Budd et al., 2013;
Davies et al., 2010; Swindles et al., 2011; Wilkinson et al.,
2012). Nonetheless, probabilistic studies of tephra dispersal
tend to focus either on local ground deposition (e.g. Biass
and Bonadonna, 2013) or on far-ranging atmospheric con-
centrations (e.g. Sulpizio et al., 2012), and only a few recent
studies account for comprehensive multi-scale assessments
(e.g. Scaini et al., 2012).
One crucial parameter for the description of the disper-
sal of tephra is the total grain-size distribution (TGSD).
Centimetric to millimetric particles are controlled by grav-
itational settling and sediment in proximal to medial dis-
tances from the eruptive vent, whereas micrometric to sub-
micrometric particles, when not aggregated, are controlled
by larger-scale atmospheric processes and transported at con-
tinental scales (Folch, 2012). Depending on the assumptions
used to model these two end-members, several modelling
approaches have been developed to solve the advection–
diffusion equation with analytical, semi-analytical or numer-
ical strategies (Bonadonna et al., 2012; Folch, 2012).
Eruption scenarios are usually developed for a single vol-
cano and are constrained by the availability of past data and
the completeness of the eruptive record (Marzocchi et al.,
2004). Through time, the definition of eruption scenarios has
evolved from a “worst-case scenario” approach towards an
evaluation of the entire possible range of activity at a given
volcano. For example, early hazard maps for Cotopaxi vol-
cano (Hall and Hillebrandt, 1988; Vink, 1984) are based
upon isopach maps of two major eruptions with opposite
wind directions in agreement with the regional wind patterns
and the most important exposed human settlements. More
recent studies considered a probabilistic approach and devel-
oped a set of eruptive scenarios of various intensities based
on accurate stratigraphic studies (Biass and Bonadonna,
2011, 2013). Probabilistic techniques such as Monte Carlo
simulations (e.g. Hurst and Smith, 2004) are nowadays an in-
tegral part of any hazard assessment for tephra dispersal and
are used to investigate both the missing or inaccessible parts
of the geological record and the impact of eruptions in a rep-
resentative set of atmospheric conditions (Bonadonna, 2006).
For probabilistic modelling, the identification of eruption
scenarios typically requires the definition of a probability
density function (PDF) for each input parameter needed by
a given model in order to account for the variability of erup-
tive processes (i.e. aleatoric uncertainty). For tephra fallout,
several approaches have been used to define eruption sce-
narios, based on individual eruptions (Bonasia et al., 2011;
Capra et al., 2008), eruptive styles (Macedonio et al., 2008),
intensities/magnitudes (Scaini et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2013)
or VEI classes (Biass and Bonadonna, 2013), mostly applied
to a single source. However, some regions in the world are
Figure 1. Overview of the computational domains at (a) large and
(b) small scales: (a) shows the locations of wind profiles (stars)
used in Fig. 3 and the main airports (circles) of London Heathrow
(EGLL), Paris Charles de Gaulle (LFPG), Amsterdam Schiphol
(EHAM), Frankfurt (EDDF), Oslo Gardermoen (ENGM), Copen-
hagen Kastrup (EKCH) and Keflavik (BIKF); (b) shows the target
volcanoes (red triangles) and the relevant volcanic zones for this
study (WVZ: Western Volcanic Zone; EVZ: Eastern Volcanic Zone;
NVZ: Northern Volcanic Zone).
under the threat of more than one volcano, sometimes pre-
senting a wide range of known eruptive styles and charac-
teristics, and the development of comparable eruption sce-
narios for a set of volcanoes becomes an obvious necessity
(e.g. Ewert, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2012a, b; Lirer et al., 2010;
Simkin and Siebert, 1994).
Here, we present a medium- to long-term multi-scale
scenario-based hazard assessment for ground tephra accu-
mulation and far-range atmospheric ash dispersal from four
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Icelandic volcanoes – Hekla, Katla, Askja and Eyjafjalla-
jökull – selected either for their high probabilities of erup-
tion in the near future or their high potential impact (Fig. 1).
Due to the different eruptive styles and the varying degree
of knowledge of the eruptive history at these volcanoes, we
developed consistent probabilistic eruption scenarios based
on field data, literature studies and historical reports. The
tephra-related hazard was assessed for each eruption sce-
nario at a local scale (i.e. ground tephra accumulation) with
the analytical model TEPHRA2 (Bonadonna et al., 2005)
and at a regional scale (i.e. atmospheric concentration) with
the numerical model FALL3D (Costa et al., 2006; Folch
et al., 2009). A population of 10 years of wind obtained
from reanalysis data sets was used to assess statistical atmo-
spheric conditions. Outputs include (i) probabilistic maps of
ground tephra accumulation and atmospheric concentration
for relevant thresholds, (ii) mean atmospheric arrival time
and persistence time, (iii) probability maps of atmospheric
arrival time and persistence time for relevant thresholds, and
(iv) ground hazard curves for critical facilities in Iceland. In
a companion paper, Scaini et al. (2014) present a vulnerabil-
ity assessment for both Iceland and the European air traffic
system and use the outcomes of this study to perform a multi-
scale impact analysis. This comprehensive assessment is in-
tended to act as a first step towards the elaboration of pro-
active measures for the management of explosive volcanic
crisis.
2 Geological setting
Iceland is the result of the combined effects of a spread-
ing plate boundary and a mantle plume (Allen et al., 1999;
Vink, 1984; White et al., 1995; Wolfe et al., 1997). Cur-
rent active volcanic zones (i.e. the neovolcanic zones) are
the superficial expression of the mid-oceanic ridge. Arranged
as discrete 15–50 km wide belts of active faulting and vol-
canism, they collectively cover a total area of 30 000 km2
(Gudmundsson, 2000; Thordarson and Höskuldsson, 2008;
Thordarson and Larsen, 2007). Volcanic zones host volcanic
systems which, in their simplest forms, contain either a fis-
sure swarm, a central volcano or both (Gudmundsson, 1995a,
b). When present, the central volcano is the focal point of
eruptive activity and the largest edifice in each system un-
der which crustal magma chambers can develop, giving rise
to either silicic or basaltic magmatism. In contrast, only
basaltic magmas are erupted within fissure swarms (Larsen
and Eirìksson, 2008; Thordarson and Larsen, 2007).
2.1 Target volcanoes
In this paper, we focus on eruptions occurring at the cen-
tral volcanoes of four different volcanic systems located
within two different volcanic zones: the Eastern Volcanic
Zone (EVZ) and the Northern Volcanic Zone (NVZ; Fig. 1),
Table 1. Historical eruptions at the central volcano of Hekla (see
Thordarson and Larsen, 2007, and references therein). Tephra vol-
umes are recorded as “freshly fallen” (i.e. 40 % larger than volumes
of old eruptions inferred from field mapping; Thorarinsson, 1967).
Following the typical pattern of mixed eruptions at Hekla, plume
heights correspond to the maximum altitude reached a few minutes
after the onset of the eruption. NA: not available.
Max plume Preceding
Eruption Tephra height interval
year (km3) (km a.s.l.) (years)
2000 0.01 12 9
1991 0.02 11.5 10
1980–1981 0.06 15 10
1970 0.07 16 22
1947–1948 0.18 32 101
1845 0.23 NA 77
1766–1768 0.4 NA 73
1693 0.3 NA 56
1636 0.18 NA 39
1597 0.29 NA 86
1510 0.32 NA 120
1389 0.15 NA 47
1341 0.18 NA 40
1300 0.5 NA 78
1222 0.04 NA 15
1206 0.4 NA 46
1158 0.33 NA 53
1104 2 36 > 230
ranked first and third in terms of volcanic activity in Ice-
land throughout the Holocene (Thordarson and Höskuldsson,
2008). No volcanic system was considered within the sec-
ond most active volcanic zone, the Western Volcanic Zone
(WVZ), because the EVZ is an active axial rift propagat-
ing southwards, thus taking over the activity of the WVZ
(Mattsson and Höskuldsson, 2003; Thordarson and Larsen,
2007). The EVZ is divided into two sectors. In the north,
the axial rift zone is characterized by a thick crust, high
heat flow, well-developed tensional features and the produc-
tion of tholeitic basalts. The southern propagating tip of the
EVZ is often referred to as a flank zone, which lies on an
older and thinner crust presenting a lower heat flow. Here,
tensional features are poorly developed and the magma pro-
duction consists mainly of transitional alkali to alkali basalts
(Loughlin, 2002; Mattsson and Höskuldsson, 2003). We con-
sider three volcanoes from the EVZ (Hekla, Katla, and Ey-
jafjallajökull; Fig. 1) and one from the NVZ (Askja).
Amongst the selected volcanoes and in terms of activity
since the settlement during the last 1100 years, Hekla is the
most active with 18 eruptions from the central vent followed
by Katla (18 eruptions), Eyjafjallajökull (3 post–17th century
eruptions) and Askja (1 central vent eruption). Tables 1 and 2
summarize the recent eruptions of Hekla and Katla, respec-
tively. The Supplement comprises a detailed description of
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Table 2. Historical eruptions at Katla that produced tephra vol-
umes > 0.1 km3 (Thordarson and Larsen, 2007). Uncompacted vol-
umes are presented either as moderate (> 0.1–0.5 km3) or large
(> 0.5 km3).
Eruption year Tephra volume
1918 Large
1755 Large
1721 Moderate
1660 Moderate
1625 Large
1500 Large
1416 Moderate
1357 Moderate
1262 Large
920 Moderate
the typical activity of these four volcanoes. The most strik-
ing features will be reviewed in Sect. 4.1. together with the
eruption scenarios.
3 Method
We aim to assess the hazard caused by the ground deposi-
tion and the atmospheric dispersion of tephra. Probabilistic
approaches are adopted in order to account for the variability
(i.e. aleatoric uncertainty) related to both eruptive and atmo-
spheric conditions. We quantify the probability of hazardous
mass load on the ground:
P
[
M(x,y)≥MT|eruption
]
, (1)
where M(x,y) is the tephra mass load (kg m−2) accumu-
lated at a given location and MT a mass load threshold (e.g.
Bonadonna, 2006). For a given eruption scenario, the proba-
bility PM at a pixel (x,y) is quantified by counting the num-
ber of times a given threshold of load is reached over the total
number of runs N :
PM (x,y)=
∑N
i=1ni
N
, (2)
where
ni (x,y)=
{
1 if Mi(x,y)≥MT|eruption
0 otherwise.
(3)
For atmospheric concentrations, we start by quantifying
P
[
C(x,y,z, t)≥ CT|eruption
]
, (4)
where C(x,y,z, t) is the tephra mass concentration in the
atmosphere (mg m−3) at a given point and time instant and
CT a mass concentration threshold. For a given eruption sce-
nario, the probability of disruption PC at a point (x,y,z) is
quantified by counting the number of times a given mass con-
centration threshold is exceeded over the total number of runs
N :
PC (x,y,z)=
∑N
i=1ni
N
, (5)
where
ni (x,y,z)=
{
1 if Ci(x,y,z)≥ CT|eruption
0 otherwise.
(6)
Disruption can be calculated at a given height or flight level
(FL) or be comprehensive of all FLs, that is, considering that
disruption occurs at a point (x,y) if the critical condition
is achieved at any height z above the point. Note that for
a given run, disruption occurs regardless of the number of
model time steps during which Eq. (6) is verified. In order
to provide a comprehensive picture of interest for air traf-
fic management (ATM), we also quantify persistence and the
first arrival time of a concentration threshold CT. The persis-
tence is calculated by counting, for each run, the time interval
in which the critical concentration threshold CT is exceeded
at a pixel (x,y,z). The first arrival time (hereafter referred
to as arrival time) computes the time from the beginning of
the eruption to the first detection of the concentration CT at a
pixel (x,y,z). Both persistence and arrival time were quan-
tified as mean (i.e. average value at a pixel (x,y,z) over the
entire number of runs), as standard deviation and as the prob-
abilities of exceeding relevant thresholds of persistence and
arrival times following the same approach as Eq. (5) at both
specific FL and considering all vertical levels simultaneously.
In this section, we review (i) the models used at different
scales, (ii) the probabilistic strategies adopted in this study,
and (iii) the strategy used to account for particle aggregation
processes.
3.1 Tephra dispersal modelling
3.1.1 Ground accumulation
The hazard related to ground deposition of tephra was as-
sessed at the scale of Iceland using the steady semi-analytical
advection–diffusion model TEPHRA2 (Bonadonna et al.,
2005) following the approach detailed in Biass and
Bonadonna (2013). TEPHRA2 requires five main input pa-
rameters: plume height, eruption duration, erupted mass,
TGSD and particle density. It also requires a vertical wind
profile, a calculation grid and three empirical parameters:
a fall-time threshold acting as a threshold for the modelling
of the diffusion of small and large particles (i.e. power law
vs. linear diffusions), a diffusion coefficient used for the lin-
ear diffusion law and an apparent eddy diffusivity fixed at
0.04 m2 s−1 for the power law diffusion (Bonadonna et al.,
2005; Suzuki, 1983; Volentik et al., 2009). Empirical pa-
rameters can be estimated either using TEPHRA2 in inver-
sion mode when enough field data are available (Connor and
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Connor, 2006; Volentik et al., 2009) or using analogue erup-
tions. Wind conditions for the 2001–2010 period were ex-
tracted from the ECMWF Era-Interim Reanalysis data set
at a 1.5◦ resolution. The calculation grid covers the small
computational domain (Fig. 1) at a resolution of 1 km. When
needed, smaller calculation grids were used at a resolution of
500 m.
3.1.2 Atmospheric concentration
The hazard related to ash dispersal was assessed at the con-
tinental scale using the non-steady numerical advection–
diffusion–sedimentation model FALL3D coupled with prob-
abilistic strategies (Costa et al., 2006; Folch et al., 2009;
Folch and Sulpizio, 2010; Scaini et al., 2012; Sulpizio
et al., 2012). Eruption source parameters (ESPs) required by
FALL3D include plume height, mass eruption rate (MER),
eruption date and eruption duration.
All simulations compute 168 h of dispersal on a 120× 60
grid with a horizontal resolution of approximately 0.5 de-
grees. Vertical layers are defined from 0 to 36 000 m with
a variable vertical interval. The mass distribution follows
Suzuki (1983) and Pfeiffer et al. (2005), with A= 4 and
λ= 5. Such values were chosen since (i) all eruptions are
of subplinian/Plinian types and (ii) only the fine fraction is
modelled with FALL3D to assess the far-range dispersal. The
terminal velocity is given by Ganser (1993), with a spheric-
ity fixed to 0.9. The vertical diffusion coefficient was fixed to
10 m2 s−1 and the horizontal diffusion coefficient was calcu-
lated using the CMAQ model parameterization (Folch et al.,
2009). Meteorological fields for the considered period were
extracted from the ECMWF Era-Interim Reanalysis at 1.5◦
every 3 h, covering northern and central Europe (Fig. 1). Out-
puts are produced at a regular 5000 ft vertical interval from
FLs 050–400.
3.2 Probabilistic strategies
Several approaches exist to assess the probability distribu-
tion of reaching a hazardous accumulation of tephra given
an eruption (Bonadonna, 2006). In order to account for vari-
able parameters (i.e. eruptive and atmospheric conditions),
a large number of model runs are performed varying in-
put parameters, including eruption date (i.e. wind profile for
TEPHRA or 4-D variables for FALL3D). Each run consists
either of a single occurrence of the model (i.e. short-lasting
eruptions) or a set of simulations in time (i.e. long-lasting
eruptions). When an approach with variable eruptive param-
eters is adopted, a PDF must be defined to constrain the
stochastic sampling. The definition of the PDF, which reflects
the knowledge of the system, is relevant to the definition of
eruptive scenarios and will be tackled later.
3.2.1 Short-lasting eruptions
One eruption scenario (OES)
The OES is an approach used to compile the probability of
reaching a given threshold of tephra accumulation in vari-
able wind conditions, with ESP chosen deterministically.
Figure 2a summarizes the algorithm applied to short-lasting
eruptions (Bonadonna, 2006). First, the plume height, the
eruption duration, the total mass and the TGSD are fixed de-
terministically. Then, for each single run of the model, an
eruption date is sampled from which the corresponding wind
conditions are extracted from the meteorological database.
Eruption range scenario (ERS)
The ERS approach allows for a stochastic sampling of ESP at
each run as well as wind conditions, where each variable pa-
rameter is characterized by a range and a PDF (Bonadonna,
2006). Figure 2b shows the algorithm used for the ERS.
First, a plume height, an eruption duration and an eruption
date are sampled from their respective PDF, and a maxi-
mum total mass for the eruption scenario is set. From the
eruption date, the respective meteorological conditions are
loaded, which, combined with the plume height, allows for
the calculation of the MER using the method of Degruyter
and Bonadonna (2012). A test is then performed to assess
whether the resulting mass, calculated by combining the
MER and the eruption duration, fits into the initial assump-
tions of mass range. If the test is negative, all parameters are
resampled, otherwise the selected input parameters are sent
to the model.
3.2.2 Long-lasting eruptions
New eruption scenarios were developed to assess the hazard
related to long-lasting eruptions (Fig. 2c and d). For long-
lasting eruptions, ESPs are expressed as time series at con-
stant time intervals, 1t , defined depending upon the avail-
ability of data (i.e. measurements of plume height, wind pro-
files). The application of algorithms shown in Fig. 2c and d
varies depending on the scale of the hazard assessment, and
thus the model used. When used with steady models (e.g.
TEPHRA2), they consist of discrete model runs at constant
time intervals, and the final hazard maps are the sum of all in-
dividual runs (e.g. Scollo et al., 2013). When used with non-
steady models (e.g. FALL3D), ESPs are updated at a con-
stant time interval. For clarity, we will refer to any single run
or update of the model as “occurrence”, i.e. for long-lasting
eruptions, a run (i loop in Fig. 2) consists of several occur-
rences (j loop in Fig. 2).
Long-lasting one eruption scenario (LLOES)
The LLOES relies on the same concept as the OES, i.e. erup-
tive parameters chosen deterministically with varying wind
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Sample Height i
Duration i
Eruption date i
Get Wind i
Calculate MER i
Mass i
if Mass within Ranges
Set TGSD i
Aggregate
Run model
i = i+1
for i = 1:nr
else Restart sampling
Get Height
Duration
Mass
TGSD
Sample Eruption date i
Aggregate TGSD
Run model
i = i+1
for i = 1:nr
Get Wind i
Sample Eruption date i
Get Wind  j
Calculate MER j
Mass j
Aggregate TGSD
Run model
j = j+1
for i = 1:nr
i = i+1
Get
Set
Total duration
Height Δt
TGSD
∆t
for j = 1:no
One Eruption Scenario (OES) Eruption Range Scenario (ERS) Long-Lasting OES (LLOES)
Set ∆t
Long-Lasting ERS (LLERS)
Sample Eruption date i
Eruption duration i
Get Wind j
Calculate MER j
Mass j
Set TGSD i
Aggregate
Run all occurrences
i = i+1
for i = 1:nr
else Restart sampling
Sample Height i
if ∑ Mass within Ranges
1
j
for j = 1:no
Figure 2. Algorithms applied for the different eruption scenarios used in this study. Get refers to access to deterministic data, Set defines a
variable and Sample indicates a stochastic sampling.
conditions, only applied to long-lasting eruptions. Here, the
total eruption duration, the time series of plume heights and
the TGSD are set deterministically, and the time interval (1t)
is set based on the availability of data. At each run of the
model, an eruption date is sampled and the corresponding
wind conditions are extracted based on the eruption duration
and 1t . At each occurrence, knowing 1t , the plume height
and the wind conditions at the given time, the MER and the
mass are calculated averaged over the interval length, and
a new occurrence of the model is performed. Each run is the
sum of all occurrences performed.
Long-lasting eruption range scenario (LLERS)
The LLERS applies the ERS strategy to long-lasting erup-
tions. Eruptive parameters are stochastically sampled as time
series at a constant 1t . Following the algorithm in Fig. 2d,
a mass boundary is first set. At each run, an eruption date
and an eruption duration are sampled. At each occurrence,
a plume height is sampled from a PDF, and the MER is calcu-
lated based on the wind conditions for that specific date using
the method of Degruyter and Bonadonna (2012). If the sum
of the mass of all occurrences of a single run falls out of the
initial mass assumptions, the sampling process is restarted.
If not, input values for all occurrences are sent to the model.
Eventually, each run is the sum of all occurrences performed.
3.3 Ash aggregation
Aggregation processes are known to modify deposition
trends along the dispersal axis by aggregating fine parti-
cles (typically < 100 µm) into larger clusters (Brown et al.,
2012; Rose and Durant, 2011). The aggregation of fine par-
ticles into larger aggregates results in premature sedimenta-
tion in the proximal area and in a relative depletion of fines
away from the vent (Carey and Sigurdsson, 1982; Hildreth
and Drake, 1992), possibly leading to an underestimation of
the hazard in proximal areas and an overestimation in dis-
tal sectors. The fallout of aggregates has been characterized
during numerous eruptions, including the 1980 eruption of
Mount St. Helens (Carey and Sigurdsson, 1982; Durant et al.,
2009), the ongoing eruption of Montserrat (Bonadonna et al.,
2002) and the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull (Bonadonna
et al., 2011; Taddeucci et al., 2011). Although aggregation is
a topic of intense research, no satisfactory parameterization
of this process has been achieved yet (e.g. Brown et al., 2012;
Costa et al., 2010; Folch et al., 2010; Van Eaton and Wilson,
2013; Van Eaton et al., 2012).
Several models attempt to describe aggregation processes
using either empirical (Bonadonna and Phillips, 2003; Carey
and Sigurdsson, 1982; Cornell et al., 1983) or numerical ap-
proaches (Costa et al., 2010; Folch et al., 2010). Here, we use
the empirical approach of Bonadonna et al. (2002) and ob-
servations of Bonadonna et al. (2011) to modify the TGSD
before running the models. Following this strategy, we re-
move an equal proportion of masses of fine particles from
phi classes ≥ 48, which are equally redistributed between
classes −18 and 38. The amount of fine particles removed,
i.e. the aggregation coefficient, is stochastically sampled be-
tween 20 and 80 % on a uniform distribution at every loop
increment on the algorithms shown in Fig. 2. The choice
of such a range is based on field observations presented in
Bonadonna et al. (2002, 2011).
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Figure 3. Wind analysis at three atmospheric levels along a N–S section from Reykjavík to the UK (Fig. 1) from the ERA-Interim Reanalysis
database. These wind roses show the probability that the wind will blow in given directions and speed intervals.
4 Results
4.1 Identification of eruption scenarios
The identification of eruption scenarios is based upon the
eruption history presented in the Supplement for each vol-
cano. Here, only the historical catalogue of eruptions was
used for three reasons. Firstly, with a mean eruption of > 20
events per century (Thordarson and Höskuldsson, 2008), re-
ports and eye-witness accounts since human settlement con-
stitute a valuable source of information when developing
eruption scenarios. Trying to merge such a data set with an
eruption catalogue based on stratigraphic studies only results
in discrepancies in the completeness of the eruptive record,
making any comparison difficult. Secondly, the climate of
Iceland is prone to fast erosion of freshly fallen deposits, in-
ducing a bias towards large eruptions when trying to assess
the prehistoric eruptive activity. Thirdly, since it is recog-
nized that mean eruption frequencies are strongly correlated
to glacier load (Albino et al., 2010), any attempt to assess
eruptive patterns during older time periods might not be rep-
resentative of the actual climate and load. As a result, the haz-
ard assessment presented here implies that a future eruption
at any of the four volcanoes will follow behaviours similar to
the eruptive style displayed in historical times.
Additionally, we only focus on the activity occurring at
the central vent of the selected volcanic systems as no explo-
sive eruptions occurred from fissure swarms. Both ground
accumulation and atmospheric dispersal were tackled prob-
abilistically, using the models TEPHRA2 and FALL3D, re-
spectively. Since statistical analysis shows neither monthly
nor seasonal trends, we used a population of 10 years of wind
data (2001–2010). Figure 3 shows wind roses at three altitude
levels for points specified in Fig. 1.
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4.1.1 Hekla
Out of all volcanoes considered in this study, Hekla presents
the most accurate historic record with 18 identified and rea-
sonably well-described eruptions, a good characterization of
5 of them and a TGSD of the 2000 eruption (Gronvold et al.,
1983; Gudmundsson et al., 1992; Höskuldsson et al., 2007;
Thorarinsson, 1967; Thorarinsson and Sigvaldason, 1972).
From the 18 eruptions presented in Table 1, we discarded the
eruption of 1104 from the eruptive record as it belongs to
the larger magnitude and lower frequency H1–5 series and
occurred after a repose interval of > 230 years, more than
twice the maximum repose time in historical times (Larsen
and Eirìksson, 2008; Thordarson and Höskuldsson, 2008;
Thordarson and Larsen, 2007). Since a large majority of
the tephra is produced during the opening phase of “mixed”
eruptions (Supplement), we only model the first part of the
eruption.
Based on the historical period summarized in Table 1, two
eruption scenarios were identified for Hekla and named after
the best-described eruption of each cluster. First, a 2000-type
eruption was identified to describe eruptions that have oc-
curred at a ∼10-year frequency. This eruption scenario con-
siders all available data for the eruptions of 1222, 1970, 1981,
1991 and 2000. Second, a 1947-type eruption is considered
representative of large Plinian eruptions occurring on an av-
erage of one per century starting from the eruption of 1158
(Thorarinsson, 1967).
2000-type scenario
The good knowledge of eruptions considered in the 2000-
type scenario allows for the identification of well-constrained
ranges of ESP for plume heights and erupted masses, and,
subsequently, the use of the ERS strategies. Table 3 and Fig. 4
summarize ranges of ESPs and their corresponding PDFs.
In agreement with historical witnesses, the duration of the
intense opening phase was fixed between 0.5 and 1 h and
sampled on a uniform PDF. Based on Table 1 and follow-
ing the algorithm presented in Fig. 2, a mass constraint was
fixed between 6.9× 109 and 6.9× 1010 kg considering a de-
posit density of 691 kg m−3. Based on observations, plume
heights were defined between 6 and 16 km a.s.l. and sampled
on a logarithmic scale in order to slightly favour small events
over large ones.
The TGSD for the 2000 eruption shows bimodality with
peaks at −38 and 38 (Fig. 4c) and a minimum at 18. This
TGSD was used as representative for the 2000-type eruption
scenario and was varied at each run. First, considering 18
as a boundary between the two populations, we varied the
relative weight percentage of the two populations between
30 and 70 %. Second, we applied the aggregation model de-
scribed in Sect. 3.3 on the resulting modified TGSD by re-
moving between 20 and 80 % of fines. Figure 4c shows the
three states of the TGSD for one of the 1000 runs.
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Figure 4. ESP used for (a–c) the Hekla 2000-type and (d–f) the
Hekla 1947-type scenarios (see Table 3 for details). (a) and (d):
plume height (m a.s.l.); (b) and (d): erupted mass; (c) and (f): to-
tal grain-size distribution. Histograms in (c) and (f) show both the
fractions of individual particles (light grey) and aggregates (dark
grey) generated based on the algorithm explained in the text; origi-
nal indicates the original grain-size distribution obtained from siev-
ing (i.e. not containing any aggregates).
1947-type scenario
A similar approach was applied to the 1947-type scenario.
Since only sparse estimates of plume heights are reported
in the literature for this eruption type, the sampling was
constrained between 16 (i.e. the highest boundary of the
2000-type eruption) and 30 km a.s.l. on a logarithmic PDF
(Fig. 4d). Based on Table 1, the mass constraint was defined
between 6.9×1010 and 3.5×1011 kg (Fig. 4e). The resulting
distribution of plume heights is shown in Fig. 4d and displays
a maximum of sampling around 18–20 km a.s.l. No solution
compatible with the mass constraint was found for plumes
higher than 27 km. Figure 4e shows a rather uniform mass
distribution, though slightly biased towards lower values.
Since no sufficient measurements exist to infer the TGSD
for any of these eruptions, we consider here a Gaussian dis-
tribution ranging from −5 to 88. We allowed a variability
of Md8 and σ8 on uniform PDF between −18 to 18 and
18 to 28, respectively. The aggregation model was applied,
with aggregation coefficients varying between 20 and 80 %
for all bins ≥ 48.
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Table 3. Summary of ESP for all eruption scenarios.
Volcano Reference Modelling Plume height Duration Mass Md 8 σ8 Max 8 Min 8 Aggregation
eruption strategy (km a.s.l.)
Hekla 2000 ERS 6–16a 0.5–1 hb 6.9× 109–6.9× 1010 – – −6 11 0.2–0.8b
1947 ERS 16–30a 0.5–1 hb 6.9× 1010–3.5× 1011 −1–1 c 1–2c −5 8 0.2–0.8b
Katla Historical moderate/larged LLERS 10–25a 1–4 daysb 7× 1011–7× 1012 −1–1 c 1–2 c −7 8 0.2–0.8 b
Eyjafjallajökull 2010 LLOES 2.5–7.8 e 40 days – – – −2 11 –
Askja Askja C OES 23 1 h 4.8× 1011 – – −6 6 0.2–0.8
Askja D OES 26 1.5 h 5.0× 1011 – – −10 6 0.2–0.8
a Logarithmic; b Uniform; c Gaussian; d Thordarson and Larsen (2007); e IMO (Arason et al., 2011) .
Table 4. Critical thresholds for probability calculation.
Threshold Unit Potential impact References
Ground load
1 kg m−2 Fluorine poisoning, electric flashover, Bebbington et al. (2008), Blong (1984),
closing of airports Thorarinsson and Sigvaldason (1972),
Wilson et al. (2011)
10 kg m−2 Impact on road traffic, damages on crops Blong (1984), Wilson et al. (2011)
100 kg m−2 Structural damages of weakest structures Blong (1984), Marti et al. (2008),
Spence et al. (2005)
Atmospheric concentration
2 mg m−3 EUR/NAT low/medium ash contamination boundary ICAO (2010)
Arrival time
24 h – Guffanti et al. (2010)
Persistence time
12 h – Ulfarsson and Unger (2011)
4.1.2 Katla
Numerous eruptions from Katla have been well described
and documented, but only a few quantitative constraints ex-
ist. Based on Table 2 and Larsen (2010), about 10 historical
eruptions produced tephra volumes > 0.1 km3, with only the
934–940 Eldgjá eruption responsible for a volume > 1 km3.
Since the Eldgjá eruption originated from the surrounding
fissure swarm rather than the central volcano, we discard it
from the eruption record used in this study, resulting in rel-
evant tephra volumes ranging from 0.1 to 1 km3. Historical
eruptions at Katla are known to have lasted from 2 weeks
to 5 months, with most of the tephra produced during the
first days. No silicic eruptions were witnessed during histor-
ical times, with the last SILK layer erupted 1675 years BP
(Larsen et al., 2001).
As a result, a LLERS strategy was applied to Katla vol-
cano in order to assess the hazard related to a future mod-
erate to large basaltic eruption (Table 2). According to the
existing literature, plume heights were sampled between 10
and 25 km a.s.l. on a logarithmic PDF (Einarson et al., 1980;
Larsen, 2000, 2002; Óladóttir et al., 2008, 2006, 2011; Thor-
darson and Höskuldsson, 2008). Only the paroxysmal phase
was modelled and assumed to last between 1 and 4 days
stochastically sampled on a uniform PDF. A volume con-
straint was set between 0.1 and 1 km3, converted into a mass
constraint between 0.7 and 7× 1012 kg using a bulk den-
sity of 700 kg m−3. Since no TGSD is available, we used
a reconstructed TGSD from the 10 points available for the
1357 eruption in the study of Einarson et al. (1980) using the
method of Bonadonna and Houghton (2005), which results
in a Md8 of −1 and a σ8 of 2. However, due to the south-
ward dispersal of the eruption and the narrow area of land
between the volcano and the sea, these points present a prox-
imal cross section of the deposit. As a result, a Md8 of −1 is
considered as a maximum value, and the TGSD adopted here
is a Gaussian distribution between −78 and 88 with Md8
sampled between−18 and 18, and σ8 sampled between 18
and 28, both on uniform PDF. The resulting distribution is
aggregated with an aggregation coefficient sampled between
20 and 80 %. The same TGSD is used for all occurrences
of a given run. The time interval between two occurrences
was set to 6 h based on the availability of wind data from the
ECMWF database.
Figure 5 and Table 3 summarize the ESP for Katla. Fig-
ure 5a shows the resulting PDF for plume heights displaying
a slight logarithmic trend, and Fig. 5b shows eruption dura-
tions. Figure 5c displays the PDF for the mass sampling of
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/14/2265/2014/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 2265–2287, 2014
2274 S. Biass et al.: Part 1: Hazard assessment
0. 8 1 1. 2 1. 4
x 10 4
0
200
400
Height (m asl )
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 2 4 6 8
x 10 11
0
1000
2000
3000
Mass − occurrence (kg)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Original
−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Diameter (phi )
W
t. 
%
 
 
40 60 80
0
20
40
60
80
Duration (hours)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 1 2 3
x 10 12
0
50
100
Mass − run(kg)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Individual particles
Aggregates
a
b
c
d
e
Figure 5. ESP for the Katla LLERS; (a) plume heights considering all occurrences (i.e. all model runs); (b) eruption duration; (c) erupted
masses considering all occurrences; (d) erupted masses considering single runs; (e) example of a TGSD of a single run. See caption of Fig. 4
for explanation of symbols.
individual occurrences and results in a strongly logarithmic
shape with masses comprised between 109 and 6× 1011 kg.
Figure 5d shows the resulting PDF for the mass per run, and
Fig. 5e the TGSD at one of the 1000 runs.
4.1.3 Eyjafjallajökull
The limited knowledge of eruptions at Eyjafjallajökull con-
strains the identification of eruption scenarios. Two prehis-
toric eruptions are recognized in the field but poorly con-
strained and three post–17th century eruptions were wit-
nessed, amongst which the eruptions of 1612 and 1821–1823
lack any constraint. However, since detailed observations and
measurements of eruptive parameters exist for the 2010 erup-
tion, we applied here a LLOES strategy in order to assess the
entire range of possible hazard related to the occurrence of
a similar eruption.
We model here the 40 days of explosive phase that oc-
curred from 14 April to 20 May 2010. The algorithm used is
shown in Fig. 2. The total duration, the time series of plume
heights and the TGSD are deterministically set a priori. Fig-
ure 6a shows measurements of plume heights every 6 h for
the 40 days of eruption (Arason et al., 2011), converted into
MER using the method of Degruyter and Bonadonna (2012)
and wind conditions extracted from the ECMWF database
(Fig. 6b). As a result, the time interval between occurrences
within a run was set to 6 h. The TGSD used here is as de-
scribed by Bonadonna et al. (2011), who reconstructed disag-
gregated and aggregated TGSD by combining ground-based
and satellite-based measurements. Here, the same TGSD is
used for all runs and does not vary through occurrences.
Following the algorithm in Fig. 2, an eruption date is sam-
pled at each run, after which wind conditions are extracted
for the 40 days of the eruption every 6 h. At each occurrence,
the MER is calculated accounting for the wind velocity and
converted to 6 h averaged mass. The occurrence is sent to
the model, and each run is the sum of the 240 occurrences.
For computational reasons, it was not possible to run the
Eyjafjallajökull probabilistically with FALL3D.
4.1.4 Askja
At least two large tephra deposits associated with strong
Plinian eruptions of VEI 5 are recognized at Askja includ-
ing the 10 ka BP and the 1875 eruptions. Since no accurate
mapping or constraints of eruptive parameters are available
for the 10 ka BP eruption, we use the 1875 as a reference
eruption. Previous studies of Sparks et al. (1981) and Carey
et al. (2010) provide an accurate chronology of the different
phases of the eruption as well as constraints of the associated
eruptive parameters. Two phases are responsible for most
of the production of tephra, namely the 1 h long phreato-
Plinian phase Askja C followed 6 h later by the 1.5 h long
Plinian phase Askja D. As a result, we apply here OES strate-
gies modelling two consecutive eruptions separated by a 6 h
break.
Figure 2 shows the algorithm developed for a single OES
modelling. Here, the hazard related to a 1875-type eruption
consists of the sum of one OES for Askja C and one OES for
Askja D. All ESPs (i.e. plume height, erupted mass, eruption
duration and TGSD) are fixed deterministically and are sum-
marized in Table 3 and Fig. 7 for both phases. At each run,
an eruption date is sampled and wind data for the consecu-
tive phases are extracted. Both TGSD are aggregated with an
aggregation coefficient sampled between 20 and 80 %.
4.2 Hazard assessment
This section presents the results of the different model runs
for all volcanoes. These results should be viewed as part of
a scenario-based hazard assessment, showing the geographi-
cal distribution of probability of tephra fallout knowing that
an eruption of a given magnitude is occurring. As described
in Sect. 3.2, the compilation of probability maps requires
a threshold – i.e. either a mass load (kg m−2), a concen-
tration (mg m−3), a persistence or an arrival time (h) – in
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Table 5. Probabilities, mean arrival time and mean persistence time for a concentration of 2 mg m−3 for all FL combined above the selected
airports shown in Fig. 1. NR: not reached.
Airport Eruption Distance Concentration Mean arrival time Mean persistence time
scenario from vent (km) probability (%) (h ± standard deviation) (h ± standard deviation)
Keflavik Hekla 2000 141 17.0 3.8± 2.2 4.7± 3.6
(BIKF) Hekla 1947 141 23.0 3.6± 3.2 7.4± 5.3
Katla 178 41.1 24.9± 22.2 21.3± 15.2
Askja 1875 303 16.8 9.2± 7.7 18.2± 12.4
Oslo Gardermoen Hekla 2000 1635 0.0 NR NR
(ENGM) Hekla 1947 1635 0.5 17.7± 5.2 4.6± 1.9
Katla 1603 6.7 45.1± 21.4 7± 5.4
Askja 1875 1503 11.5 24.6± 12.1 6.9± 4.3
London Heathrow Hekla 2000 1780 0.2 11.2± 3.2 2.9± 0.9
(EGLL) Hekla 1947 1780 0.8 13.0± 3.2 3.4± 2.2
Katla 1731 5.2 47.3± 24.4 9.8± 8.1
Askja 1875 1767 8.5 22.6± 12.8 7.6± 4.4
Amsterdam Schiphol Hekla 2000 1909 0.1 15.3± 0 2.7± 0
(EHAM) Hekla 1947 1909 0.5 15.9± 1.0 6.7± 3.6
Katla 1862 7.3 48.6± 20.7 9.0± 7.1
Askja 1875 1860 9.7 22.6± 7.2 8.0± 4.3
Copenhagen Kastrup Hekla 2000 2000 0.0 NR NR
(EKCH) Hekla 1947 2000 0.3 20± 0.8 4.4± 1.6
Katla 1938 5.0 50.9± 20.6 6.6± 4.8
Askja 1875 1876 6.9 25.9± 9.3 6.0± 3.1
Paris Charles De Gaulle Hekla 2000 2136 0.0 NR NR
(LFPG) Hekla 1947 2136 0.2 15.8± 0.4 3.4± 1.6
Katla 2075 3.7 50± 25.8 9.1± 8.6
Askja 1875 2106 8.1 27.6± 12.5 6.9± 3.7
Frankfurt Hekla 2000 2223 0.0 NR NR
(EDDF) Hekla 1947 2223 0.3 18.7± 0.6 5.9± 1.5
Katla 2175 5.2 47.9± 21.1 7.7± 5.3
Askja 1875 2175 6.8 27.4± 11.7 6.6± 3.3
order to calculate the exceeding probability for each erup-
tion scenario. Based on the available literature, we use three
relevant thresholds for ground accumulation, one for atmo-
spheric concentration, one for persistence and one for arrival
time (Table 4). The Supplement contains the entire collec-
tion of maps produced including probability maps for atmo-
spheric concentration as well as persistence and arrival times
in terms of mean, standard deviation and probability, com-
puted for all FL and for all critical thresholds. The result-
ing impact is presented in the companion paper of Scaini
et al. (2014).
4.2.1 Ground deposition
Figures 8–11 show the probability maps of exceeding a given
threshold of tephra accumulation on the ground for Hekla,
Katla, Eyjafjallajökull, and Askja, respectively. In agreement
with Fig. 3, there are preferential eastwards dispersals, leav-
ing the Reykjavík area with a negligible probability of being
affected by tephra fallout for the volcanoes considered here.
As a result, eruptions from volcanoes in the EVZ are likely to
affect the area between and east of Gullfoss and Vík í Mýrdal
(hereafter referred to as Vík; Fig. 1) (Figs. 8–10).
Figure 8 shows the probability maps for Hekla. Figure 8a
and b show the probability of reaching an accumulation of
1 kg m−2 for the 2000-type and the 1947-type scenarios,
respectively. In the case of a 2000-type eruption, there is
a > 10 % probability of reaching such an accumulation up
to 50 km east of the volcano and a negligible probability to
affect Vík. However, Vík and the southernmost coast have
a ∼ 15 % probability of reaching an equal accumulation for
a 1947-type eruption, with the > 10 % probability line ex-
tending 150–200 km eastwards and 50 km westward from the
volcano (Fig. 8b). This scenario has a ∼ 10 % probability of
producing tephra accumulation of 10 kg m−3 in the vicinity
of Gullfoss (Fig. 8c) and has a 10 % probability of affecting
an area with an accumulation of 100 kg m−3 25 km east of
the volcano (Fig. 8d).
Figure 9a–c show the spatial distribution of probabilities
of reaching tephra accumulations of 1, 10 and 100 kg m−2,
respectively, associated with an eruption at Katla. At Vík,
such an eruption results in probabilities of 40 %, ∼ 30 %
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Figure 6. ESP for the Eyjafjallajökull LLOES; (a) 6 h interval mea-
surements of plume height for the period 14 April–21 May 2010
(Arason et al., 2011); (b) corresponding MER for the same period
based on wind conditions extracted from the ERA-Interim database
and the method of Degruyter and Bonadonna (2012); (c) disaggre-
gated and aggregated TGSD as inferred by Bonadonna et al. (2011).
See caption of Fig. 4 for explanation of symbols.
and 10 % of reaching tephra accumulations of 1, 10 and
100 kg m−2, respectively. The 10 % probability line of reach-
ing a tephra accumulation of 1 kg m−2 extends about 200 km
northwards on the mainland and eastwards along the coast.
Figure 10 displays the probability distribution for an Ey-
jafjallajökull 2010-type eruption, resulting in 80 and 20 %
probabilities of reaching tephra accumulations of 1 and
10 kg m−2 in Vík, respectively (Fig. 10a and b). Due to
the low probability level, the map for an accumulation of
100 kg m−2 is not shown.
Located in the NVZ, Askja is most likely to impact the
eastern part of the country, with half of the territory hav-
ing a 5–10 % probability of reaching a tephra accumulation
of 1 kg m−2 should an 1875-type eruption occur (Fig. 11a).
The main town under the threat of an eruption of Askja,
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Figure 7. Original and aggregated TGSD of the 1875 Askja erup-
tion based on Sparks et al. (1981) for (a) the phreato-Plinian phase
Askja C and (b) the dry Plinian phase Askja D. See caption of Fig. 4
for explanation of symbols.
Egilsstaðir, has ∼ 35 and ∼ 15 % probabilities of reach-
ing tephra accumulations of 1 and 10 kg m−2, respectively
(Fig. 11a and b). The towns of Akureyri and Húsavik, which
both have airports used for internal flights, have 15 and 20 %
probabilities of reaching tephra accumulations of 1 kg m−2,
respectively. A 1875-type eruption also has a 10 % probabil-
ity of depositing 100 kg m−2 of tephra 50 km east of the vent
(Fig. 11c).
Along with probability maps, the hazard related to tephra
accumulation can also be expressed as hazard curves, for
which the probability of exceeding any tephra accumulation
is quantified for a given location. Figure 12 shows hazard
curves for relevant eruptions for the locations of Vík, Gull-
foss, Akureyri and Egilsstaðir. Although Gullfoss is only
a tourist facility, this location was used to assess the probabil-
ity of tephra accumulation inland. Figure 12a shows that Vík
has 15, 40 and 80 % probability of exceeding a tephra accu-
mulation of 1 kg m−2 following the considered eruptions of
Katla, Hekla 1947-type and Eyjafjallajökull, respectively.
4.2.2 Atmospheric concentration
The hazard assessment for atmospheric concentration is
shown in Figs. 13 and 14, Table 5 and the Supplement.
For practical reasons, we present here only probability maps
accounting for the presence of ash above a threshold of
2 mg m−3 at any FL (Sect. 3, Table 4). Arrival time and
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Figure 8. Probability maps (%) for ground accumulation for an eruption at Hekla. (a) ERS for a 2000-type eruption, threshold of 1 kg m−2;
(b) ERS for a 1947-type eruption, threshold of 1 kg m−2; (c) ERS for a 1947-type eruption, threshold of 10 kg m−2; (d) ERS for a 1947-type
eruption, threshold of 100 kg m−2. Eruption parameters are summarized in Table 3 and Fig. 4.
persistence are compiled here in the form of probability maps
of exceeding arrival and persistence times of 24 and 12 h, re-
spectively. The choice of 24 h for the threshold of arrival time
is based on Guffanti et al. (2010), who showed that 89 % of
the aircrafts encounters with volcanic ash in the period 1953–
2009 occurred within the first 24 h after the onset of the erup-
tion. Since no threshold of persistence time has been offi-
cially outlined, we adopted a threshold of 12 h based on qual-
itative observations found in the literature (e.g. Ulfarsson and
Unger, 2011). The Supplement comprises probability maps
for other thresholds (i.e. 2× 10−6 and 0.2 mg m−3) and for
separate FL as well as maps of mean and standard deviation
of persistence and arrival time. Due to the high computing
demand required to run FALL3D in a probabilistic mode for
a 40 day long eruption, the Eyjafjallajökull LLOES 2010-
type eruption was omitted from the hazard assessment for
atmospheric dispersal.
Figure 13a–c show the results for Hekla. Due to the lo-
cal dispersal following a 2000-type eruption, only maps for
a 1947-type eruption are presented here. Such an eruption
would result in a 5–10 % probability of reaching a concen-
tration of 2 mg m−3 above the northern Atlantic Ocean and
probabilities of reaching London and Oslo of 0.8 and 0.5 %
after 13± 3 and 17± 5 h, respectively (Fig. 13a and b, Ta-
ble 5). Persistence times for these locations are negligible and
are of 3± 2 and 5± 2 h, respectively (Fig. 13c, Table 5). As
shown in the Supplement, similar observations can be made
at all separate FLs. These results are in agreement with the
findings of Leadbetter and Hort (2011), although differences
in scenario identification, modelling strategies and definition
of critical thresholds make detailed comparison difficult.
Following the scenario used here, an eruption at Katla has
a 5–20 % probability of affecting the UK and Scandinavia
with concentrations of 2 mg m−3. Such concentrations are
expected to arrive above London and Oslo after ∼ 45± 22 h
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Figure 9. Probability maps (%) for ground accumulation for a long-
lasting eruption at Katla. (a) LLERS, threshold of 1 kg m−2;
(b) LLERS, threshold of 10 kg m−2; (c) LLERS, threshold of
100 kg m−2. Eruption parameters are summarized in Table 3 and
Fig. 5.
in both cases but persist in the atmosphere for less than 10 h
(Fig. 13d–f, Table 5). Due to the long-lasting nature of the
Katla scenario, note (i) the longer arrival time compared to
other eruption scenarios and (ii) the high uncertainty on the
mean persistence and arrival time. The Supplement shows
that at separate FL, the impacts of a Katla eruption tend to
decrease with altitude.
The atmospheric dispersal of tephra following a 1875-type
eruption at Askja is presented in Fig. 13g–i, which results
in 5–20 % probabilities to reach a concentration of 2 mg m−3
over Scandinavia and Western Europe (UK, Northern France,
Netherlands, Belgium, and Western Germany). Such a con-
centration has a 5–10 % probability of reaching the UK and
Scandinavia within 24 h, with mean arrival times above Lon-
don and Oslo of 22±13 h and 25±12 h, respectively (Fig. 13g
and h, Table 5). The airports of Paris and Frankfurt can po-
tentially be impacted after ∼ 50± 20 h in both cases. In all
cases, persistence in the atmosphere would be in the range of
∼ 6–8±4 h, with a 5–10 % probability of western Norway to
be locally impacted by concentrations of 2 mg m−3 persisting
for more than 12 h. Similar probability distributions, arrival
and persistence times are to be expected at all separate FL
(see the Supplement).
4.2.3 Short vs. long-lasting eruptions
In order to compare the potential impact resulting from dif-
ferent types of activity at the selected volcanoes (i.e. short-
vs. long-lasting eruptions), this section presents deterministic
scenarios based on historical and well-constrained eruptions.
Note that these simulations do not aim at presenting “worst-
case” scenarios, which would require the combined identifi-
cation of worst-case eruption scenarios and wind condition,
but can be viewed as a comparison of key historical eruptions
happening under similar meteorological conditions.
The eruptions of Hekla 1947, Katla 1918, Eyjafjallajökull
2010, and Askja 1875 were selected as case-study scenarios
for which sufficient data were available to produce a realis-
tic forecast of potential impact. In order to scale and com-
pare the effect of these eruptions, simulations were run us-
ing the wind conditions of Eyjafjallajökull 2010, starting
from 14 April and lasting for 10 days. ESPs for Eyjafjalla-
jökull and Askja are summarized in Table 3. The 1918 erup-
tion of Katla is the most recent eruption to break through
the Mýrdalsjökull ice cap. The available literature suggests
that the eruption lasted for 3 weeks, with the most intense
tephra production during the first days, plume heights up
to 14 km a.s.l. and a total volume varying between 0.7 and
1.6 km3 (Larsen, 2000; Sturkell et al., 2010). In the absence
of any detailed variations of plume heights, radar observa-
tions of Arason et al. (2011) were used and scaled to fit ob-
served minimum and maximum plume heights of the Katla
1918 eruption. Using wind conditions specified above and
the method of Degruyter and Bonadonna (2012) to estimate
the MER, we obtained a total mass of 1.24×1012 kg, which is
consistent with published volume estimates. Given the sim-
ilarities between the two systems (Sturkell et al., 2010), the
TGSD of Eyjafjallajökull defined by Bonadonna et al. (2011)
was also used for this run. ESP for the Hekla 1947 erup-
tion were set using the literature, with a plume height of
27 km a.s.l., a total erupted tephra volume of 0.18 km3 and
a duration of 1.5 h.
Figure 14 summarizes the expected concentrations at
FL150 over the main European airport hubs of London
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Figure 10. Probability maps (%) for ground accumulation associated with a long-lasting 2010-type eruption of Eyjafjallajökull volcano.
(a) LLOES, threshold of 1 kg m−2; (b) LLOES, threshold of 10 kg m−2. Eruption parameters are summarized in Table 3 and Fig. 6.
Heathrow (EGLL), Paris Charles de Gaulle (LFPG), Am-
sterdam Schiphol (EHAM), Frankfurt (EDDF) Oslo Gar-
dermoen (ENGM), and Copenhagen Kastrup (EKCH) with
wind conditions of April 2010, corresponding to the onset
of the explosive phase of Eyjafjallajökull 2010 (see Fig. 1
for locations). When interpreting Fig. 14, one should keep in
mind that it represents a slice at FL150, namely an altitude
of about 4.6 km a.s.l., and the plume height of each scenario
should be put in context when interpreting results. Concen-
tration maps for these scenarios for all flights levels can be
found in the Supplement.
Figure 14 shows that a Hekla 1947-type eruption bears the
largest impact in terms of airborne concentration. A 1947-
type eruption would result in concentrations above the
threshold of 0.2 mg m−3 over London, Paris, Amsterdam,
Frankfurt and Copenhagen (i.e. 0.35–0.68 mg m−3) arriving
after 2–4 days and potentially disrupting the air traffic be-
tween 1 and 3 days. Oslo would be the most impacted area
with concentration peaks above 10 mg m−3. A Katla 1918-
type eruption, characterized by a pulsatory regime with re-
peated emissions of ash, would potentially be most problem-
atic for the European airspace in terms of duration of disrup-
tion. Although most likely reaching concentrations compris-
ing only between 0.1 and 0.25 mg m−3, Fig. 14 reflects the
repeated arrival of clouds over time and its potential impli-
cations for the management of a volcanic crisis. The erup-
tions of Askja 1875 and Eyjafjallajökull 2010 only seem to
be problematic for Oslo, reaching concentrations above 2 and
0.2 mg m−3 respectively.
5 Discussion
5.1 Eruption scenarios and probabilistic strategies
Three steps were taken to develop probabilistic hazard sce-
narios including (i) the identification of the most probable
and potentially problematic eruptive styles at given volca-
noes, (ii) the development of adapted algorithms to model
each eruption type (Fig. 2), and (iii) the definition of erup-
tion scenarios with constrained ESPs (Figs. 4–7). At the se-
lected volcanoes, this led to the identification of both short-
and long-lasting eruptions scenarios with both fixed and
variable ESP.
5.1.1 Fixed vs. variable ESPs
Amongst chosen volcanoes, a large discrepancy exists in
terms of the knowledge of the eruptive history, which is
directly related to the frequency of activity during histori-
cal times: 17, 10, 3, and 1 eruptions of interest (i.e. explo-
sive eruptions at the central vent) occurred during histori-
cal times at Hekla, Katla, Eyjafjallajökull and Askja, respec-
tively. On the other hand, a discrepancy also exists in the
degree of detail to which eruptions have been mapped and
characterized. For example, the single eruption of Askja is
thoroughly characterized in terms of chronology of eruptive
phases, plume height, erupted volume and TGSD whereas
eruptions of Katla are mainly bounded by rough estimates of
volume. As a result, the choice of expressing eruption sce-
narios as either a single set of ESPs deterministically defined
(OES) or as a stochastic sampling on a PDF (ERS) is made
upon the combined knowledge of the eruptive history and the
degree of characterization of eruptions. The end-user should
account for the limitations considered with each approach.
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Figure 11. Probability maps (%) for ground accumulation asso-
ciated with a multi-phase 1875-type eruption at Askja volcano.
(a) OES, threshold of 1 kg m−2; (b) OES, threshold of 10 kg m−2;
(c) OES, threshold of 100 kg m−2. Eruption parameters are summa-
rized in Table 3 and Fig. 7.
5.1.2 Sampling of ESPs
Figure 2 shows the algorithms used to produce both ERS
and LLERS, where the erupted mass is indirectly derived
from the plume height, the eruption duration and wind con-
ditions (Degruyter and Bonadonna, 2012) and tested against
a mass range. Although the sampling of plume height was
constrained on a logarithmic distribution as a prior knowl-
edge, the resulting PDF only including values validated by
our algorithm shows a wide variety of shapes. For exam-
ple, Fig. 4a shows that the initial assumptions of erupted
mass (i.e. 6.9× 109–6.9× 1010 kg) for a 2000-type eruption
at Hekla for a 0.5–1 h long eruption cannot be realistic with
plume heights under 10 km a.s.l., resulting in (i) a PDF for
plume heights biased towards the largest end-members and
(ii) a PDF for erupted mass in agreement with an initial
assumption of a logarithmic distribution of ESP. Similarly,
the 1947-type scenario results in a PDF with a maximum
at plume heights of 18–20 km a.s.l. but without solution for
plume heights above 27 km a.s.l. satisfying the initial mass
(6.9× 1010–3.5× 1011 kg) and duration (0.5–1 h) conditions
(Fig. 4d). As a result, this method accounts for a prior knowl-
edge of the system (i.e. initial choice of a PDF for the sam-
pling of ESP) and helps to correct the sampling of dependent
ESPs (i.e. plume height, eruption duration, MER and erupted
mass) in order to produce realistic events within an eruption
scenario.
5.1.3 Short- vs. long-lasting eruption scenarios
Assessing the hazard related to tephra dispersal from long-
lasting eruption is commonly done using non-steady models
but rarely using steady models. Scollo et al. (2013) already
used the model TEPHRA2 to evaluate tephra hazard asso-
ciated with long-lasting violent Strombolian activity at Mt
Etna, Italy (e.g. the 21–24 July 2001 eruption). They defined
it as weak long-lived plume scenario (OES-WLL and ERS-
WLL) with an eruption duration of 4–100 days, in contrast
to short-lived plume scenarios (OES-SSL and ERS-SSL) as-
sociated with the paroxysmal phase of subplinian eruptions
(e.g. the 22 July 1998 eruption).
Here, we developed new algorithms for the sampling of
ESPs to assess the ground deposition from long-lasting erup-
tions (Fig. 2). Conceptually, the total ground accumulation
calculated with TEPHRA2 consisted of consecutive occur-
rences of the model run at a given time interval 1t , after
which all outputs are summed. With FALL3D, the continu-
ous computation allowed simply updating of the ESPs every
1t without interruption. Here, the typical 6 h time resolution
of reanalysis data sets conditioned the duration of 1t , im-
plying constant eruption conditions between either different
runs or updates.
5.2 Ground accumulation and atmospheric dispersal
5.2.1 Ground accumulation
Figures 8–11 show that although computed accumulations
are not sufficient to cause structural damage to buildings (i.e.
> 100 kg m−2), deposition of 1–10 kg m−2 is likely to oc-
cur, which is consistent with historical chronicles primarily
reporting impacts on agricultural activities (e.g. crops de-
struction, poisoning of animals; Thorarinsson, 1967; Tho-
rarinsson and Sigvaldason, 1972). In addition, eruptions from
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Figure 12. Hazard curves for the locations of (a) Vík, (b) Gullfoss, (c) Akureyri and (d) Egilsstaðir (see locations in Fig. 1). Only relevant
eruptions are shown at each location, i.e. ERS Hekla 2000- and 1947-type, LLERS of Katla and LLOES 2010-type of Eyjafjallajökull for
Vík and Gullfoss and OES 1875-type of Askja (total eruption and individual phases) for Akureyri and Egilsstaðir.
ice-capped volcanoes such as Katla and Eyjafjallajökull are
typically associated with jökullhaups, which can cause sig-
nificant structural damage to buildings, roads and bridges. If
these observations are valid for the selected volcanoes and
potentially for most of central vent eruptions with VEI up
to 5 – excluding maybe the volcanoes located in the vicin-
ity of Reykjavík and Keflavik – “fires”-type eruptions would
result in larger magnitude impact. A review of the environ-
mental changes produced by the Eldgjá fires can be found in
Larsen (2000).
Hazard maps produced here show preferential disper-
sals towards the E–ENE, consistent with wind observations
(Fig. 3). However, compilations of dispersal axes for his-
torical eruptions are available for Hekla (Thorarinsson and
Sigvaldason, 1972) and Katla (Larsen, 2000) and show the
existence of deposition in all directions around the vents. For
example, only 7 out of the 14 historical eruptions of Hekla
were dispersed in directions between 0 and 180◦, and 8 erup-
tions dispersed tephra in a 340–20◦ sector. Similarly, half of
the historical eruptions of Katla were dispersed and deposited
with a bearing comprised between 0 and 180◦. By compar-
ing our probability maps for Eyjafjallajökull to the isomass
maps of Gudmundsson et al. (2012) compiled for land depo-
sition in the period 14 April to 22 May, we observe a ground
deposition slightly more directed towards the south than pre-
dicted by our model (Fig. 10). However, deposition observed
on the ground for both 1 and 10 kg m−2 (converted from the
isopach maps of Gudmundsson et al. (2012) with a density
of 1400 kg m−3) fall between our 10 and 30 % probability
lines. Similarly, the isopach maps and ground measurements
for the C and D units of the Askja 1875 produced by Carey
et al. (2010) are in agreement with our 10 and 20 % probabil-
ity lines for ground tephra accumulations of 1 and 10 kg m−2
(Fig. 11).
5.2.2 Atmospheric concentration
Figure 13 summarizes the most likely dispersal trends, in
agreement with the wind transect of Fig. 2, and shows that
the areas most probably affected by far-range dispersal of
ash are Scandinavia and the northern UK. Such results are
in agreement with the compilation of the tephrochronolog-
ical studies of Swindles et al. (2011), who show that the
past 7000 years of volcanic activity in Iceland resulted in
the identification of 38, 33, and 11 tephra layers in Scandi-
navia, Ireland and Great Britain, respectively. As suggested
by Lacasse (2001), Scandinavia is subject to zonal airflow,
whereas Ireland is more likely to be affected than the rest of
Europe as it is most probably in the path of anticyclonic air-
flows from Iceland. As a result, minimum estimates provided
by Swindles et al. (2011) show that, based on the record of
the past 1000 years, northern Europe is affected by volcanic
ash with a mean return interval of 56±9 years and that there
is a 16 % probability of tephra fallout every decade based on
a Poisson model.
When using a deterministic approach, Fig. 14 shows that
amongst the selected eruptions, an eruption of Hekla 1947
is the most likely to produce critical concentrations above
the main European airports. Interestingly, scaling Hekla 1947
with the two main phases of Askja 1875 reveals that an
erupted volume falling within the boundaries of a low VEI
4 (Hekla 1947) can produce concentrations more than one
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Figure 13. Atmospheric dispersion of tephra for a threshold of 2 mg m−3 for all FL for the eruption scenarios of Hekla ERS 1947-type
(a, b, c), Katla LLERS (d, e, f) and Askja OES 1875-type (g, h, i). Maps show (a, d, g) probability maps of exceeding a concentration of
2 mg m−3, (b, e, h) probability maps of exceeding an arrival time of 24 h for a concentration of 2 mg m−3 and (c, f, i) probability maps of
exceeding a persistence time of 12 h for a concentration of 2 mg m−3. Probability maps for other thresholds and separate FL are available in
the Supplement.
order of magnitude larger than an eruption of low–medium
VEI 5 (Askja 1875). For example, London Heathrow would
suffer ash concentrations of 0.68 and 0.025 mg m−3 follow-
ing eruptions of Hekla 1947 and Askja 1875, respectively
(Fig. 14). Similarly, Davies et al. (2010) report that five
eruptions of Hekla with volumes varying between 0.18 and
0.33 km3 produced tephra beds in Norway, Scotland and Fin-
land, more than 1500 km beyond the source. Such obser-
vations support the growing idea that the tephra volume of
an eruption is not the primary factor controlling the distal
dispersal of fine ash and that the TGSD, the nature of the
fragmentation process (i.e. dry vs. phreatomagmatic) and the
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weather patterns play important roles (Davies et al., 2010;
Swindles et al., 2011).
The concept of defining critical thresholds, typically 0, 0.2
or 2 mg m−3 depending on the approach adopted, implies
that the hazard level is at its maximum once the concen-
tration threshold has been reached. If, for instance, a value
of 0.2 mg m−3 is adopted as critical, the shape of the curve
above the threshold for the eruption of Hekla 1947 displayed
on Fig. 14 does not provide any relevant information as the
level of maximum impact is reached. However, for crisis
management purposes, the duration during which concentra-
tions are above the threshold becomes critical. In this per-
spective, the eruption type has a major control on the hazard
and the potential associated consequences. For example, con-
centration plots using a deterministic approach for all flight
levels shown in the Supplement illustrate how short-lasting
and intense Plinian eruptions result in single peaks of critical
concentration typically lasting for a couple of days, reaching
up to 12 mg m−3 above the Oslo airport following a Hekla
1947 eruption. In contrast, an eruption of Katla 1918, al-
though not reaching such high levels of critical thresholds,
results in more diffuse signals spanning over longer peri-
ods of time over single geographic points. When considering
a 3-D volume above the European territory representing the
airspace and observing the potential disruptions from a man-
agement perspective, continuous emission of tephra with
a pulsatory regime, though not producing the high concen-
trations of Plinian eruptions, are potentially able to become
more problematic than short-lasting powerful eruptions.
6 Conclusions
The present work highlights the challenges of achieving
a multi-scale hazard assessment from multiple and hetero-
geneous sources in order to compare and combine outcomes
of the most likely range of possible eruptions. For the se-
lected volcanoes, we could define both semi-probabilistic
(i.e. stochastic sampling of wind conditions and ESP de-
terministically fixed) and fully probabilistic (i.e. stochastic
sampling of both wind profiles and ESP) eruption scenar-
ios based on the available data. In each case, we developed
new algorithms to assist the identification of eruption param-
eters for both short- and long-lasting eruptions, which help
to achieve the sampling of realistic ESP and account for par-
ticle aggregation processes. For the atmospheric dispersal of
fine ash, a sound deterministic approach demonstrated the
different hazards posed by short- and long-lasting eruptions
and showed the importance of the potential disruption time
over high concentrations. As a result, the outcomes of this
work constitute a first step towards an improved manage-
ment of future volcanic crises, accounting for most critical
aspects of both the geological and atmospheric science sides
of the problem. The second step toward a sound impact and
risk assessment typically involves the identification of the ex-
posed elements and their vulnerability to the stress consti-
tuted by ground tephra accumulation and distal atmospheric
ash. Such an approach is tackled in a companion paper by
Scaini et al. (2014).
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In terms of hazard assessment, we can conclude that:
– Eruption scenarios and ESP must be defined using prob-
abilistic strategies based on strong field observations.
– Based on our probabilistic scenarios (e.g. OES, ERS),
Askja represents the most hazardous volcano.
– Based on our deterministic scenarios, Hekla is likely to
produce the largest atmospheric concentrations of ash
but Katla will result in longer disruptions of air traffic.
– At the Icelandic scale, expected accumulations will
mainly be a concern for electrical power-lines and agri-
cultural activities (i.e. accumulations of 10 kg m−2).
– Our empirical approach to describe aggregation, al-
though simplistic, is a suitable field-based method for
computationally heavy probabilistic analysis, which al-
lows the investigation of a wide range of aggregation
conditions.
– Results suggest that the erupted tephra volume is not the
primary control on the dispersal, whereas the eruptive
style (i.e. long-lasting vs. short-lasting) and the TGSD
(i.e. fine vs. coarse distributions) might play primary
roles.
The Supplement related to this article is available online
at doi:10.5194/nhess-14-2265-2014-supplement.
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1. Introduction 
The main topic of this work is the impact of explosive volcanic eruptions on the anthropic system, at 
both local and global scale. When an explosive volcanic eruption takes place, a huge quantity of 
tephra is ejected. The coarse fraction is soon deposited at ground, while fine ash can remain airborne  
from days to weeks. 
Impacts of tephra deposition are quite well-studied. Ash deposition can damage to structures (Spence 
et al., 2005a,b; ), lifelines (Johnston and Becker, 2001; Stewart et al., 2006), impact crops and kettle  
(Neild  et  al.,  1998),  disrupt  road  traffic  (Wilson  et  al.,  2012)  and cause  the  closure  of  airports  
(Casadevall, 1993; Guffanti et al., 2009). Finally, massive tephra deposition can produce respiratory 
problems on vulnerable subjects (Baxter, 1999).  
There are only a few studies on impacts of atmospheric tephra dispersal. The main impact of ash 
contamination in atmosphere is  the disruption of aerial  traffic (Guffanti  et  al.,  2009).  Impacts of 
volcanic ash have been documented in the past (Casadevall, 1993), but underestimated until recently. 
The  volcanic  eruption  of  Eyjafjallajokull  (Iceland,  2010)  produced  the  largest  breakout  of  civil 
aviation in Europe after  the II World War. This event underlined the high vulnerability of aerial  
traffic, and showed that weak eruptions can cause massive economical losses and affect the entire 
society (Mazzocchi et al., 2010; Ulfarsson and Unger, 2010). It is therefore important to characterize 
the active volcanoes, assess the expected impacts and improve preparedness. 
This abstract  will  briefly describe the hazard assessment and impact  estimation for a case-study:  
Concepción volcano, Nicaragua. The idea started from a field trip to Ometepe Island (November  
2010), constituted by the twin stratovolcanoes Concepción and Maderas.  Concepción volcano has 
been  quite  active  in  recent  years  (Delgado-Granados  et  al.,  2006).  Ometepe island  is  highly 
vulnerable at a local scale, and the aerial traffic of the region is relevant for tourism and commerce. 
An explosive eruption from Concepción volcano could produce serous consequences at both local and 
regional scale. We perform the hazard assessment (Scaini et al., 2012) and assess the vulnerability at  
local and regional scale. We produce hazard and vulnerability maps for local and regional scale. All 
maps are produced through the open GIS Grass (Neteler et al., 2011) and Qgis (http://www.qgis.org/).
Having characterized the hazardous phenomena and the vulnerability, the impacts can be seen as their 
“combination”, that is,  the spatial overlap. The GIS, due to its enormous capabilities of handling 
spatial data (Renschler, 2005), is especially suitable for this task. There are few examples of volcanic 
hazard assessment (Felpeto et  al.,  2007) and impact  estimation of tephra deposition (Biass et  al., 
2012) based on GIS, while it has never been used for the assessment of tephra dispersal impacts.
The  GIS-based  visualization allows  to  identify the  most  impacted areas  and assess  the  expected 
impacts at local and global scale. The aim of future work is to produce impact maps at local and  
regional  scale.  At  the  moment,  we  present  some  preliminary  results  and  briefly  discuss  their  
implication for local and regional risk management. We conclude proposing further developments for 
the integration of GIS in the risk management process.
2. Hazard assessment
Hazard  assessment  is  the  procedure  of  characterization  and  modelling  of  the  expected  eruptive  
scenarios. The hazard assessment methodology and its application to Concepción volcano is fully  
described in Scaini  et  al.  (2012).  We run several  simulations for each scenario,  using the Fall3d 
numerical model (Costa et al., 2006; Folch et al.,2009). Hazard maps are produced by merging the 
results and calculating the probability for each point to be affected by a critical value of ash load or  
concentration. We produced probabilistic hazard maps of ash load at ground for the critical values of  
1 kg/m² (which corresponds to road traffic disruption, crops and kettle damages), 50 and 100 Kg/m 2 
(collapse  of  weak  and  stronger  buildings,  respectively).  Moreover,  we  produced  maps  of  ash 
concentration at different flight level, using the thresholds of 0.2 mg/m³ and 2 mg/m³ (restricted aerial 
traffic and no-fly zone, respectively). Figure 1 shows the results of hazard assessment for the higher-
magnitude scenario (described in Scaini et al., 2012) for tephra load at ground. Figure 2 shows results 
at Flying Level (FL) 050 and 150.  
3. Vulnerability and impact assessment
The vulnerability and impact assessment are performed at local and regional scale. Ometepe Island is 
highly vulnerable due to several factors. First, the fact of being an island increases the vulnerability.  
The connection to the mainland mainly depends on private boat services, which is strategical for the  
island communities.  The situation of internal transportation is critical because the road networks is 
constituted by one main circumambulation road and lacks of redundancy. Buildings are weak and in 
their majority poorly maintained. Moreover, the steep flanks of Concepción volcano are likely to  
generate landslides, especially during the rainy season. With a scarce transportation network and few 
alternative paths, the occurrence of a landslides can cut a road and aisle entire communities. Figure 3 
shows the vulnerability maps produced at the moment for the local assessment, synthesizing the main 
features considered (population, roads, crops). From a regional point of view, the main strategical 
airport  of  the  area  is  Managua  International  Airport,  located  at  only  100  km from Concepción. 
Moreover, the new airport being built in Ometepe is clearly vulnerability due to its location. Having 
identified  the  main  airports  of  the  area,  it  would  be  suitable  to  rank  them  according  to  their  
importance. At the moment, data about passengers and freight traffic are not available for the area,  
but we are starting a collaboration with local authorities. 
4. Results and discussion
The overlap of hazard and vulnerability  maps allows to  estimate the  expected impacts.  Maps of  
expected impacts cannot be produced at the moment. Preliminary results of local impact assessment  
can be inferred from Table 1. Tephra deposition can produce damages to crops in the island and the 
rest of the region. Moreover, tephra accumulated in the flanks of the volcano can produce landslides,  
especially during the rainy season. The situation of the road network can therefore become critical.  
The analysis of impacts is still ongoing and will likely produce an expected impact map, underlining 
the critical areas.
Table 2 shows the probability of closure of the aerial  space during an high-magnitude explosive  
eruption at Concepción volcano. With data on aerial traffic, one could assess the number of disrupted  
flights and the passengers stranded. It is worth to note the high impact of volcanic activity on the new 
airport which is currently being built near the town of Moyogalpa. Moreover, some of the considered 
airport  are  strategical  for  the  Nicaraguan  economy,  especially  for  the  tourism  and  the  trade  of 
perishable goods.
This work shows the importance of GIS to display and analyse spatially-based information in the field 
of volcanic risk-management. GIS enhances the communication process, improves the information 
flow and supports decision-making. Finally, the use of Open Source GIS allows an advanced control 
of functions and guarantees the interoperability with other programs.
5. Figures and tables
Figure 1: results of hazard assessment for tephra load at ground, for values of 1 (top), 50 (middle) and 
100 (bottom) kg/m² respectively. 
Figure 2: results of hazard assessment for tephra dispersal at FL050 (top) and 150 (down), for the 
critical value of  0.2 mg/m³ (left) and 2 mg/m³ (right) respectively.
Figure 3: Synthesis of vulnerable elements at local scale. Strategical points and population (left) and 
roads classification (right). 
Ground load Concentration at FL050 Concentration at FL150
San Jose del Sur 100 99 98 100 100 100 100
Esquipulas 99 98 91 100 100 95 95
Moyogalpa 99 91 79 100 100 97 93
Rivas 97 56 46 99 99 86 75
Granada 77 65 74 55
1 kg/m² 50 kg/m² 100 kg/m² 0.2 mg/m³ 2 mg/m³ 0.2 mg/m³ 2 mg/m³
~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0
Table 1: Table 2: Probability of having a tephra accumulation at ground of 1, 50 and 100 mg/m³ at the 
main airports of the region (results for high-magnitude scenario).
Concentration at FL050 Concentration at FL050 
2 mg/m³ 2 mg/m³
Managua Airport 57 50
Corn Island 36 43
Bluefields 40 47
Los Chiles 34 37
Liberia International 30 30
Riofrio Progreso 22 24
Barra colorado 22 27
Guapiles 16 18
Tegucicalpa
Tomalapa International
Puerto Cabezas
~10 ~10
~10 ~10
~10 ~10
Table 2: Probability of having a concentration of 2 mg/m³ at the main airports of the region (results 
for high-magnitude scenario).
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Abstract—Impacts of volcanic ash on air traffic have been
reconsidered in the aftermath of the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjal-
lajo¨kull volcano (Iceland), which caused great impacts to the
European air traffic network. We present a GIS-based method-
ology to estimate the impacts of tephra dispersal from explosive
volcanic eruptions aimed at improving air traffic management
in case of ash-contaminated airspace. We use the 2010 Eyjafjal-
lajo¨kull eruption as a case study with two main objectives: to
introduce the methodology and to perform a posteriori analysis of
the 2010 aviation breakdown. Modelling results of atmospheric
tephra dispersal over Europe build upon a reanalysis dataset of
meteorological and volcanological parameters. Given that there
is still no consensus on thresholds of ash concentration that
is critical for flight safety, the methodology takes into account
several ash concentration values. Results are hourly tables and
maps containing information on potentially affected airports and
routes at different Flight Levels (FLs). This allows estimating
impacts at a high temporal frequency. We also compute daily-
accumulated impacts for each FL. We compare our results with
the 2010 impacts. Furthermore, advantages and disadvantages
of this methodology are discussed and compared with similar
existing tools. Finally, we underline possible improvements of
the methodology and describe further work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tephra dispersal is a common phenomenon during explosive
volcanic eruptions and can affect downwind areas at regional
to global scales. It is well recognized since the first serious
jet engine aircraft encounter with ash in the 80s [9] that
ash contamination of airspace can cause short to long-term
disruptions to airports and aircraft. The knowledge in this
field has been systematized during the last decades [9], [8],
[23], [21], but the sistemic impacts were underestimated
until the Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption [3], which lasted 4 weeks
between April and May 2010 and caused the largest civil
aviation breakdown after World War II. It is estimated that
this event provoked 2.6 billion US$ losses in Europe and
impacted regional and global economy [29] highlighting the
high vulnerability of European air traffic network, particularly
to long-lasting volcanic eruptions [3].
The 2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption triggered a change of
procedures in the volcanic ash events in Europe. In fact,
the procedures in effect in 2010 were put in discussion [3].
The precautionary “zero tolerance” paradigm [23] showed
its limitations for an effective management of the European
airspace. During the eruption, the closure of airspace in
presence of low concentrations of ash was strongly criticized.
On 19th May 2010, the European Aviation Crisis Coordination
Cell (EACCC) was established, with the aim to improve pre-
paredness, enhance current procedures and ensure cooperation
for an integrated risk management [26]. One of the changes
was the introduction of the ash concentration charts, based
on quantitative thresholds. The zones of lower concentration
would not be closed to air traffic, but the operations are subject
to the Safety Risk Assessment [3], [7].
In May 2010, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) established the International Volcanic Ash Task Force
(IVATF). The IVATF comprises experts from different fields
and identified the stakeholders’ needs for the effective manage-
ment of civil aviation during explosive volcanic eruptions. One
of the most critical issues was recognized to be the estimation
of ash concentration tolerance of turbines and the definition of
ash concentration thresholds [24]. Quantitative thresholds were
first suggested by UK MET Office, accepted by EACCC [7]
and then modified by the ICAO International Volcanic Ash
Task Force [26]. There is still no consensus on the critical
values [3] and, although several tests are being performed by
manufacturers [12], this remains an open issue.
At present, there are only a few examples of air traffic
management procedures linked closely with volcanic ash
monitoring systems. Probably, the most advanced system for
managing air traffic operations in presence of volcanic ash is
the one implemented at the “Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica
e Vulcanologia” (INGV) in Catania, Italy [31]. Seismic and
plume monitoring are combined with ash dispersal models
for different eruptive scenarios to provide dispersal forecasts
every 12 hours. The system helps in managing airspace
closure in case of ash contamination from Etna volcano.
During the 2010 aviation breakout, local response strategies
were developed, some being very effective in the mitigation
of impacts. For example, the Icelandic company Icelandair
managed to move some aircraft from Keflavik (Iceland) to
Glasgow (UK), lowering the impacts of ash contamination and
maintaining their routes to North America opened [34]. During
the 2011 eruption of Cordo´n Caulle (Chile) [16], [1], Aerolinas
Argentinas and LAN Chile declared that a large percentage of
economic losses were caused by their fleet being blocked at
Bariloche airport, closed for months [2]. This issue could have
been better managed with a timely action allowing part of the
fleet to be moved elsewhere.
These examples underline the need for methodologies and
systems to support mitigation strategies, and many times
reiterated request for a higher degree of freedom in the
decision-making and management during these events by the
airlines. During the 2010 Task force meeting [26], the idea
that airlines should be able to decide whether to fly or not in
an airspace for which is forecasted to have volcanic ash was
expressed. This procedure was then implemented during the
2011 Volcanic Ash Exercise (VOLCEX) [20], an exercise that
is performed once or twice yearly in the ICAO European and
Northern Atlantic Region with the objective of improving the
response to volcanic eruptions and volcanic ash contamination.
At present, specific strategies may be applied by any airline,
after having presented and approved a Safety Risk Assessment
(SRA) [4], [13].
Here we present a methodology for a preliminary estimation
of ash dispersal impacts on civil aviation. Ash dispersal
maps and air traffic data are combined to estimate expected
impacts in form of maps, plots and tables. The methodology
is implemented within a Geographical Information System
(GIS) that allows effective data management, visualization
and post-processing of results [28]. This is the first time
that a GIS-based tool is used to assess impacts of ash on
civil aviation. The only comparable tool is EVITA (European
crisis Visualization Interactive Tool for ATFCM), a map-
based tool developed in 2010 by EUROCONTROL and used
during the last three VOLCEX exercises and the Grimsvo¨tn
eruption in 2011 [3], [4], [32]. EVITA acts as a web-based
tool and provides graphical visualization of VAAC's ash
charts, produced every 6 hours. Moreover, it is linked with
the EUROCONTROL's flight plan database and allows the
visualisation of the impacted flights in both horizontal and
vertical planes. The advantage of our methodology is that it
allows estimating hourly impacts by analysing every time step
of the ash dispersal forecast. We apply the methodology to the
2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull case-study and discuss the implications
of results for European air traffic management.
II. TEPHRA DISPERSAL MODELLING
The 2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption has been modeled using
different Tephra Transport and Dispersal Models (TTDMs)
[16], including those running at the London and Toulouse
Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers (VAACs), responsible for
issuing volcanic ash advisories in Europe [22]. For example,
Folch et al. [17] simulated 10 days of the eruption (from 14th
to 24th April 2010) using the FALL3D model [10], [18]. The
meteorological dataset was the ECMWF (European Center
for Medium-range Weather Forecasts) Era-Interim reanalysis,
produced for a computational grid having horizontal resolution
of 0.25o. The volcanological inputs relied on hourly-averaged
radar observations of plume height [17] and characterization
of the ejected material [6], [11]. It should be noted that, be-
cause a posteriori simulations use better-constrained (defined)
meteorological and volcanological model inputs, it comes at
no surprise that outcomes from reanalysis simulations can be
different from those of forecasts.
Results from TTDMs are a necessary input for subsequent
impact assessment, but transferring results to the decision-
makers is not straightforward. In fact, numerical models
produce a large amount of information, usually stored in
compact binary formats. Here we automatically generate dig-
ital ash concentration maps for each time step and vertical
level considered. There are several tools that support post-
processing of modelling results, e.g GRASS GIS [28]. Given
that we combine ash concentration maps with air traffic data
at selected Flight Levels (FLs), model results are extracted
the vertical level closest to each FL. On the other hand,
because ash concentration thresholds are still undefined, we
contemplate three different values associated to no-ash, 0.2,
and 2 mg/m3 concentration respectively. This approach has
been already adopted by recent hazard assessments from
tephra dispersal [19], [30], [33].
III. DATA MANAGEMENT
We use two types of air traffic data: spatial data in the
form of GIS maps and air traffic data in the form of database
tables. Spatial data is processed and visualized by two common
GIS software: GRASS GIS [28] and QGIS (www.qgis.org),
both open source. Air traffic data is managed and analyzed
using tailored python codes (www.python.org). Queries are
performed in Structured Query Language (SQL).
A. Spatial data
Spatial data is constituted by GIS maps containing the
main European airports and route trajectories, provided by
EUROCONTROL. For simplification, we consider only air-
ports located in the European area and routes that connect
the selected European airports. We use air traffic data for
14th 2010, corresponding to the eruption onset. In total,
the input database for the impact assessment methodology
contains 1264 airports and 22494 flights. Airports and flights
are identified in both spatial database and tables by unique
identification (ID) codes [14].
B. Air traffic data tables
We used air traffic data from the EUROCONTROL De-
mand Data Repository (DDR), in particular from the M1SO6
database that contains the last filed flight plans for all flights
in the European airspace [14]. Air traffic on Wednesday 14th
April 2010 was normal, with a total of 28157 flights, while
on 15th and 16th of April the number of flights dramatically
decreased due to the applied restrictions in Northern Europe
(I). On 17th and 18th April, the European air traffic continued
to decrease. From 17th April, the European air traffic saw a
dramatic breakdown that lasted until the 21st of April. The
rating of the day in the monthly rank (column “Position” in
Table I) underlines the evolution of the crisis, showing that the
days 17th and 18th had the lowest air traffic values in April
2010.
Fig. 1. Flight level statistics for European flights for 14th April 2010. The
histogram shows the numbers of flights (identified by an unique Flight ID)
having the cruise altitude in each FL interval. Dashed lines show the range
of eruptive column height [17]
The day 14th April, used in our analysis, is one of the top-10
days for April 2010, and therefore can be a representative day
for April air traffic in Europe. Assuming that air traffic patterns
on week days in the same period are similar, air traffic data for
14th April 2010 is used to estimate the impacts on air traffic
for the 15th and 16th April. Having discarded extra-European
flights, we take into account the 22494 flights contained in
the spatial database. Air traffic data consists of flight profiles
that are stored as 4D trajectories composed of a sequence of
segments, each having start and end time, length and Flight
Level (FL) (see [14] for details). An analysis of 14th April air
traffic was performed in order to identify the strategic FLs.
For each flight, all the trajectory segments are extracted, and
the most frequent value of FL in the en-route flight phase is
determined. For very short flights, when no value appears to
be the most frequent, we take the maximum FL value.
As the en-route phase is characterized by the relatively
constant altitude, we take the extracted most frequent (or
TABLE I
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS DURING APRIL 2010 AND MONTHLY RANK OF THE
DAY.
Day Flights Position
13 27550 12
14 28157 9
15 20528 25
16 11596 27
17 5296 29
18 5291 30
19 9504 28
20 13261 26
21 22159 22
22 27241 14
maximum for short flights) FL value as a constant en-route FL
in our methodology. Fig. 1 shows the distribution of estimated
en-route altitudes grouped by FL intervals for 14th April 2010
air traffic data. This plot underlines the importance of FLs in
the range 300-400, that together account for approximately
50% of the total flights. Given that we do not expect to have
critical ash concentration at upper FLs [17], we include FLs
150, 200 and 250, that were strongly impacted during Eyjaf-
jallajo¨kull eruption, and together account for approximately
20% of total flights. The flight levels considered are therefore
FL150, FL200, FL250.
IV. METHODOLOGY
For each hour, the area with critical ash concentration is
overlaid with the air traffic features (airports, routes) and the
disruptions are quantified. A GRASS script performs, for each
hour, three main operations: data extraction, overlap of hazard
(ash concentration) and air traffic data, and production of
results in form of tables. All extractions are performed using
SQL queries embedded into GRASS scripts.
A. Disrupted airports
The disrupted airports are identified by overlapping the
critical hourly ash concentration map and the digital map of
European airports. Impacted airports are the ones overlaid by
the ash cloud at the FLs 050, 100 and 150, where take-off and
landing operations occur.
Airports are stored as points in the GIS database, but we
create a circular buffer of user-defined radius surrounding each
airport, in order to account for its spatial extension. For each
time step, we produce a table containing the characteristics
of the airport (ID code, position). The unique ID code can
be used to connect this table to other databases and support
specific analyses.
B. Impacted flights
Disrupted flights are identified by overlapping the critical
ash concentration map and the digital map of routes, for each
hour and at each FL considered. The procedure is performed
in 5 steps that are repeated for each FL and concentration
thresholds:
1) We extract the flights scheduled in the given hourly
interval. An automated SQL query selects all flights
passing at ± 3000 feet from the FL for which the
ash concentration is calculated. We allow an overlap of
1000 feet between adjacent FLs, that is, some routes
are extracted two times, for upper and lower FLs.
Although this could lead to a slight overestimation of
impacts, this procedure allows accounting for the vertical
uncertainties on cloud location, related to the modelling
output.
2) We overlap selected flights at FL ± 3000 ft and ash
concentration chart, identifying the ones that may be
impacted.
3) For the intersected flights, we extract the waypoints and
the corresponding segments scheduled for the time step.
Fig. 2. Visualization of hourly impacts on European air traffic. The script exports graphical output in shp format, that can be visualized by any GIS system.
The example shows airports impacted at FL050 (left) and routes impacted at FL150 (right), for 15th April, from 11:00 UTC to 12:00 UTC at FL150. Impacted
routes are visualized with green, yellow and red color, respectively for low, medium and high impact. Note that few flights were present at FL150, which is
coherent with FL statistics (Fig. 1).
TABLE II
QUALITATIVE IMPACT CLASSIFICATION DEFINED FOR IMPACTED ROUTES,
BASED ON THE PERCENTAGE OF ROUTE DISRUPTED.
Lenght disrupted x(%) Impact Impact rating Strategy
x <10% Low 1 Small deviation
10% <x <80% Medium 2 Change FL
x >80% High 3 Not flying
4) We select the segments that are intersected by ash cloud.
5) For each time step, we produce a table containing the
characteristics of the whole flight (length, duration). We
then calculate the disrupted length and consequently the
percentage of the route that is impacted by ash.
Based on the impacted length, we distinguish three qualitative
levels of impact: low (disrupted portion lower than 10%),
medium (disrupted portion between 10% and 80%), and high
(disrupted portion greater than 80%) (Table II). Criteria of 10%
and 80% have been chosen according to our personal opinions
and considerations, and can be changed. This criterion can be
associated also with a limitation on impacted length in km,
in order to include long distance and intercontinental flights.
Finally, hypothesizing a constant speed of the aircraft, we
estimate the exposure time.
V. RESULTS
We produced two hourly tables containing information on
impacted airports and routes. As an example, Table III contains
length and duration of disrupted flights, and the percentage
of length impacted by ash cloud, value used to estimate
the qualitative impact level. Results correspond to the 15th
April, from 11:00 UTC to 12:00 UTC at FL150. Having
calculated the percentage length impacted by ash cloud, the
corresponding impact level is assigned.
Fig. 3. Hourly impacts on airports for 15th and 16th April 2010 (48 hours)
at FL050. The plot shows the number of impacted airports for the critical ash
concentration threshold considered (zero tolerance, 0.2 and 2 mg/m3). Note
that the Y-Axis has logarithmic scale.
For every hour, we also produce a graphical output of the
expected impacts. For example, Fig. 2 shows the impacts on
airports (left) and routes (right) for 15th April, from 11:00 to
12:00 UTC at FL050 for airports and FL150 for routes. Finally,
we produce plots to summarize the impacts for the whole day
or period. Fig. 3 summarizes impacts on airports, collecting
all hourly information generated by the automated impact
assessment methodology. We estimate the number of impacted
airports for 15th and 16th April at FL050, relevant for take-
off and landing operations, for the three critical thresholds of
ash concentration considered. There is a peak in the number
of impacted airports, considering the FL050, corresponding to
TABLE III
HOURLY IMPACTED ROUTES FOR 15th APRIL, 11:00 TO 12:00 UTC.
TABLE CONTAINS THE UNIQUE ROUTE ID, TOTAL AND DISRUPTED (“DIS”)
LENGTH AND DURATION (IN KM AND MINUTES, RESPECTIVELY),
PERCENTAGE OF DISRUPTED LENGTH AND THE QUALITATIVE IMPACT
RATING ASSOCIATED TO EACH FLIGHT (TABLE II)
Flight ID Time
tot
(min)
Length
tot
(km)
Length
dis
(km)
Time
dis
(min)
Length
dis
(%)
Impact
135200495 33 247 221 29 89 3
135200372 34 268 252 32 94 3
135195266 268 974 172 47 18 2
135199465 57 582 343 34 59 2
135199991 38 436 334 29 77 2
135200164 48 545 327 28 60 2
135199526 40 425 280 26 66 2
135200166 68 782 257 22 33 2
135197704 141 656 139 30 22 2
135199822 66 697 74 7 11 2
135199382 73 605 65 8 11 2
135197704 141 646 54 12 8 1
135199866 36 251 17 2 7 1
approximately 15:00 UTC of 16th April 2010.
Fig. 4 shows the hourly impacted routes for 15th and 16th
April. Results have been produced for the critical thresholds at
the considered FL (150, 200 and 250 from top to bottom). This
figure allows visualizing the temporal evolution of impacts
during the peak days of the emergency. Maximum impacts
correspond to 16th April, 04.00 pm and 15th April, 13:00 and
07:00 UTC, respectively for FLs 150, 200 and 250. Highest
disruptions are estimated at FL150 and FL200, while at FL250
only few flights would be highly impacted according to the
analysis.
During the 2010 crisis, a high percentage of European
flights were cancelled, as documented in the EUROCON-
TROL's Monthly Network Operations report for April 2010
[15], and the levels of European air traffic dramatically de-
creased due to the partial closure of European airspace (Table
I). We compare the number of cancelled routes on 15th and
16th April 2010 [15] and the expected impacts resulting from
our analysis for the zero tolerance criterion (Table IV). Table
IV shows a high difference in the number of cancelled routes.
VI. DISCUSSION
The ultimate aim of this work is to support the decision-
making process, taking the highest advantage of the modelling
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF TOTAL NUMBER OF CANCELLED ROUTES ON 15th-16th
APRIL 2010 AND ESTIMATED NUMBER OF IMPACTED ROUTES IN THIS
STUDY.
Day 2010 This study
15th April 7736 170
16th April 16938 208
output and transferring the relevant information to decision-
makers. The final decision on whether to fly or not is not
addressed in this document, but we aim to support this decision
with the highest amount of information available.
First, the methodology presented here takes into account
the developments done by the modelling community. Given
that Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption has been carefully studied and
input parameters are relatively well constrained, modelling
is expected to give reliable outputs. Moreover, although ash
charts are provided by VAACs every 6 to 12 hours, modelling
results can have a higher temporal resolution, e.g. on the order
of 0.5-2 hours. A higher temporal resolution allows to transfer
information to the stakeholders in a more dynamic way. In
fact, by estimating impacts at each time-step (one hour in our
study), the improvements achieved in the estimation of ash
concentration could be transferred to the decision-makers with
the highest possible temporal and spatial resolution. This is
particularly true with the implementation of new cutting-edge
techniques such as data-assimilation, which is a suitable and
not-so-far-fetched achievement for the scientific community
[16]. These techniques could increase the accuracy of results
[5], [17].
Results for the Eyjafjallajo¨kull case-study can be useful
for two main reasons: evaluation of what occurred during
2010 eruption with an hourly-based analysis, and possible
integration of this methodology within current strategies. Re-
sults produced for each time step (Table III) would provide
a more dynamic and timely information basis for managing
disruptions than is the case with 6-hour forecasts. The calcu-
lation of length of disrupted segments and elapsed travel time
through ash cloud is of particular interest. In fact, if critical ash
ingestion rate is defined, these parameters may be integrated in
the impact assessment methodology. It should be stressed that
this comparison performed in Table IV is biased by the fact
that, in 2010, results of the forecast were different from the
ones used in this study. Moreover, it has been stated that many
flight cancellations were not directly caused by the presence of
ash, but were the consequence of the airspace closures (based
on the forecasted ash presence). For these reasons, although
the 2010 aviation breakdown has been widely studied in recent
years, it is not straightforward to compare what occurred with
a posteriori analysis. However, this comparison underlines the
order of magnitude of differences between the 2010 impacts
and the ones expected today. The aim of this comparison is
not to criticize the air traffic management during 2010 but to
underline the enormous opportunities for improvement in this
field.
Results of a posteriori numerical modelling performed by
Folch et al. [17] show that at FLs 300, 350 and 400 there
was no critical concentration of 2 or 0.2 mg/m3. If follows
that changing altitudes to the upper FLs would have been
possible, at least for the aircraft with the necessary technical
characteristics. For this reason, the strategy of changing FL
seems suitable for long-lasting eruptions with low eruptive
columns, for the flights that are able to take-off (climb/descent
is not impeded by ash presence).
Fig. 4. Hourly impacts for 15th and 16th April 2010 for FL 150, 200 and 250 (from top to bottom). The plot shows the number of impacted routes for the
critical ash concentration threshold in case of zero tolerance (blue) and for the thresholds of 0.2 and 2 mg/m3 (red and yellow, respectively)
One important difference between the impact assessment
methodology presented here and the one implemented within
EVITA is that EVITA shows the effects for every 6 hours,
while our methodology allows the estimation of impacts at
every time step of the ash dispersal forecast. In addition, the
operational automated forecast can be produced every few
hours (depending on the resolution of the domain and the
complexity of the eruptive scenario, but indicatively every 2-3
hours). This would allow to update the expected impacts with
higher temporal frequency.
Both EVITA and the methodology presented here improve
graphical outputs, compared with the initial tabular formats
strongly criticized by several stakeholders [25], [27], [4]. In the
case of EVITA, the graphical aspect received positive feedback
during the VOLCEX exercises [4]. Our hourly maps are read-
able by GIS and Google Earth, which helps to better visualise
results. Moreover, it supports the production of animations of
the evolution of impacts. The use of these formats could also
enhance the interoperability between different stakeholders
and ultimately the communication and information manage-
ment.
The methodology presented here is a first academic at-
tempt to support civil aviation management in cases of ash-
contaminated airspace. We are aware that this topic is very
complex, and that we need to introduce improvements in order
to produce a methodology that is flexible, adaptable and effi-
cient. Table V synthesizes the main limitations and advantages
of the methodology, as well as the possible improvements. On
one hand, the impact assessment methodology relies on strong
assumptions that greatly simplify the real processes, and is
not operational yet. On the other hand, the main advantage
of this methodology is that it links ash dispersal modelling
and civil aviation management by providing the hourly results
from the modelling output, which has a great practical value
for decision makers, especially for the airlines, during the
volcanic ash event. Further advantage is that this methodology
can potentially be interfaced with results coming from any ash
dispersal model, and is therefore model-independent.
TABLE V
MAIN LIMITATIONS AND ADVANTAGES OF THE METHODOLOGY. POSSIBLE
IMPROVEMENTS ARE UNDERLINED FOR FUTURE WORK.
Limitations Advantages Improvements
Strong
assumptions
Link science and
management
Economic aspect
Not operational Synhtesis Become operational
Hourly analysis Include probabilistic
forecast
Model-
independent
We identify three main roads for the future development
of the presented methodology: including the economic anal-
ysis, interfacing this methodology with a probabilistic ash
dispersal forecast, and integrating the methodology into a
broader operational framework. First, the combined analysis
of our results and the economic impact estimated for the
2010 crisis could help clarifying the process of propagation of
impacts from civil aviation to society. Although the definition
of economic impacts of civil aviation breakdowns is extremely
difficult due to the multitude of variables involved, an effort
should be made to include it in a broader multi-disciplinary
methodology. Second, this methodology could have as input
a probabilistic forecast, that is, a forecast constructed of
many forecasts produced by varying the eruptive scenario.
The ensemble of these forecasts would produce a probabilistic
output, allowing to account for the uncertainties related to the
modelling process. The probabilistic approach would strongly
support new impact assessment methodologies.
Third, the GIS-based methodology presented here could
also be integrated in the existing risk management strategies
for civil aviation management such as VOLCEX exercises
and SRAs. The implementation of the impact assessment
methodology presented here, far from being straightforward,
could enable the stakeholders to define operational strategies
within their long-term plans, that would need to be supported
by the input data (operational ash dispersal forecast and air
traffic). Furthermore, the design of the reliable and user-
friendly decision-support tool would greatly improve the use-
fulness of the methodology to the end users. Our contribution
could therefore improve the current risk management strategies
by supporting the decision-making process, in order to increase
preparedness and eventually minimize losses.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work presents the first example of GIS-based ash
dispersal impact assessment especially designed for civil avia-
tion purposes. The impact assessment methodology presented
here is a valid result in itself, and may be applied to other
case-studies or implemented in a broader short-term risk
management operational strategy. Specific results presented for
Eyjafjallajo¨kull 2010 eruption allow to perform a posteriori
analysis of impacts and identify the critical issues to solve.
Finally, this is a first attempt of filling a gap between ash
dispersal modelling and civil aviation management, allowing
to use the full potential of the model outcomes, and to produce
practical results that can support an effective management of
civil aviation during explosive volcanic eruptions.
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Appendix C
Web-based survey
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Page 1
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The ongoing research is focused on volcanic ash dispersal in atmosphere and its impacts on civil aviation. We are currently developing a map­
based tool that allows estimating expected hourly impacts by an explosive volcanic eruption.  
 
This survey aims at collecting the opinion of different stakeholders involved in civil aviation management during explosive volcanic eruptions. 
Understanding the opinion of stakeholders on ash dispersal models, temporal resolution, data management and output formats will improve 
the ongoing reserarch and be the the basis for further developments. 
 
Survey is anonymous. The results of this survey are for scientific research purposes only. Please fill­in the survey only one time. Duplicate 
entries will be discarded. The survey takes aproximately 15 minutes. 
 
Please, feel free to contact me at chiara.scaini@bsc.es for any question you may need for answering the survey. 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time! 
 
Introduction
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1. Choose your area of expertise:
2. How many years have you been working in each of these sectors? 
3. Where is your working experience based? (Multiple answers allowed)
4. Check the box that corresponds to your age group:
 
1­ Personal
*
Atmospheric modeling
Field and monitoring sciences
Civil aviation management
Civil aviation activities
Other activities
 
Atmospheric modeling (e.g. ash dispersal modelers, meteorologists)
 
gfedc
Field and monitoring sciences (e.g. geologists, monitoring experts)
 
gfedc
Civil aviation management (e.g. public and private, international and national regulators and associations, airlines)
 
gfedc
Civil aviation employees (e.g. pilots, crew, controllers, CAA employees)
 
gfedc
Other stakeholder (e.g. services / activities connected to aviation)
 
gfedc
Specify 
Europe
 
gfedc
Africa
 
gfedc
North­America
 
gfedc
South­America
 
gfedc
Asia
 
gfedc
Oceania
 
gfedc
< 30
 
nmlkj
> 30 and < 40
 
nmlkj
> 40 and < 50
 
nmlkj
> 50 and < 60
 
nmlkj
> 60
 
nmlkj
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5. Are you familiar with the input of volcanic ash transport and dispersal models?
 
2 ­ Volcanic Ash Transport and Dispersal Models
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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6. Are you an atmospheric modeler or field scientist?
 
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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7. Amongst the following list, choose the parameters that, in your opinion and to your 
knowledge, are used as input for volcanic ash transport and dispersal models (Multiple 
answers allowed).
 
*
 
Wind field
 
gfedc
Temperature
 
gfedc
Humidity
 
gfedc
Precipitation rate
 
gfedc
Column height
 
gfedc
Vertical mass distribution
 
gfedc
Mass eruption rate
 
gfedc
Total grain size distribution of particles
 
gfedc
Particle size
 
gfedc
Exit velocity
 
gfedc
Cloud height
 
gfedc
Ash concentration
 
gfedc
N/A
 
gfedc
Other (specify) 
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8. Here is a list of the input data commonly used by volcanic ash transport and 
dispersal models. Which is, in your opinion and to your knowledge, the level of 
uncertainty associated with these data?
 
*
Very low 
uncertainty
Low uncertainty
Medium 
uncertainty
High uncertainty
Very high 
uncertainty
N/A
Wind field nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Temperature nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Humidity nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Precipitation rate nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Column height nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Vertical mass distribution nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Mass eruption rate nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Total grain size 
distribution of particles
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Percentage of fine ash nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Aggregation coefficient nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Particle size nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Exit velocity nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Cloud height (satellite 
retrieval, for data 
assimilation)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Cloud load (satellite 
retrieval, for data 
assimilation)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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9. To which degree you think SO2 released by explosive vocanic eruptions in 
atmosphere can be hazardous for civil aviation?
 
*
No impact Very low impact Low impact Medium impact High impact Very high impact N/A
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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10. Are you familiar with the output of volcanic ash dispersal models (e.g volcanic 
ash cloud extent, ash concentration charts)? 
 
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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11. Do you directly or indirectly use the outputs of ash dispersal models during 
explosive volcanic eruptions? 
 
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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12. For which purposes do you use outputs of volcanic ash dispersal models? (Multiple 
answers allowed)
13. Which output formats from ash dispersal models do you use? (Multiple answers 
allowed)
 
 
Emergency management
 
gfedc
Air quality assessment during explosive eruptions
 
gfedc
Civil aviation management during explosive eruptions
 
gfedc
Airline management
 
gfedc
Air quality management
 
gfedc
Long­term civil aviation management
 
gfedc
Long­term territorial planning
 
gfedc
Research
 
gfedc
Other (specify) 
NetCDF/HDF5
 
gfedc
Grib
 
gfedc
Other binary
 
gfedc
Text files (e.g. ASCII, txt, SIGMET, NOTAM)
 
gfedc
Ash concentration maps (e.g. pdf)
 
gfedc
Ash concentration maps, image format (e.g. jpeg, bmp, ps)
 
gfedc
Digital map (any raster or vector format)
 
gfedc
Other (specify) 
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14. Which is your level of agreement with the introduction of a "standard output" (still 
under development) of volcanic ash dispersal models?
15. Do you think that the introduction of standart model output formats could enhance 
interoperability between VAACs?
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Indifferent Agree Strongly agree N/A
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
N/A
 
nmlkj
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16. Are you familiar with the graphical outputs of ash dispersal models presented in 
the figures below? Answer Y/N in the column “Familiar”. Also, rate their usability for 
your work in the corresponding column.
FIgure 1 ­ Ash cloud extent (raster format)
 
 
*
Familiar Usability
Raster image (Fig. 1) 6 6
Cloud extent map (Fig 2) 6 6
Cloud extent map in Google Earth ( Fig. 3) 6 6
Ash concentration curves (Fig. 4) 6 6
Arrival time curves (Fig. 5) 6 6
Residence time curves (Fig. 6) 6 6
Probability curves for ash concentration (Fig. 7) 6 6
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Figure 2 ­ Map showing one contour for the extent of ash contamination at given 
concentration threshold and FL
Figure 3 ­ Kml file of ash cloud extent
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Figure 4 ­ Map with several contours for many ash concentration values
 
Figure 5 ­ Contours of arrival time for given ash concentration and FL
 
Page 15
Volcanic
Figure 6 ­ Contours of residence times for given ash concentration and FL
 
Figure 7 ­ Contours for probability of having ash concentration higher than a defined 
threshold, at a given FL. These maps are result of an ensemble modeling.
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17. How much do you agree with the use of the following methods to define 
thresholds for allowing aircraft to fly or not into ash­contaminated airspaces? And how 
do your think each method is applicable (= it may be used operationally)? Express your 
opinion at a world­wide level and/or for the European area.
 
3­ Ash concentration thresholds
*
Agree ­ Worldwide
Applicability ­ 
Worldwide
Agree ­ Europe Applicability ­ Europe
Zero tolerance 6 6 6 6
Visible ash 6 6 6 6
Discernible ash (discerned by satellite 
imagery and other indirect measures)
6 6 6 6
Ash concentration based on forecast 6 6 6 6
Ash concentration based on on­board 
instrumentation detection
6 6 6 6
Engine rate (amount of ash ingested per 
unit of area, mg/m²)
6 6 6 6
Engine dose (engine rate for time unit, 
mg/m²·s)
6 6 6 6
Some combination of the above 6 6 6 6
 
Other (specify) 
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18. What does “short term” mean in your field of expertise? (Multiple answers allowed)
19. What does “long­term” mean in your field of expertise? (Multiple answers allowed)
 
4 ­ Temporal resolution
 
< 10 minutes
 
gfedc
10 minutes to 1 hour
 
gfedc
1 to 24 hours
 
gfedc
1 to 5 days
 
gfedc
5 days to 1 month
 
gfedc
1 month to 1 year
 
gfedc
> 1 year
 
gfedc
Other (specify) 
> 10 years
 
gfedc
10 to 1 year
 
gfedc
1 year to 1 months
 
gfedc
1 month to 5 days
 
gfedc
5 days to 24 hours
 
gfedc
24 to 1 hour
 
gfedc
< 1 hour
 
gfedc
Other (specify) 
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20. If an explosive volcanic eruption takes place, how often do you or your organization 
ISSUE information related to volcanic ash transport and dispersal in atmosphere? By 
information we mean all formats related to ash dispersal modeling in atmosphere: ash 
dispersal modeling outputs, VAA (Volcanic Ash Advisory), VAC (Volcanic Ash Chart), 
SIGMET (Significant Meteorological Information), NOTAM (Notice To Airman), etc. 
21. How often would you like to RECEIVE information related to volcanic ash transport 
and dispersal in atmosphere to perform your task? By information we mean all formats 
related to ash dispersal modeling in atmosphere: ash dispersal modeling outputs, VAA 
(Volcanic Ash Advisory), VAC (Volcanic Ash Chart), SIGMET (Significant Meteorological 
Information), NOTAM (Notice To Airman), etc. (Multiple answers allowed)
 
 
less than once a day
 
nmlkj
every 24 to 12 hours
 
nmlkj
every 12 to 6 hours
 
nmlkj
every 6 to 1 hour
 
nmlkj
every 1 hour to 10 minutes
 
nmlkj
less than 10 minutes
 
nmlkj
I do not issue information related to volcanic eruptions
 
nmlkj
Other (specify) 
every 24 to 12 hours
 
gfedc
every 12 to 6 hours
 
gfedc
every 6 to 1 hour
 
gfedc
< 1 hour
 
gfedc
I do not use/need information related to volcanic eruptions
 
gfedc
Other (specify) 
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22. Are you dealing with management in aviation in case of explosive volcanic 
eruptions?
 
5 ­ Air traffic management during explosive volcanic eruptions
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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23. How useful is, in your experience, each of the data type listed below for air traffic 
management BEFORE explosive volcanic eruption take place?
24. How useful is, in your experience, each of the data type listed below for air traffic 
management DURING an explosive volcanic eruption?
 
Useless Of little use Useful Very useful
Extremely 
useful
N/A
Meteorological data nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Volcanological data (expected eruptive 
scenarios)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Hazard assessment results (probabilistic 
hazard maps produced for expected 
eruptive scenarios)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Flight trajectories, flight plans similar data 
sources
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Location of airports nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Aircraft or engine type nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Useless Of little use Useful Very useful
Extremely 
useful
N/A
Total grain size distribution nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Particle composition nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Temporal series of column height nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Meteorological data nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Satellite imagery nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Ash dispersal maps (modelling outputs) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Aircraft trajectory (constituted by a set of 
segments and way­points)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Scheduled flights, last filed flight plans or 
similar data source
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Location of airports nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Airport status (closed/open) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Airspace status (danger zones, open/closed 
airspace)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Data from on­board instrumentation nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Aircraft or engine type nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
Other (specify) 
Other (specify) 
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25. Are you familiar with GIS (Geographical Information Systems)?
 
6 ­ Use of GIS
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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26. Please, answer Yes, No or N/A to the following questions:
27. Which is your level of agreement with these sentences? 
 
Yes No N/A
How often do you get in touch with digital maps (raster images, vectorial files)? nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Is anybody in your working environment using GIS? nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Is anybody in your working environment using raster images? nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Are you familiar with Database Management Systems? nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Are you familiar with spatial Database Management Systems? nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Do you think GIS may support your current work? nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree Indifferent Agree
Strongly 
agree
N/A
GIS is suitable for visualization and processing of 3D 
variables
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
GIS is suitable for visualization and processing of time 
series
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
GIS is suitable for visualization and processing of 
satellite images
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
GIS allows automating spatial analysis operations nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
GIS programs having a graphical interface (e.g. 
ArcGIS, QGIS) are easier to use
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Command­line based GiS programs (e.g.GRASS, 
GMT) are faster in performing spatial analysis tasks
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Command­line based GiS programs (e.g.GRASS, 
GMT) allow higher customization of functions
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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We are developing a tool to estimate the impacts produced by an explosive volcanic eruption on civil aviation (to be 
presented at the Third Sesar Innovation Days, 26­28 November 2013).  
 
Inputs of the tool are volcanic ash dispersal forecasts and air traffic data. Given these data, the tool estimates hourly 
impacts expected (flights disrupted, airports closed).  
28. Our GIS­based tool allows to post­process the output of ash dispersal models 
and produce hourly maps of ash concentration. To which extent would the production 
of hourly maps of ash concentration be useful for your work?
29. Our GIS­based tool estimates expected impacts for a temporal resolution of one 
hour, which may be increased depending on the user's needs. To which extent would 
the production of hourly impact maps be useful for your work?
 
7­ Current research: impacts of volcanic ash dispersal on civil aviation
*
Not useful Indifferent Useful Very useful Extremely useful N/A
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
*
Not useful Indifferent Useful Very useful Extremely useful N/A
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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30. If impacts were to be classified in a qualitative way, which kind of classification 
would you prefer? 
31. if impacts were to be classified on qualitative way, which of these methods would 
you use to define an indicator of impact produced by volcanic ash contamination on a 
given flight? Multiple answers allowed)
 
 
2 classes (low ­ high)
 
nmlkj
3 classes (low – medium ­ high)
 
nmlkj
5 classes (very low – low – medium – high – very high)
 
nmlkj
7 classes (very low – low – low to medium – medium – medium to high – high ­ very high)
 
nmlkj
None of these
 
nmlkj
N/A
 
nmlkj
Other (specify) 
Flight distance through ash cloud (km)
 
gfedc
Flight time trough ash cloud (sec)
 
gfedc
Percentage of flight length through ash cloud
 
gfedc
Percentage of flight time through ash cloud
 
gfedc
Other (specify) 
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32. For each type of hourly result produced by the tool, estimate its usefulness for 
your work. 
33. For each output format produced by the tool and displayed below, rate its 
usability for your work
FIgure 8 ­ Example of hourly table produced by the GIS­based tool. Table contains 
disrupted flights ID, lenght and duration of disruption (respectively in km and minutes) 
and percentage of disruption on the total flight lenght. A qualitative impact classification 
is associated to the percentage of disruption. Similar tables can be produced for 
airports and FIRS.
 
 
*
Not useful Indifferent Useful Very useful
Extremely 
useful
N/A
Expected airports impacted nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Expected routes disrupted (length) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Expected airspaces impacted (Flight Information 
Regions (FIR) and Upper Information Regions (UIR))
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
*
Not useful Indifferent Useful Very useful Extremely useful N/A
Hourly table (Fig. 8) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Time series (Fig. 9) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
GIS map (Fig. 10) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Google Earth (Fig. 11) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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Figure 9 ­ Example of time series produced for 48­hours time interval. Plot shows hourly 
number of disrupted flights for given ash concentration thresholds and FL. Similar 
plots can be produced for airports and FIRS. Re
Figure 10 ­ Example of hourly GIS maps of disrupted airports (left) and flights (right). 
Disrupted flight segments are displayed in a colour­scale according to the impact 
assessment. Similar results can be produced for FIRS.
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Figure 11 ­ Example of hourly KML map (visualized in Google Earth) of ash plume and 
impacted flights. The KML file contains basic information (flight ID, impact 
classification). Similar results can be produced for airports and FIRS. 
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Our GIS­based tool (still under development) will allow user interaction. The user will be able to select parameters of 
impact assessment analysis, producing specific results (for example, impacts expected for a specific company and 
geographical area). The choice must be coherent with data availability and temporal and spatial resolution of tephra 
dispersal moodeling output.  
34. As a possible end­user of the impact assessment tool, would you like to select the 
input paramteters and produce specific results? 
35. Which parameters of impact assessment analysis would you select in order to 
produce specific results? (Multiple answer allowed). 
 
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
Ash concentration thresholds
 
gfedc
FLs
 
gfedc
Time frequency
 
gfedc
Time interval of the analysis
 
gfedc
Geographical area
 
gfedc
FIR
 
gfedc
Airline
 
gfedc
Airport selection
 
gfedc
Specific route
 
gfedc
City­pairs
 
gfedc
Other (specify) 
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36. Which are, in your opinion, the IMPACTS and the IMPROVEMENTS introduced by 
the procedures and techniques listed below (introduced or emphasized after 2010) on 
civil aviation management during volcanic eruptions? (By impact we mean the 
amount/relevance of changes induced).
 
8 ­ Recent developments
Impact Improvement
Use of probabilistic eruptive scenarios based on event tree (methodology to define eruptive 
scenarios based on previous knowledge, experts judgments and statistical inference)
6 6
Improvement of monitoring (ground­based or satellite) 6 6
Development of opportunistic measurements (measurement flights performed during the eruption, 
close to the volcano or in distal areas with forecasted ash presence)
6 6
Development of on­board instruments for particle detection and cloud avoidance 6 6
Data assimilation 6 6
Ensemble forecast (probabilistic) 6 6
Safety Risk Assessment (Mandatory for airlines in order to fly through ash­contaminated airspace.) 6 6
New aircraft maintenance protocols 6 6
Crew specific training 6 6
EVITA (Map­based tool developed by Eurocontrol to display information related to air traffic and 
volcanic ash dispersal. Activated in case of volcanic eruptions.)
6 6
VOLCEX (Exercise organized twice a year by ICAO in order to improve preparedness of 
stakeholders involved in civil aviation management during volcanic eruptions.)
6 6
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37. Recent developments in volcanic risk management (event trees, bayesian expers 
systems) support the definition of a priori eruptive scenarios. Did you know about the 
possibility of producing a priori forecasts?
 
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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38. How much do you agree with the following sentences? 
 
Totally 
disagree
Disagree Indifferent Agree Totally agree N/A
Uncertainties on ash concentration calculated by ash 
dispersal models decrease after the eruption onset, 
when input parameters are more known by monitoring 
and satellite observations.
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Uncertainties related to a priori forecast are not 
acceptable with the current scientific and technical 
knowledge.
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Uncertainties related to a priori forecast are acceptable 
only for very well­known and well­monitored volcanic 
systems.
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Having an a priori forecast in the unrest phase 
improves preparedness.
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Having an a priori forecast in the unrest phase could 
support air traffic management during unrest.
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Having an a priori forecast during the unrest phase can 
be confusing for the stakeholders involved in air traffic 
maangement.
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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39. To which extent do you use probabilistic data while performing your task in the 
following situations? And to which extent would you use probabilistic data if they were 
available to you?
 
9 ­ Probabilistic framework
USE WOULD USE
In your daily work 6 6
Before explosive volcanic eruptions 6 6
During explosive volcanic eruptions 6 6
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40. In your area of expertise, which is the range that is commonly considered as “low” 
probability?
41. In your area of expertise, which is the range that is commonly considered as “high” 
probability?
 
 
< 0.001 %
 
gfedc
0.001 to 0.01 %
 
gfedc
0.01 to 0.1%
 
gfedc
0.1 to 1%
 
gfedc
1 to 10%
 
gfedc
> 10 %
 
gfedc
N/A
 
gfedc
0.001 to 0.01 %
 
gfedc
0.01 to 0.1%
 
gfedc
0.1 to 1%
 
gfedc
1 to 10%
 
gfedc
10 to 50 %
 
gfedc
50 to 80 %
 
gfedc
> 80 %
 
gfedc
N/A
 
gfedc
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42. Recent developments in ash dispersal modelling suggest that, in a near future, 
outcomes of ash dispersal models may be probabilistic. What does it mean to you? 
(Multiple answers allowed)
 
 
Some inputs of ash dispersal models are probabilistic
 
gfedc
All inputs of ash dispersal models are probabilistic
 
gfedc
Uncertainty associated with inputs of ash dispersal models is taken into account
 
gfedc
Some outputs of ash dispersal models are probabilistic
 
gfedc
All outputs of ash dispersal models are probabilistic
 
gfedc
Deterministic results of many ash dispersal models are combined to obtain probabilistic results
 
gfedc
Uncertainty associated with results of ash dispersal models is taken into account
 
gfedc
N/A
 
gfedc
Other (specify) 
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43. Which is your level of agreement with these sentences? 
44. Which is your overall level of agreement with the introduction of probabilistic 
framework in your work?
 
Strongly 
disagree
Disagree Indifferent Agree
Strongly 
agree
N/A
Probabilistic framework allows accounting for model 
uncertainties
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Deterministic approach is easier to understand nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Probabilistic framework allows to account for expert 
opinions
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Probabilistic framework reduces safety nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
*
Strongly disagree Disagree Indifferent Agree Strongly agree N/A
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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45. We have noticed that some commonly used terms in risk management have 
different meanings or connotation amongst the surveyed groups. Have you ever 
experienced it?
46. Amongst the concepts listed below, which may be a source of misunderstanding 
while communicating with other group of stakeholders?
 
10 ­ Sources of misunderstanding
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
Eruptive scenario
 
gfedc
Threshold
 
gfedc
Acceptable risk
 
gfedc
Forecast
 
gfedc
Safety
 
gfedc
Airworthiness
 
gfedc
Strategy
 
gfedc
Action
 
gfedc
Procedure
 
gfedc
Harmonization
 
gfedc
Timely
 
gfedc
Confidence
 
gfedc
Uncertainty
 
gfedc
Other (specify) 
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47. Have you ever participated in a survey specifically designed for volcanic ash 
impacts on civil  
aviation?
48. Do you think that the communication and information flow amongst different 
stakeholders inolved in air traffic management during explosive volcanic eruptions 
should be improved?
 
12 ­ Feedback
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
N/A
 
nmlkj
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
N/A
 
nmlkj
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Thank you very much for your time! 
 
